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ABSTRACT 
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SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
Doctor of Philosophy 
ACCOUNTING PRACTICES IN THE TANZANIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
AUTHORITIES (LGAs): THE GROUNDED THEORY OF MANIPULATING 
LEGITIMACY 
by Siasa Issa Mzenzi 
This research investigates accounting practices in four Tanzanian Local Government 
Authorities  (LGAs).  It  seeks  to  understand  how  accounting  is  practiced  and  the 
situations which sustain its undertaking. The peculiar role of local governments in the 
delivery of public services and the influence of accounting on the same has motivated 
this study (Lapsley & Mussari, 2008). It has also been driven by the inadequacy of 
interpretive theoretically based informed studies into public sector entities, and the 
limited accounting research in the emerging economies (Goddard, 2010). 
  The  study  applies  an  interpretive  approach  to  investigate  accounting  in  the 
organisations  in  which  it  operates  (Ahrens  &  Mollona,  2007),  and  executes  a 
grounded theory method to develop a theory systematically from the raw data (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967). In order to ensure the general application of the emergent theory 
beyond the case studies, the development of a formal grounded theory was sought. 
  This research revealed that the operations of the Tanzanian LGAs were constrained 
by  factors  such  as  deficient  regulatory  systems,  political  interference,  donors’ 
influences, and funding uncertainties. These conditions forced the technocrats to use 
important accounting practices, such as budgeting, auditing, financial reporting, and 
performance measurement to manipulate the organisational legitimacy. The process of 
legitimacy manipulation ensured the availability of resources for the LGAs and the 
attainment of the individual interests of the Councils’ officials. 
  This study contributes to the interpretive approach in emerging economies. Also, 
meta-coding, intra-relationships of categories, and development of formal grounded 
theory, add new insights to the grounded theory analysis. It is also worth noting that 
the study integrates the emergent theory within the New Institutional Sociology (NIS) 
framework. It was not intended to test NIS, but rather, to adopt it as a theoretical lens 
that assisted interpretation of the research findings. In the NIS framework, the study 
establishes  the  simultaneous  achievement  of  legitimacy  and  efficiency,  recognises 
multiple sources of loose coupling, and the influence of performance management on 
shaping  accounting  practices  in  the  public  sector  organisations.  It  also  offers  the 
micro reactions of the Councils’ officials, and recognises the different patterns of the 
officials’ responses across Councils and service deliveries. The study argues that in 
emerging economies considerations of a country’s local contexts has the potential to 
minimise  any  counter-productivity  of  reform  programs.  Moreover,  this  research 
appeals for a holistic approach to the reform programs, harmonization of laws and 
regulations,  the  institution  of  efficient  financial  management  and  reporting 
mechanisms, and the improvement of employee welfare in the Tanzanian Councils.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1  Background Information and Rationale of the Research 
This research investigated accounting practices in the Tanzanian Local Government 
Authorities (LGAs). The lack of attention given to public sector accounting research 
in  emerging  economies  motivated  this  study.  The  premise  of  this  study  was  that 
despite the increase of public sector accounting research in the developed countries, 
the same has not been effectively extended to the emerging economies (Goddard, 
2010). Because public sector accounting research is context specific (Broadbent & 
Guthrie, 2008), its inadequacy in the emerging economies has limited theoretical and 
practical understanding of how accounting has been implicated in these countries. 
When  compared  to  the  developed  countries,  the  emerging  economies  have  very 
different political, social, economic, and cultural settings, all of which equally affect 
the  actual  undertaking  of  accounting  practices  (Hopper,  Tsamenyi,  Uddin,  & 
Wickramasinghe,  2009;  Tambulasi,  2007;  Tsamenyi,  Onumah,  &  Tetteh-Kumah, 
2010;  Uddin,  Gumb,  &  Kasumba,  2011).  Arguably,  some  of  the  observations 
originating from the developed countries cannot adequately explain the way in which 
accounting has been practiced in the emerging economies (Hopper et al., 2009), and 
its  potential  role  in  the  development  of  these  countries  and  their  communities 
(Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008). Thus, the main focus of this research was to 
understand how accounting is practiced in the context of emerging economies. 
 
Also, this research recognised a number of reforms introduced into the public sector 
entities in the wake of New Public Management (NPM) and their related impacts on 
the organisational operations (Hood, 1991, 1995). Given their unique position, local 
governments  were  highly  affected  by  these  reforms  (Chandler,  2008;  Chandler, 
2010).  The  reforms  generally  modernised  the  Local  Government  Organisations 
(LGOs) through the adoption of the private sector management practices, such as 
benchmarking, balanced score cards, and competitive tendering (Ball, Bowerman, & 
Hawksworth, 2000; Bowerman, Ball, & Francis, 2001; Bowerman, Francis, Ball, & 
Fry, 2002). Accounting has been actively involved in these reforms, and in some 
cases, has reinforced them (Kurunmaki, Lapsley, & Melia, 2003; Lapsley & Mussari,  
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2008; Lapsley & Wright, 2004). Therefore, Local Government Organisations, such as 
the  ones  studied  in  this  research,  provided  an  interesting  setting  in  which  to 
investigate the accounting practices. 
 
It  is  also  important  to  note  that  this  study  investigated  accounting  practices  as 
implemented  in  the  delivery  of  primary  education  and  health  services  in  the 
Tanzanian  Councils.  This  is  attributed  to  the  fact  that  these  services  consumed 
substantial financial resources of the Tanzanian Councils. For example, in the FY 
2009/10, the actual expenditures of primary education and health services accounted 
for about 58.5% of the total Councils’ expenditures (LOGIN)
2. Also, the provision of 
these services constituted major and traditional functions performed by all Councils 
in Tanzania. Importantly, effective undertaking of these services which are regarded 
as  basic  needs,  promises  the  overall  improvement  of  the  livelihood  of  local 
Tanzanians (Ngwilizi, 2001). Therefore, in line with other studies which focused on 
education  and  health  services  (see,  for  example,  Broadbent,  Jacobs,  &  Laughlin, 
2001; Järvinen, 2006; Modell, 2005; Nyland & Pettersen, 2004; Scarparo, 2006), it 
was  thought  important  as  well  to  investigate  how  accounting  practices  were 
implemented in the delivery of primary education and health services in the context 
of Tanzania.  
1.2  Aims and Objectives of the Research 
The overall objective of this research was to understand how accounting practices 
were  actually  implemented  in  the  Tanzanian  LGAs.  Therefore,  the  study  was 
designed  to  obtain  in-depth  understanding  of  the  accounting  practices  and  the 
conditions which sustain their undertaking. The specific objectives of this research 
were: 
 
i.  To understand the perceptions of the Councils’ officials on the accounting 
practices as implemented in the Tanzanian LGAs; 
 
ii.  To assess how actual undertaking of accounting practices differ among the 
LGAs, and between the primary education and health services; 
 
                                                 
2  http://www.logintanzania.net/monitor6b.asp accessed on 1st February, 2012  
 
Accounting Practices in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs): Page 3 
 
iii.  To provide practical and theoretical explanations  of the operational changes 
which  normally  occur  in  the  LGAs  from  the  view  point  of  the  Councils’ 
officials; and 
 
iv.  To  analyze  influences  of  the  external  bodies  such  as  the  Government  of 
Tanzania  and  donors,  on  the  accounting  practices  as  implemented  in  the 
Tanzanian LGAs.  
1.3  Significance of the Research 
Local Government Organisations (LGOs) are important public sector entities, highly 
involved in the provision of public services such as education, health and sanitation, 
water, and urban planning. The overall aim of their involvement is to improve the 
quality of, and access to, public services through increased citizen’s participation at 
the very local levels where the services are provided (Ngwilizi, 2001). The particular 
role  of  the  LGOs  in  public  services  provision  was  further  broadened  by  the 
emergence of public sector reform programs such as New Public Management, Best 
Value, and New Public Financial Management (Bowerman et al., 2001; Hood, 1991, 
1995;  Kuhlmann,  2009,  2010).  Therefore,  it  was  considered  to  be  worthwhile  to 
investigate  how  accounting  has  been  implemented  in  these  environments  and  its 
corresponding consequences on the organisational operations. 
 
Attempts have been made to study the accounting practices in the public sector in 
general, and local governments in particular. These studies have focused on areas 
such  as  accountability  and  governance,  performance  measurement,  financial 
reporting,  management  accounting,  and performance  auditing.  However, there  are 
concerns that developing countries have not been sufficiently represented (Broadbent 
& Guthrie, 2008; Goddard, 2010; Hopper et al., 2009). Because the public sector 
entities  of  the  emerging  economies  are  highly  involved  in  the  delivery  of  public 
services (Ngwilizi, 2001; Rahaman, 2010), the inadequacy of accounting research in 
these  countries  has  limited  the  understanding  of  how  actual  undertaking  of 
accounting has facilitated and/or constrained the efficient delivery of public services. 
The current study is an attempt to fill this gap. 
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Recognizing the particular role of public sector organisations in general, and local 
governments  in  particular,  this  study  broadens  the  theoretical  and  practical 
understanding of how accounting practices are implemented in Local Government 
Organisations. For example, in Tanzania where this research was undertaken, more 
than 20% of the public funds are spent by local governments (URT, 2005). In this 
context,  it  was  vital  to  investigate  the  role  of  accounting  when  discharging 
accountability for public funds, and its potential implications for the livelihoods of 
the common Tanzanians. Therefore, the current research is equally relevant to the 
policy  makers,  the  funding  agencies,  the  academicians,  the  practitioners,  and  the 
general public. 
1.4  Overview of Theoretical Foundation, Findings, and Contributions 
This section discusses briefly the theoretical foundation of the current research, the 
main research findings, and the contributions of this study to the methodology, New 
Institutional Sociology, accounting research in emerging economies, together with 
specific recommendations to the Tanzanian LGAs. A detailed discussion of each of 
these is provided in their respective chapters.(Hopper & Major, 2007) 
1.4.1  Theoretical Foundation 
This research is a qualitative based study, situated within the interpretive paradigm of 
the Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) sociological framework. It stresses the subjective 
elements of social science research and assumes that society is in a state of order. It 
also  stresses  the  inductive  approach,  which  seeks  explanations  from  individual 
consciousness  without  imposing  any  statistical  generalizations  (Creswell,  Plano 
Clark, Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003). The interpretive approach applied in this research 
is a response to the repeated calls for the need to study accounting practice in the 
social context in which it operates (Baker & Bettner, 1997; Baxter & Chua, 2003; 
Parker, 2008). Therefore, by using the interpretive approach, the current research is 
not only contributing to the interpretive literature in general, but also extends the 
approach to the emerging economies, which generally receive less attention in the 
extant literature. 
 
The  current  research  was  carried  out  through  case  studies  of  four  (4)  Local 
Government Authorities which consisted of two Municipal Councils (KAMC and 
MDMC) and two District Councils (KBDC and MCDC) located in Tanzania. The  
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fieldwork was divided into two phases. The first phase was conducted from July 2010 
to January 2011, whilst the second phase was carried out from August to October 
2011. In-depth interviews, non-participant observations, and documents, were used as 
data  sources.    Since  empirically  rich  case  studies  hold  the  potential  for  the 
development of a theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Humphrey & Scapens, 1996; Llewelyn, 
2003), this research falls into the classification of Theory-building Case Studies. It 
executed a grounded theory approach to develop a theory systematically from the raw 
data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This approach provides an appropriate mechanism for 
studying  a  complex  phenomenon,  such  as  accounting,  as  practiced  in  the  public 
sector organisations  (Locke  &  Locke, 2001). The grounded theory informed case 
study, which was applied in this study, increased the theoretical sufficiency of the 
investigated phenomenon (Llewelyn, 2003). Data analysis was carried out through 
the three coding processes (open, axial, and selective), recommended by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998). 
1.4.2  Research Findings 
The main findings of this study are expressed in the emergent theoretical framework 
around a central phenomenon named manipulating legitimacy. The emergent theory 
represents the deliberate actions employed by the officials of the Tanzanian LGAs to 
cope with operational uncertainties. Manipulating legitimacy ensured the availability 
of resources for the operations of the Councils as well as attainment of the individual 
interests  of  the  Councils’  officials.  The  process  comprised  two  main  strategies, 
namely,  building  the  organisational  image  and  managing  the  organisational 
performance. Whilst the former focused on creating an externally favourable image 
of the Councils in order to attract more resources from the Government and donors, 
the  latter  concentrated  on  controlling  the  internal  problems  which  threatened  the 
performance of the Councils. The combination of these two strategies depicts the 
external and internal oriented tactics employed by the Councils’ officials to influence 
organisational legitimacy and obtain resources from a variety of stakeholders. The 
central phenomenon was situated within its conditioning contexts, namely, political 
interference, deficient regulations, funding uncertainties, and donors’ influence. 
 
The  process  of  manipulating  legitimacy  led  to  the  subordination  of  accounting 
practices  in  the  internal  decision  making  processes.  Accounting  was  primarily  
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undertaken to satisfy the requirements of the Government and donors, and had little 
relevance internally. The phenomenon of manipulating legitimacy also resulted in the 
emergence  of  fraud  and  corruption,  as  well  as  professional  conflict  between 
accountants and medical practitioners. The emergent theory also suggests a need for 
the  active  involvement  of  the  accounting  regulatory  board  in  the  public  sector. 
Because the process of manipulating legitimacy ensured the availability of funds for 
the  Councils’  operations,  it  also  boosted  social  and  political  legitimacy  of  the 
Councils, the politicians, the ruling party, and the entire Government.  
 
The phenomenon of manipulating legitimacy differed across Councils and service 
deliveries, in that the degree of manipulating legitimacy was higher in the District 
Councils than the Municipal Councils. The extent of the manipulation by the District 
Councils had been increased by less pressure from the regulatory bodies due to their 
distant location, inadequate financial knowledge of the Councillors, and the weakness 
of the accounting establishment. Similarly, the degree of manipulation was higher in 
the Lower Local Governments (LLGs), such as Wards and Villages, than the Higher 
Local  Governments  (HLGs).  This  was  partly  contributed  to  by  the  shortage  of 
competent  staff  and  the  absence  of  a  statutory  audit  at  the  LLGs.  Furthermore, 
because  donors  were  highly  involved  in  the  Health  Services,  the  extent  of 
manipulation was relatively low when compared to the Primary Education sector. 
 
The  discussion  of  the  substantive  theory  within  the  NIS  theoretical  framework 
proposed the formal grounded theory of manipulating legitimacy, which suggests that 
the  extent  of  the  manipulation  of  organisational  legitimacy  is  mediated  by  the 
interactions  between  the  degree  of  institutional  pressures  and  the  internal  and/or 
external  arrangements.  The  theory  hypothesized  that  when  institutionalized 
organisations face high institutional pressures and when the internal and/or external 
organisational  arrangements  are  weak,  high  levels  of  manipulations  are  likely  to 
occur  in  order  to  maintain  organisational  operations.  Therefore,  drawing  on  the 
institutional  theory,  this  research  established  that  the  actual  undertaking  of  the 
accounting in the Tanzanian Councils has been affected by the interactions between 
the institutional influences from the Government and donors and the responses of the  
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Councils’ officials (see also, Moll & Hoque, 2011; Oliver, 1991; Tsamenyi, Cullen, 
& Gonzalez, 2006). 
1.4.3  Research Contributions 
This research makes a number of contributions to the methodology, New Institutional 
Sociology,  accounting  research  in  emerging  economies,  and  offers  specific 
recommendations to the Tanzanian LGAs. The use of the interpretive approach in the 
current research explicates it in the context of emerging economies, where research 
into public sector accounting has rarely been undertaken. The current research also 
makes  three  specific  contributions  to  the  canons  of  grounded  theory.  Firstly,  the 
research establishes that main category (ies) can be sufficiently explained by the sub-
category (ies) of another main category (ies). This is especially the case when the 
categories are closely related and theoretically dense. Secondly, the emergent theory 
establishes the possibility for using meta-coding in the inductive coding processes, an 
approach  which  provides  broader  meanings  of  the  concepts  and  still  remains 
grounded from raw data. Finally, moving from substantive to formal theory, and the 
techniques  employed  in  the  process,  contributes  to  the  approach  in  accounting 
research, which has experienced a very limited number of formal grounded theory 
studies. In general, the detailed descriptions of the grounded theory offered in this 
thesis,  represent  a  response  to  the  concerns  raised  by  Chesler  (1987)  about  the 
absence of detailed descriptions of the data analysis approach in grounded theory 
studies: 
 
“Careful reading of substantial literature in qualitative methods indicates that there 
are far too few details provided in most works as to why and how scholars code and 
analyze their data. While the methods of contextual coding and constant comparison 
are often invoked, they are seldom described in detail” (Chesler, 1987, p. 7). 
 
The integration of the research findings within the extant literature revealed a number 
of contributions which this research makes to the New Institutional Sociology (NIS). 
Firstly, unlike other NIS studies which assumed that organisational actors are passive 
adopters  of  the  institutional  pressures,  this  study  established  that  the  actors  are 
strategic in their responses to the institutional pressures (Modell, 2001; Oliver, 1991). 
Also,  in  contrast  to  the  majority  of  NIS  informed  studies,  the  current  research  
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establishes that the responses of the Councils’ officials differed across Councils and 
service deliveries, depending on the effectiveness of the supervisory bodies, and the 
internal and/or external arrangements. This adds a theoretical level of analysis of the 
actors’ strategic responses and provides proof of the strategic nature of the actors’ 
responses.  
 
Interestingly, the emergent theory posits the possibility of the public sector entities, 
even  in  emerging  economies,  achieving  both  external  legitimacy  and  technical 
efficiency  (see  also  Okike  &  Adegbite,  2012).  Thus,  the  current  study  also 
contributes  to  the  contemporary  NIS  theorists,  who  ignored  the  strict  dichotomy 
between legitimacy and efficiency (see for example, Collier, 2001; Hopper & Major, 
2007; Modell, 2003; Okike & Adegbite, 2012). However, the emergent theory shows 
that legitimacy was achieved not only by mere adoption of the external structures, but 
also through the internal techniques of the Councils’ officials. This supports Moll and 
Hoque’s  (2011)  argument  that  the  internal  actors  are  also  significant  legitimating 
agents.  In  contrast,  technical  efficiencies  emerged  automatically  in  the  course  of 
undertaking the adopted initiatives. Furthermore, as the funding of the public sector 
entities  depended  on  performance,  the  current  study  revealed  the  influence  of 
performance  management  initiatives  on  shaping  the  legitimating  role  of  the 
accounting practices in the public sector. Finally, the current research establishes that 
loose coupling/decoupling may originate from a variety of sources, such as informal 
resistances,  conflicting  pressures  from  the  external  environment,  the  laxity  of  the 
regulatory bodies, and the absence of supporting environment. The multiple sources 
of ‘loose coupling’ found in this study suggest a need for a detailed assessment of the 
institutional pressures, the actors’ responses, and their corresponding consequences 
for  the  organisational  operations.  Also,  this  study  found  the  influence  of  self-
interested  behaviour  of  the  Councils’  officials  in  the  decoupling  of  the  formal 
structures to be stronger than that found in the extant literature. 
 
This research also offers a number of contributions to accounting research in the 
emerging economies. Firstly, there is a need for the reformers of public sector entities 
to consider context specific factors, such as social, political, economic and cultural 
environments, before executing accounting related reform programs. As evidenced in  
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this study, failure to take into account the contextual factors had contributed to the 
undesirable consequences (see also Hopper et al., 2009). Secondly, there is a need for 
a broad range of organisational performance criteria which take into consideration the 
livelihoods of local communities. It appears that the current evaluations of public 
sector  performance  tend  to  concentrate  more  on  financial  transparency  than  on 
improving public welfare. As a result, whilst public sector organisations in emerging 
economies report improved financial performance, the corresponding improvement in 
the  livelihoods  of  communities  has  not  been  evidenced  (Rahaman,  Lawrence,  & 
Roper, 2004; Tsamenyi et al., 2010; Uddin & Tsamenyi, 2005). Also, without ruling 
out  other  anti-corruption  mechanisms,  this  study  appeals  for  a  wider  societal 
engagement  to  address  the  corrupt  practices  eminent  in  the  emerging  economies. 
Finally, this research has the broader appeal of having a comprehensive overview of 
development  programs  in  the  emerging  economies,  prime  amongst  which  are  the 
professional  development  programs  for  the  organisational  members.  This  has  the 
potential  to  address  the  low  competencies  facing  the  majority  of  public  sector 
officials in the emerging economies. 
 
The current study also makes a number of recommendations to the Tanzanian LGAs. 
Firstly, the research suggests the need for a holistic approach to the public sector 
reform programs. The current reforms carried out in the Tanzanian LGAs have put 
more emphasis on fiscal issues and have ignored other important aspects such as 
legal, human resources, and political reforms. This partial nature of the reforms had 
contributed to the operational uncertainties which had forced the Councils’ officials 
to be manipulative. Secondly, harmonization of the LGAs laws with other principal 
laws  and  review  of  the  same  has  the  potential  to  minimize  the  contradictory 
provisions and would enhance the effective undertaking of the Councils’ operations, 
including  accounting  practices.  Also,  strengthening  the  Councils’  self-generated 
incomes has the potential to minimize funding uncertainties facing the Councils. In 
this regard, addressing the political and hierarchical interference, collusion, lobbying, 
and  the  inherent  weaknesses  of  the  internal  revenue  systems  might  significantly 
reduce the LGAs’ financial dependence. Furthermore, it is important to improve fund 
disbursement and the reporting mechanisms in order to minimize the unspent fund 
balances which are prominent in the LGAs. Finally, the current research appeals for  
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reform of employee welfare systems. Improving working conditions and incentive 
schemes would assure an increase in  working morale and reduction of fraud and 
corruption. The arrangement of this thesis is presented in the following section. 
1.5  Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis has nine chapters in total, including the introduction chapter. Chapter 2 
reviews New Public Management (NPM) practices applied in the local governments 
and their implications for the accounting practices. Chapter 3 provides descriptions of 
the  Tanzanian  Local  Government  Authorities  (LGAs),  while  the  methodology 
employed in this research is discussed in Chapter 4. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 report the 
empirical findings of the current study, through a grounded theory approach. Chapter 
8 integrates the empirical findings within the extant literature, while the last chapter 
(Chapter 9), offers the conclusions and recommendations of the current research. A 
detailed summary of each chapter is given below. 
Chapter Two 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature regarding the NPM practices applied in 
the local governments and their related consequences. The premise of the chapter is 
to evaluate a number of management reforms borrowed from business organisations 
and introduced into local governments in the wake of NPM (Hood, 1991, 1995). In 
this regard, the chapter discusses some of the common NPM initiatives applied in 
local  governments  such  as  Public  Private  Partnerships,  fiscal  decentralization, 
privatisation, and performance management. What emerged from the discussion was 
the  interaction  between  accounting  practices  and  these  initiatives,  indicating  that 
accounting is influencing, and being influenced by, these reform initiatives (Lapsley 
& Mussari, 2008; Lapsley & Wright, 2004). In order to position the current research 
within the context of the emerging economies, the chapter also reviews the nature of 
public sector accounting research in the emerging economies. The review not only 
shows that there has been limited research into the emerging economies, but also 
reveals that local governments in emerging economies have also not been sufficiently 
studied.  The  chapter  also  offers  a  synthesis  of  the  accounting  research  into  local 
governments and suggests the need for an interpretive theoretically based study that 
focuses  on  the  context  of  emerging  economies.  The  chapter  finally  presents  the 
research  questions  which  were  used  to  investigate  accounting  practices  in  the 
Tanzanian LGAs.  
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Chapter Three 
The chapter starts with  brief background information about the Tanzanian LGAs, 
focusing on the territorial and legal positions of the organisations and their related 
responsibilities. Then, discusses the different levels of LGAs (urban and rural), and 
their political and administrative structures. It then explains the rationale behind the 
selection of the case studies, before providing their specific information, which falls 
into the following general sub-headings: biographic characteristics; own revenues and 
expenditures; accounting establishment; and education and health information. The 
chapter also highlights the major stakeholders of the Tanzanian LGAs and suggests 
that  the  operations  of  the  Councils  were  highly  influenced  by  the  external 
stakeholders,  an  aspect  which  is  discussed  further  in  the  analysis  chapters.  The 
chapter finally provides an overview of the Tanzanian Local Government Reform 
Programme (LGRP). 
Chapter Four 
Chapter four discusses the methodology employed in the current research. It starts by 
drawing a clear distinction between methodology and methods, with the overall aim 
of  differentiating  between  the  broad  frameworks  of  conducting  research 
(methodology)  and  specific  research  techniques  (methods).  The  chapter  then 
discusses the social science research paradigms provided in Burrell and Morgan’s 
(1979)’s  sociological  framework,  namely,  functionalist,  interpretive,  radical 
structuralist, and radical humanist. It then discusses specific research paradigms that 
have  been  applied  in  accounting  research,  namely,  mainstream,  critical,  and 
interpretive.  The  chapter  then  adopts  an  interpretive  approach  to  investigate 
accounting  in  organisational  settings  in  which it  operates  (Ahrens  &  Dent,  1998; 
Ahrens & Mollona, 2007). This chapter also discusses the grounded theory approach 
used in the current study. The chapter finally describes the specific research methods 
employed under the following sub-headings: research process, sampling method, in-
depth  interviews,  non-participant  observation,  and  documentary  sources,  data 
management, data analysis, validity and reliability, and research ethics. 
Chapter Five, Six, and Seven 
These  chapters  report  the  empirical  findings  of  the  current  research  within  the 
grounded  theory  data  analysis  framework.  The  analysis  was  informed  by  the 
Straussian approach of grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss & Corbin,  
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1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Chapter 5 discusses open coding, a process which 
involved examination of the raw data ‘word by word’, ‘sentence by sentence’, ‘line 
by line’, and ‘paragraph by paragraph’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The output of the 
process  was  the  emergence  of  21  open  categories,  which  describe  incidences 
pertaining to the accounting practices in the Councils. The chapter discusses these 
open categories in detail and their patterns within the Councils visited. Chapter 6 
discusses the axial coding process, which involves elevating categories to a higher 
level.  The  discussion  suggests  that  the  core  categories  and  sub-categories  were 
closely  related  in  both  their  properties  and  their  dimensions.  The  discussion  also 
revealed theoretical patterns which were further integrated into Chapter 7 to form a 
substantive theory. 
 
Chapter 7 integrates the main categories discussed in Chapter 6 around the central 
category of the study. This was accomplished by using a paradigm model, which 
relates all categories to the central phenomenon in the form of conditions, strategies, 
or consequences (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Manipulating legitimacy emerged as the 
central phenomenon of the study, and described the process used by the Councils’ 
officials to overcome the operational uncertainties through ‘harsh’ techniques. The 
chapter  also  discusses  four  conditioning  contexts  which  facilitated  the  process  of 
manipulating  legitimacy,  namely,  funding  uncertainties,  political  interference, 
donors’ influences, and deficient regulatory systems. The process of manipulating 
legitimacy ensured the availability of funds for the operation of the Councils and the 
attainment  of  the  individual  interests  of  the  Councils’  officials.  The  chapter  also 
discusses  the  two  main  strategies  which  illustrated  the  process  of  manipulating 
legitimacy,  namely,  building  the  organisational  image  and  managing  the 
organisational  performance.  It  also  discusses  the  consequences  of  manipulating 
legitimacy, which revolved around social and political legitimacy, subordination of 
accounting practices, professional conflict, fraud and corruption, and the role of the 
accounting board. A presentation of the manipulating legitimacy model concludes the 
chapter. 
Chapter Eight 
This  chapter  integrates  the  empirical  findings  presented  in  the  analysis  chapters 
within  the  extant  literature.  It  starts  by  integrating  the  central  phenomenon,  
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manipulation  strategies,  and  the  other  issues  of  interest  which  emerged  from  the 
research  into  the  extant  literature.  The  chapter  then  provides  an  overview  of 
institutional  theory  and  its  three  branches,  and  then  adopts  New  Institutional 
Sociology (NIS) to interpret the current research findings. Within the integration of 
the  emergent  theory  into  NIS  framework,  the  chapter  discusses  the  institutional 
pressures  imposed  on  the  Councils,  the  technocrats’  reactions,  and  their 
corresponding  consequences  on  the  operations  of  the  Councils  in  general,  and 
accounting practices in particular. It finally presents the formal grounded theory of 
manipulating legitimacy, which was enabled by the presence of coercive pressures 
from the Government and donors, deficient regulations, and funding uncertainties, 
and, was illustrated through the legitimization games, managing the organisational 
performance,  and  loose  coupling.  Interestingly,  the  chapter  establishes  the 
simultaneous achievement of organisational external legitimacy and internal technical 
efficiency. 
Chapter Nine 
This chapter provides the concluding remarks of the current research. The chapter 
starts with an overview of the research and then details its research contributions 
under  four  sub-headings,  namely,  methodological  contributions,  theoretical 
contributions, contributions to accounting research in the emerging economies, and 
contributions  to  the  Tanzanian  LGAs.  The  methodological  contributions  revolve 
around the use of the  interpretive approach  to  investigate accounting practices  in 
emerging  economies,  a  meta-coding  approach,  establishing  the  close  intra-
relationship of categories, and the development of a formal grounded theory. It also 
offers contributions to NIS in areas such as the nature of the actors’ responses, the 
multiple sources of loose coupling, the influence of performance management in the 
public sector entities, and the intertwining of legitimacy and efficiency. Based on the 
empirical findings, the chapter also presents its contributions to accounting research 
in  the  emerging  economies  and  specific  contributions  to  the  Tanzanian  LGAs. 
Recognising the incomplete nature of the research, the chapter presents the potential 
the potential limitations of the current research and the mechanisms used to address 
them. It finally offers areas for further research.  
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Chapter Two 
Local Governments and New Public Management 
2.1 Introduction 
This  chapter  discusses  public  sector  reforms  in  Local  Government  Organisations 
(LGOs), and specifically highlights the impact of New Public Management (NPM) 
on accounting practices in LGOs. The chapter is divided into eight major sections. 
Section  2.2  provides  brief  descriptions  of  LGOs,  while  section  2.3  provides  an 
overview of NPM as applied in the public sector in general, and local governments in 
particular.  Section  2.4  summarises  the  implications  of  NPM  practices  in  the 
management of LGOs in general, while section 2.5 provides a summary of previous 
accounting  research  into  LGOs.  Accounting  research  in  emerging  economies,  the 
synthesis of accounting research into local governments, and problem statements are 
covered in section 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 respectively. Research questions (section 2.9) 
conclude the chapter. 
2.2  Local Government Organisations-An Overview 
Despite an increasing interest in LGOs, there is currently no consensus on its global 
meaning. As Mackenzie (1961) claimed half a century ago, “…there is no theory of 
local government. There is no normative general theory from which we can deduce 
what  local  government  ought  to  be”  (p.5).  As  a    result,  what  constitutes  local 
government differs between one country and another, and sometimes differs within a 
country (Chandler, 2010). This is associated with the structural differences between 
central governments, which then permeates different formations, sizes, and functions 
of local governments (Wollmann, 2012)-thus complicating the universal meaning of 
local  governments  even  further.  To  escape  universal  definitions,  the  literature 
describes local governments in terms of their functions, boundaries, and leadership 
structures. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) describe local governments as formal 
structures  located  at  the  very  grass  roots  level,  with  political  jurisdiction  and 
independent  decision  making  addressing  community  interest.  Others  view  local 
governments as those institutions which exist at a very low level of communities 
which aim not only to serve the interests of the central government (an expediential 
role), but also to foster the development of the local populace whom they represent 
(ethical role) (Chandler, 2008; Chandler, 2010). From these explanations it can be 
deduced that local governments represent a form of public entity which acts virtually  
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between the central government and general public, having responsibilities to both. 
Therefore, regardless of their national and international differences, virtually all local 
governments share two basic functions: ensuring the efficiency of the public service 
provisions and maintaining stability within their area of jurisdiction (Chandler, 2010). 
Depending on the level and the country of origin, LGOs have variety of names such 
as  provinces,  municipalities,  communal,  federal  states,  counties,  departments, 
regions, villages, and towns (Wollmann, 2012). 
 
Notwithstanding the unique role played by LGOs, there is some debate about their 
relationship  with  central  governments,  in  particular,  whether  local  governments 
should stand alone or central government should interfere their operations. Chandler 
(2008)  argues  that  when  local  governments  exist  merely  to  serve  the  interest  of 
central government (expediential role), the former has the right to interfere, in order 
to ensure that local governments functions are in accordance with its demand. On the 
other  hand,  when  local  governments  exist  solely  for  community  liberty  (ethical 
reason), central  government has  no mandate to  interfere  with  their structures  and 
functions. Despite this position, the current trend shows that the existence of LGOs is 
more expediential than ethical. Thus, the high influence of central government to 
local  governments  is  not  something  to  be  surprised  at  (Chandler,  2008).  These 
influences  have  different  ‘labels’  such  as  New  Public  Management  (Hood,  1991, 
1995), New Public Financial Management (Olson, Guthrie, & Humphrey, 1998), and 
Best  Value  (Bowerman  et  al.,  2002;  Lapsley  &  Wright,  2004).  Despite  having 
different  labels,  all  these  initiatives  advocate  the  implementation  of  modern 
management practices into local governments. These initiatives are discussed in the 
following section under the general heading of New Public Management. 
2.3  New Public Management Practices in Local Governments 
The emergence of New Public Management (NPM) in the 1980s has had a great 
impact on the operational aspects of public sector organisations (Hood, 1991, 1995). 
NPM,  as  a  new  mode  of  public  sector  governance,  emphasizes  “hands-on 
professional management in the public sector', ‘explicit standards and measures of 
performance’, ‘greater emphasis on output controls’, ‘[a] shift to disaggregation of 
units in the public sector’, ‘[a] shift to greater competition in public sector’, ‘stress on 
private sector styles of management practice’ and ‘stress on greater discipline and  
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parsimony in resource use” (Hood, 1991, pp. 4-5). Service (1995) provided a detailed 
explanation of NPM, as applied to public sector organisations: 
 
“New Public Management (NPM) includes a greater focus on results and increased 
value  for  money,  devolution  of  authority  and  enhanced  flexibility,  strengthened 
accountability and control, a client and service orientation, strengthened capacity for 
developing  strategy  and  policy,  introduction  of  competition  and  other  market 
elements, and changed relationships with other levels of government” (Service, 1995, 
p. 37). 
 
Of particular interest to this research is the adoption of private sector management 
practices, such as accrual accounting, balanced score card, benchmarking, best value, 
and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), by the public sector organisations. The use 
of private sector instruments has been favored because, as Metcalfe and Richards 
(1990)  argued,  they  “offer  a  set  of  readymade  solutions  to  public  management 
problems” (p.20). As a result, NPM with its emphasis on private sector management 
practices  have  been  applied  to  majority  of  public  sector  entities  in  majority  of 
countries regardless of their economic development. Therefore, NPM is regarded as 
“global” (Hughes, 1998, p. 58), “inevitable” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 325), and 
“a public management for all seasons” (Hood, 1991, p. 3). These suggest that NPM is 
a global phenomenon which is advocated and applied in developed and developing 
countries.  Whilst  developed  countries  experience  NPM  led  practices,  such  as 
benchmarking  (Bowerman  et  al.,  2002),  privatization  and  the  corporatization  of 
publicly owned entities constitute the main agenda in developing countries (Chand & 
Moene, 1999; Livingstone & Charlton, 1998; Thomas, 1996). However, there are 
concerns about the appropriateness of private sector techniques in the domain of the 
public  sector  in  general.  For  instance,  Robinson  (2003)  claims  that  there  are 
fundamental differences between private and public organisations, which make the 
application  of  private  sector  management  techniques  to  the  public  sector  too 
complex.  The  same  observation  was  made  by  Polidano  and  Hulme  (1999)  and 
Tambulasi  (2007)  in  the  context  of  emerging  economies.  Similarly,  Watkins  and 
Arrington  (2007)  criticise  the  NPM  initiatives  for  placing  more  emphasis  on 
efficiency, as propounded by the private sector entities. As a result, public resource 
allocations are based on economic calculations rather than public values. Generally,  
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NPM practices are criticised for being unable to change the modes of public sector 
operations,  their  failure  to  lower  unit  costs,  and  the  irrelevance  of  its  claim  of 
universality (Hood, 1991). Nevertheless, public sector organisations, especially local 
governments,  continue  to  apply  the  NPM  led  initiatives  such  as  public  private 
partnerships,  fiscal  decentralization,  privatization,  and  performance  management. 
Each of these is briefly discussed below. 
2.3.1  Public Private Partnerships 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have attracted various definitions in the extant 
literature. Van Ham and Koppenjan (2001) define public-private partnerships as “co-
operation of some durability between public and private actors in which they jointly 
develop  products  and  services  and  share  risks,  costs  and  resources  which  are 
connected with these products or services” (p. 598). As Lonsdale (2007) argued, this 
definition can be applied to virtually any other buyer-supplier relationship and that 
the element of partnership between the public and private sector is flawed. Without 
specifically defining it, Lonsdale (2007) holds the view that  private partnerships 
represent arrangements which entail private actors undertaking the activities which 
were previously perceived to be the responsibility of the public sector entities. PPPs 
have  also  been  defined  as  the  institutional  relationships  and  cooperation  between 
public  and  private  sector  entities  (Hodge  &  Greve,  2007).  Others,  such  as  Kettl 
(1993),  regard  PPPs  and  contracting-out  or  outsourcing  as  synonymous  terms.  In 
general,  these  explanations  share  the  common  theme  of  the  PPPs  which  is  the 
involvement  of  private  sector  actors  in  various  public  engagements.  These 
engagements normally involve contractual arrangements, such as BOT (build-own-
transfer) and sale-and-lease-back agreements, between the public sector and private 
actors  (Savas,  2000).  PPPs  also  include  “institutional  cooperation,  long-term 
infrastructure  contracts,  public  policy  networks,  civil  society  and  community 
developments, and urban renewal and downturn economic development” (Hodge & 
Greve, 2007, p. 547).  
 
The involvement of the private sector in public services through PPPs has  led to 
operational changes in the public sector. As Broadbent and Guthrie (2008) noted, 
PPPs and other private elements in the public sector have permeated a shift from 
“public sector provision to the provision of public services” (p. 137). As a result,  
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there is an increasing amount of accounting literature focusing on PPPs arrangements 
and their related consequences in the provision of public services. In general, the 
literature records positive and negative results from the use of PPPs (see for example, 
English, 2007; English & Guthrie, 2003; Hodge & Greve, 2005, 2007; Newberry & 
Pallot,  2003).  This  suggests  a  need  for  thorough  investigations  of  the  PPPs 
arrangements, with the aim of not only contributing to the existing literature, but also 
to  feedback  the  policy  makers  and  other  stakeholders.  This  study  is  one  of  such 
initiatives. 
2.3.2  Fiscal Decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization is a by-product of local  government reforms introduced in 
different countries (Smoke, 2001). It represents the NPM initiatives, which advocate 
the transfer of financial power and responsibility to the low levels of government 
(Cameron,  2002).  The  act  of  transferring  power  and  responsibility  is  normally 
accompanied  by  devolving  some  of  the  government  revenue  and  expenditure 
functions  to  the  lower  tiers  of  the  government  (De  Mello,  2000).  Fiscal 
decentralization has been applied in developed and developing countries at different 
times and magnitude. It is mainly reflected in the government budgeting and planning 
decisions, where funds mainly flow from the top to bottom (Wunsch, 2001). The 
political  and  economic  emphasis  on  fiscal  decentralization  has  contributed  to  the 
increase of accounting studies in local governments (Goddard, 2004, 2005a; Kloot, 
1999; Robinson, 2003). 
 
Fiscal  decentralization  is  normally  implemented  in  the  belief  that  the  act  of 
transferring  government  functions  to  the  very  lowest  levels  increases  efficiency, 
accountability, and transparency, and at the same time reduces the operational costs 
of public service delivery (De Mello, 2000). Despite these promising benefits, there 
are concerns about its effective coordination: 
 
“Given the increased complexity in coordinating government actions when lower 
levels  of  government  enjoy  greater  autonomy  in  policy-making,  the  key  policy 
challenge  in  decentralization  programs  is  to  design  and  develop  an  appropriate 
system  of  multilevel  public  finances  in  order  to  provide  local  public  services  
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effectively  and  efficiently  while,  at  the  same  time,  maintaining  macroeconomic 
stability” (De Mello, 2000, p. 366). 
 
Therefore, achieving the desired results of the fiscal decentralization depends, among 
other  factors,  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  institutional  framework  to  properly 
coordinate the fiscal relations between the central government and low levels, and 
between the low levels themselves. This, as De Mello (2000) noted, has only been 
limitedly achieved by the majority of countries, including developed ones. Similarly, 
Prud'Homme  (1995)  argued  that  ill-formulated  decentralization  programs  can 
increase  disparities,  jeopardize  stability,  and  undermine  efficiency.  In  China,  for 
instance,  Wong  (1991)  evidenced  that  Post-Mao  fiscal  decentralization  lacked 
appropriate coordination at the central level, as well as in local governments, and 
became counter-productive. It had contributed to the government deficit and local 
governments had to transfer the burden of increasing functions to the communities 
through local taxes (Wong, 1991).  
 
In African context, majority of African governments lack appropriate mechanism for 
fiscal coordination and are unwilling to implement fiscal decentralization effectively 
(Wunsch,  2001),  the  main  reasons  being  the  need  to  retain  authority  as  well  as 
financial resources (Olowu, 1990). In Tanzania, for example, Gilson, Kilima, and 
Tanner  (1994)  noted  that  fiscal  decentralization  in  Tanzanian  local  governments 
failed  to  provide  sufficient  financial  resources  to  the  district  health  financial 
managers  to  effectively  undertake  the  transferred  responsibilities.  Of  particular 
interest to this study are the changes of the accounting practices in local governments 
as a product of fiscal decentralization. As the autonomy and responsibilities of local 
governments  increase,  the  extent  and  nature  of  accounting  practices  change  to 
accommodate the evolving nature of the decentralized operations. The most affected 
accounting aspects for local governments are budgeting, financial reporting, auditing, 
and performance measurement practices. A detailed discussion of these aspects is 
offered under section 2.5. 
2.3.3  Privatization 
Privatization  represents  one  of  the  common  forms  of  local  government  reform 
programs  (Bel, Hebdon, & Warner, 2007). It normally involves partial, or complete,  
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sale of local government assets to the private sector entities (Wollmann, 2012). It is 
applied  equally  in  developing  and  developed  countries,  with  different  results  and 
modalities.  In developed countries,  privatization normally involves the transfer of 
local government functions to outside parties, such as corporate units and municipal 
corporations, which are still owned by local governments (Wollmann, 2012). This is 
mainly used as a defensive mechanism against partial or complete sale of the local 
government  assets.  As  Tavares  and  Camöes  (2007)  observed,  out  of  308  local 
governments  in  Portugal,  269  have  formed  municipal  corporations.  Partial  and/or 
complete  sale  of  assets  is  the  common  approach  for  privatisation  in  developing 
countries (see Chand & Moene, 1999; Livingstone & Charlton, 1998; Thomas, 1996). 
 
In general, privatization has been regarded as a means of reducing the operational 
costs and increasing the efficiency of local governments (Bel et al., 2007; Domberger 
& Jensen, 1997; Domberger  & Rimmer, 1994). There are also  external  pressures 
from interest groups, which reinforces the privatization process in local governments 
(Bel  & Fageda, 2007).  As a result, some of the  privatization decisions  are taken 
without  due  consideration  of  the  desired  outcomes.  In  developing  countries, 
privatization has been characterized by uncertainties and financial malpractices, and 
has  become  more  rhetoric  than  practice  (Polidano  &  Hulme,  1999).  Anecdotal 
evidence shows that the privatization agenda in the public sector in general, and local 
governments in particular, is challenging and requires both internal organisational 
support  and  appropriate  external  institutional  arrangements,  which  are  difficult  to 
achieve  simultaneously.  It  has  also  brought  management  challenges  for  the  local 
governments, which have contributed to the reluctance of some countries to initiate 
the privatization process (Hefetz & Warner, 2007). As Wollmann (2012) claimed, 
“the position and role of traditional local government has been questioned by the 
emergence and expansion of actors and institutions that, resulting from ‘hiving off’, 
outsourcing  and  privatizing  local  government  functions  to  external  actors  and 
organisations, constitute local governance networks essentially operating outside the 
immediate  realm  of  local  government”  (p.  65).  This  study  has  examined  these 
challenges in the context of Tanzanian LGAs.  
 
Accounting Practices in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs): Page 21 
 
2.3.4  Performance Management 
NPM  also  advocates  the  use  of  performance  management  in  the  public  sector  in 
general,  and  local  governments  in  particular.  The  overall  aims  of  performance 
management  systems  are  to  increase  organisational  efficiency  (Hoque,  2008),  to 
assess the ability of the organisations to provide public services outside of the market 
conditions  (Ševic,  2005),  and  to  enhance  public  sector  accountability  and 
transparency  systems  to  the  multiple  stakeholders  (Broadbent  &  Guthrie,  2008; 
Lapsley & Mitchell, 1996). In fact, as Ghobadian and Ashworth (1994) argued, local 
governments need performance management badly when compared to other public 
sector organisations. This is associated with a “lack of alternative supplier in most 
cases; the absence or low risk of liquidation; a large, long-life asset base; continuous 
government pressures; lack of apparent direct connection between services and cost 
to  electors;  wide  range  of  services  with  varying  degree  of  tangibility;  and  the 
powerful role of staff vis-à-vis the line managers” (Ghobadian & Ashworth, 1994, pp. 
36-37).  Additionally,  performance  management  in  local  governments  aims  to 
improve the quality of the service offered, reduce operational costs, and make local 
governments  more  responsible  to  both  central  government  as  well  as  the  general 
public  (Bowerman  et  al.,  2001).  Others  regard  the  introduction  of  performance 
measurement and management systems into local governments as a form of indirect 
control by the central government and other financiers (Pollitt, 1986; Rose & Miller, 
1992). This is especially the case where the practice is used for funding purposes 
(Benington, 2000). However, as Ševic (2005) claimed, without being performance 
based “it would have been very difficult to justify the major changes in the public 
sector” (p.587). 
 
Performance management in local governments normally involves the use of Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) in the main functional areas of local governments and 
performance measurement exercises, which are usually carried out and/or supervised 
by  central  government  (Broadbent  &  Guthrie,  2008).  It  also  involves  the  use  of 
various  techniques,  including  compulsory  competitive  tendering,  balanced  score 
cards,  zero  base  budgeting,  and  benchmarking.  The  application  of  performance 
management and measurement in local governments has generated huge interest in 
accounting researchers in both developed and developing countries. The studies tend  
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to  concentrate  on  areas  such  as  adoption,  implementation,  and  evaluation  of  the 
performance measurement and management practices. These studies are reviewed in 
section 2.5.2. 
2.4  Implications of NPM Initiatives on Accounting Practices 
Undoubtedly, the application of the NPM initiatives discussed above changes major 
aspects of local governments’ management and technical functions, including their 
accounting practices (Hodges  & Mellett, 2006). This is attributed to the fact that 
traditional accounting information “may not generate useful reports for management 
decision making when there are significant government policy changes” (Sciulli & 
Wise, 2004, p. 5). Therefore, accounting has been involved in, and has become, an 
important ingredient of the changes (Pilcher, 2011). In fact, from all of the public 
sector  entities,  accounting  practices  in  local  governments  have  been  those  most 
affected by the NPM initiatives. This is attributed to the peculiarities and importance 
of local governments: 
 
“We see local government as significant because of the central position which it 
occupies in  the  arrangement  and  delivery  of  public services; the  impact  of  local 
government on the everyday lives of its citizens; the influential role occupied by 
local  government  as  the  custodian  of  key  community  assets  and  resources;  the 
complexity  of  local  authority  relationships  –  direct,  indirect  and  diffuse  –  with 
citizens  and  other  stakeholders;  and  with  local  government  as  the  locus  of  an 
interaction  between  political  voice,  management  action  and  accountability  to 
citizens” (Lapsley & Mussari, 2008, pp. 207,  emphasis in original). 
 
In  general,  local  government  organisations  experience  changes  in  accounting 
practices as the result of NPM. The changes are claimed to be able to accommodate 
the  changing  nature  of  local  government  operations  and,  at  the  same  time,  to 
legitimize  the  organisational  operations  to  the  external  funds  providers  (Anessi-
Pessina, Nasi, & Steccolini, 2008). Therefore, accounting aspects such as adoption of 
the  accrual  basis  of  accounting,  performance  audit,  performance  measurement, 
accountability and transparency, accounting for infrastructures, and the adoption of 
management accounting techniques, such as ABC, has become widespread in local 
governments. A detailed discussion of these is provided in the following section.   
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2.5  Accounting Researches in Local Governments 
The literature evidences substantial and frequent changes in accounting practices in 
LGOs. This is partly associated with the massive financial and management reforms 
introduced  into  public  sector  organisations  in  general,  and  local  governments  in 
particular (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2005). It is therefore not surprising to find that the 
majority of accounting research has concentrated on the adoption, implementation, 
and evaluation  of the  reforms  introduced into  LGOs,  and their  related impact  on 
accounting practices  (Broadbent  &  Guthrie, 1992, 2008). Thus, studies  into local 
governments’  accounting  practices  tend  to  put  more  emphasis  on  the  accounting 
changes brought about by the volume of the public sector reform programs (Lapsley 
& Mussari,  2008; Monsen, 2006; Yamamoto,  1999).  Despite this,  there has  been 
continuing debate as to whether the changes have been beneficial or not. Whilst some 
regard  accounting  changes  as  necessary  steps  to  enhance  the  efficiency  of  the 
changing local governments (Lapsley & Mussari, 2008), others regard them to be 
fiscally driven, and externally imposed, with no relevance for the internal decision 
making processes (see Yamamoto, 1999). This debate has increased research interest 
into local government in areas such as governance and accountability, performance 
measurement, financial reporting, management accounting, performance audit, and 
accounting for infrastructure assets. The next six sub-sections discuss each of these in 
detail. 
2.5.1  Governance and Accountability 
Governance, being a global theme, attracts a great deal of attention in both private 
and public entities. It started in the private sector and was brought to the public sector 
as a mechanism to safeguard public entities against financial scandals (Broadbent & 
Guthrie,  2008).  As  a  concept  borrowed  from  private  entities,  its  adoption  and 
implementation  in  public  sector  entities,  including  local  governments,  is  a 
contentious issue (Collier, 2005; Langlands, 2004), and that’s why in some cases, 
governance structures in public sector are less appealing (Goddard, 2005a). On the 
other hand, the accountability of the public sector in general, and local governments 
in particular, has also attracted the attention of many stakeholders, although there has 
been  a  debate  as  to  where  the  accountability  of  the  local  government  lies.  The 
problem increased even more following the introduction of the NPM related reforms. 
Following the adoption of a NPM related agenda, there is a need to identify whether  
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the  accountability  of  local  government  lies  with  central  government,  the  local 
community, and/or  the  shareholders  (Pollitt,  1993).  Others, like  Cochrane (1993), 
argue  for  a  reduction  in  the  hierarchical  financial  accountability  to  the  central 
government,  an  attempt  which  will  enable  local  governments  to  concentrate  on 
improving the quality of the local public services.  In general, as  Goddard (2004) 
commented “accountability and governance are contentious concepts” (p. 543), and 
has  led  too  much  research  into  the  ways  in  which  these  concepts  have  been 
implemented by local governments (Devas & Grant, 2003; Goddard, 2004, 2005a, 
2005b; Goddard & Powell, 1994; Kloot, 1999; Ryan, Stanley, & Nelson, 2002). 
 
In emerging economies where this research is situated, accountability is normally in 
an upward form (Devas & Grant, 2003). Central performance monitoring and grants 
conditions  have  forced  local  governments  to  be  more  accountable  to  foreign  aid 
agencies and central government, and less, if at all, to the local citizens. Devas and 
Grant  (2003)  also  observed  that  accountability  in  Kenya  and  Uganda,  which 
supposedly  represent  most  of  the  emerging  economies,  was  constrained  by 
inadequate  information  and  resources.  Since  quality  of  information  and,  more 
specifically,  annual  reports  are  necessary  for  local  government’s  accountability 
(Ryan,  Stanley,  et  al.,  2002),  any  inadequacy  limits  mechanisms  by  which  local 
governments  convey  accountability  information.  In  general,  local  government’s 
accountability and governance measures are skewed to the central government and 
other  financiers,  which  can  be  attributed  to  the  substantial  funds  which  local 
governments accrue from these sources. As noted by Devas and Grant (2003), local 
governments have yet to demonstrate accountability effectively to the local citizens. 
2.5.2  Performance Measurement 
The  term  ‘performance’  attracts  different  meanings  depending  on  the  nature  of 
organisations  and  context  in  which  it  has  been  used.  Rogers  (1994)  defines 
performance as an outcome of the interaction between organisational goals, customer 
satisfaction and the economic contribution which the organisation plays. To Otley 
(1999), performance is the degree of outcomes achieved in undertaken activities. In 
public sector, the term  ‘performance’ is usually associated with the effectiveness, 
economy, and efficiency in the delivery of the public services (Hood, 1995; Otley, 
2001). On the other hand, Mwita (2000) raises the issue about whether performance  
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entails result, or outcome, behaviour, or both. He reiterates the importance of the 
organisation  to  be  clear  about  the  measurement  and  argues  for  the  need  for  the 
organisation to state clearly whether it intends to measure outcome (result/output), 
behaviour (process), or both (outcome and behaviour). Regardless of what constitutes 
performance, the need for performance measurement is claimed to be high in the 
public sector in general, as opposed to its private counterparts (Lapsley & Mitchell, 
1996). This is attributed to the nature of the service offered, and to the ownership 
structures of the public sector organisations. Because public sector entities are mainly 
deal with intangible products, and accountable to multiple stakeholders, performance 
measurement increases their ability to discharge accountability obligations. Likewise, 
as Ševic (2005) noted, consumers of public services rarely pay the market price for 
the  service  offered.  Therefore,  there  is  an  immense  need  for  the  public  sector 
organisations to continually measure performance in order to assess the capacity of 
providing  them  outside  the  market  conditions.  Since  local  governments  occupy  a 
middle position between central government and the general public, they are highly 
involved in the delivery of public services. As a result, there are increasing trends 
towards the adoption and implementation of performance measurement practices in 
local government organisations (Brignall & Modell, 2000; Ghobadian & Ashworth, 
1994; Modell, 2009). 
 
Using  four  government  departments  in  Australia  as  a  case  study,  Hoque  (2008) 
concludes that performance measurement practices not only enhance organisational 
performance,  but  also  shape  the  strategic  plan  and  management  framework  of 
organisations. Also, performance measurement provides important information for 
budgetary  decision  making  and  other  operational  aspects  of  local  governments 
(Melkers & Willoughby, 2005). Therefore, when performance measurement practices 
are  successfully  adopted  and  implemented,  they  have  the  potential  to  foster 
organisational management and accountability  (Coates, 2004). However, there are 
cases  where  the  use  of  performance  measurement  to  enhance  organisational 
efficiency is questionable. For example, Heinrich and Marschke (2008) argued that 
the complexities of public sector entities make performance measurement a difficult 
exercise to undertake. They also raised the possibility that the performance games to 
be played by the public sector entities made the entire exercise to be worthless. Also,  
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Kurunmäki and Miller (2006) found that public sector performance assessments are 
limited and fail to take into account the multiple issues involved in organisations. In 
general, these concerns suggest that there are operational difficulties associated with 
the  development,  implementation,  and  evaluation  of  performance  measurement  in 
public sector in general, and local governments in particular (see Bowerman et al., 
2001; Johnsen, 1999; Pollanen, 2005). 
 
Also,  studying  performance  measurement  in  Canadian  municipalities,  Pollanen 
(2005) observed that the municipalities put more emphasis on the efficiency criteria 
and ignored effectiveness, which is important to public sector entities. The study also 
identified  the  gap  between  the  actual  and  the  desired  use  of  the  performance 
measures, and therefore, the performance measures were of little use to improve the 
organisational performance. Furthermore, Hernandez (2002) claims that performance 
measurement  practices  in  the  public  sector  in  general,  and  local  government  in 
particular, are normally misused.  As a result, the exercise becomes a data collection 
tool and a normal reporting exercise with little use to the strategic management of the 
organisations. As Bowerman et al. (2001) noted, the application of benchmarking as 
performance measurement tool in the UK local governments is “frequently limited to 
a  compulsory  and  defensive  mode  rather  than  an  improvement  one”  (p.  322).  In 
general,  despite  the  importance  of  performance  measurement  practices  to  local 
governments,  its  implementation  is  surrounded  by  numerous  challenges  and 
difficulties. As a result, local governments, like other public sector organisations, 
merely adopt and implement performance measurement for external legitimacy and 
have  little  relevance  for  improving  internal  organisational  efficiency  (Robinson, 
2003). 
 
The review of performance measurement practices in local government organisations 
reaches  three  main  conclusions.  Firstly,  there  has  been  an  increasing  trend  of 
studying performance measurement practices in public sector in general, and local 
governments in particular. The studies mainly focus on the development, adoption, 
implementation,  and evaluation  of performance measurement as  applied to  public 
sector organisations. Secondly, the literature records different and opposing views 
about  the  outcome  of  the  exercise  for  the  public  sector  in  general  and  more  
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particularly in local governments. Despite the claimed benefits of the exercise, the 
majority  of  the  studies  show  that  performance  measurement  has  not  successfully 
achieved its claimed benefits. Poor involvement of the key stakeholders, inadequate 
technical  capacity,  and  weak institutional  arrangements  represent  major obstacles. 
Lastly,  little  is  known  about  the  performance  measurement  of  local  governments 
located  in  emerging  economies.  There  have  only  been  a  few  performance 
measurement  related  studies    undertaken  in  emerging  economies,  and  these  have 
focussed on state owned enterprises (Abdel Aziz, Dixon, & Ragheb, 2005; de Waal 
& Augustin, 2005; Uddin & Tsamenyi, 2005), public sector banks (Kumar & Gulati, 
2009), and education colleges (de Waal, 2007). The few local governments’ studies 
tend to concentrate on financial analysis and managerial performance (Jaber & Sabri, 
2010;  Sabri  &  Jaber,  2007).  As  a  result,  it  is  not  known,  for  example,  how 
performance measurement is practiced and what factors influence its undertaking? As 
local governments in emerging economies depend heavily on central government and 
donors (Devas & Grant, 2003), little has also been recorded about the manner in 
which officials justify their performance, in order to accrue resources from these, and 
other sources. These concerns are addressed in the current study. 
2.5.3  Financial Reporting 
The  financial  reporting  practices  of  local  government  organisations  receive  much 
attention in the accounting literature. This is associated with the structural changes 
brought about by the NPM reforms and the corresponding commentary on the need to 
investigate financial reporting in local governments (Christensen & Yoshimi, 2001; 
Pilcher, 2011). This, in part, is a product of frequent changes to local governments’ 
financial reporting frameworks. The notable, and probably the most discussed one, is 
the  introduction  of  private  sector  financial  reporting  mechanisms  into  the  public 
sector organisations. This can be attributed to two main reasons: the involvement of 
private sector elements in public service delivery, and arrangements between public 
and private entities, such as public-private partnerships (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008). 
These  arrangements  require  comparable  financial  information,  which  has  led  the 
public sector to adopt private sector financial reporting practices, such as accrual 
accounting as imbedded in International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). 
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The introduction of accrual accounting into the public sector in general, and local 
governments in particular, can be traced back to the 1980s, when the public sector 
reforms were pioneered for the first time, with New Zealand and Australia among the 
early adopters of the practice (Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2009; Funnell & Cooper, 1999; 
Pallot, Chan, & Xiaoyue, 2002). Later, the adoption of accrual accounting spread to 
other countries as a result of the NPM agenda (Blondal, 2003). Currently, accrual 
accounting is commonly used in various decisions such as budgeting and planning, 
public private arrangements, and evaluation of health and education related projects 
(Ball, 1994; Likierman, 2000). Those who support accrual accounting in public sector 
entities  are  of  the  view  that  the  practice  enhances  efficiency,  effectiveness, 
transparency, and the accountability of public entities (Lye, Perera, & Rahman, 2005; 
Pilcher, 2011). This is accomplished by “providing a complete picture of resources, 
debt and revenues, [so that] public accounts may achieve better communication with 
stakeholders,  who  include  service  users,  citizens,  oversight  bodies  and  other 
interested bodies” (Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2009, p. 813). Also, accrual accounting is 
praised for providing full cost information, which is claimed to be useful for decision 
making  (Arnaboldi  &  Lapsley,  2009).  However,  there  are  concerns  about  the 
appropriateness of accrual accounting in the public sector in general (Arnaboldi & 
Lapsley, 2009; Guthrie, 1998; Pilcher, 2011; Pilcher & Dean, 2009a). For example, 
Guthrie (1998) questions the appropriateness of the business focus and the outdated 
management  accounting  techniques  embedded  in  accrual  accounting.  Pilcher  and 
Dean (2009a) are also of the view that aspect of accrual accounting, especially IFRSs, 
increases financial, political, and social costs to local governments. They claim that 
local governments spend too much time complying with the reporting requirements, 
which are not always relevant. They further argued that IFRSs place more emphasis 
on bottom up reporting which loose political and social identity of local government 
organisations  to  the  communities.  Similarly,  Pilcher  (2011)  observed  that  local 
governments are forced to adopt IFRSs which have less value internally. The practice 
is  also  regarded as  time consuming  and costly, and there is  a high  possibility of 
accounting  manipulation  (Pilcher,  2011).  Accrual  accounting  is  also  criticised  for 
having  little  impact  to  users  of  public  sector  financial  information  (Arnaboldi  & 
Lapsley, 2009). Pilcher and Dean (2009b)  went further and argued that there are 
massive  legislation  requirements  facing  the  public  sector  organisations,  and  the  
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adoption of accrual accounting increases the reporting burdens for local governments. 
As a result, important management accounting issues are ignored. 
 
Despite these concerns, accrual accounting, as one of the private sector reporting 
practices  became  popular  in  the  public  sector  generally  (Lapsley,  Mussari,  & 
Paulsson, 2009). It has been applied in both developed and developing countries with 
different results and time-scale and the debate on its relevance to the public sector 
entities,  including  LGO,  is  far  from  over.  As  evidenced  in  the  discussion  above, 
IFRSs as one of the components of accrual accounting is also penetrating LGOs and 
further reaction to its impact is expected. It is in this context that some accounting 
researchers  have  appealed  for  comprehensive  and  effective  regulations  of  the 
financial reporting practices in the public sector in general, as opposed to piecemeal 
adoption of the private sector reporting mechanisms (Lye et al., 2005; Mack & Ryan, 
2006; Mayston, 1992). 
2.5.4  Management Accounting 
Management accounting is regarded as the most researched topic in public sector 
accounting literature (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008), and the introduction of public 
sector  management  reforms  is  partly  attributed  to  this  trend.  The  reforms  mainly 
involve the adoption of private sector management accounting techniques, such as 
ABC, benchmarking, the balanced score card, and target costing (Lapsley & Wright, 
2004; McAdam & Walker, 2003). These techniques are normally diffused into the 
public  sector  entities  through  professional  membership,  management  accounting 
publications, central governments’ recommendations, and with legislations (Lapsley 
&  Wright,  2004).  These  techniques,  which  are  highly  influenced  by  central 
government,  play  an  important  role  in  the  implementation,  and  subsequent 
evaluation,  of  the  NPM  related  reforms  (Tambulasi,  2007;  ter  Bogt,  2008;  Van 
Helden, 2005). Notwithstanding the impact of NPM reforms on the introduction of 
management accounting into the public sector, there are also rationality arguments 
behind the practice, as reflected by Likierman (1994): 
 
“…the influence of management accounting techniques in central government has 
developed  dramatically  in  the  past  ten  years.  From  being  at  the  fringes  of 
administrative practices, such techniques are increasingly an essential part of key  
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managerial developments. There can be  doubt that these initiatives have required 
management accounting…without them implementation of the key reforms would 
not have been possible” (p.109). 
 
Thus, management  accounting is  not  only  a product  of  the public sector reforms 
agenda,  but  also  an  important  agent  which  facilitates  the  reform  programs. 
Additionally,  management  accounting  is  an  important  aspect    of  development 
programs  (Hopper  et  al.,  2009).  It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  management 
accounting  techniques,  such  as  ABC,  benchmarking,  and  balanced  score  cards 
receive considerable attention in LGOs (Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2003; Ball et al., 2000; 
Bowerman et al., 2001; Bowerman et al., 2002; Kloot & Martin, 2000; McAdam & 
Walker, 2003). Within the public sector management accounting research, budgetary 
practices and performance measurement receive the highest attention, followed by 
cost accounting, especially in schools and hospitals (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008; Van 
Helden, 2005).  
 
There is also a growing interest in studying management accounting research in the 
context  of  developing  countries  (Alawattage,  Hopper,  &  Wickramasinghe,  2007; 
Hopper  et  al.,  2009;  Tambulasi,  2007;  Uddin  &  Tsamenyi,  2005).  Despite  this 
promising trend, the literature records mixed reactions to the impact of these modern 
management accounting techniques on the public sector entities. For instance, Nyland 
and  Pettersen  (2004)  found  that  the  accounting  information  available  in  the 
Norwegian University hospital was irrelevant to decision making. Investment budgets 
and salary, which were the main accounting activities, were controlled at the top, 
leaving the lower levels with little freedom. As a result, management decisions were 
made without accounting justification.  Related findings were reported by Scarparo 
(2006) in NHS hospitals in Scotland and hospitals in Sweden. Examining interactions 
between  management  accounting  methods  and  clinical  practices,  Scarparo  (2006) 
observed  that  evaluation  of  medical  care  and  cost  control  was  highly  needed  by 
participants.  Despite  a  general  recognition  of  the  importance  of  accounting 
information for decision making, doctors, nurses, and managers in Scotland opposed 
a move to integrate management accounting methods and clinical practices. They 
were of the view that the two issues were different and should not be integrated.  In 
contrast, doctors, nurses and managers in Swedish hospitals welcomed the integration  
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of management accounting methods and clinical practices. In fact, “the availability of 
costing information to medical professionals is perceived as a way of strengthening 
clinician’s sphere of governance” (Scarparo, 2006, p. 153). Likewise, Järvinen (2006) 
observed that that institutional pressures and efficient criterion were driving forces 
towards the adoption of management accounting techniques (in this case ABC) in 
Finnish university hospitals. Contradictory observation was made by Pendlebury and 
Algaber  (1997).  In  a  survey  about  the  cost  of  central  support  services  in  UK 
universities, they found that half of the universities visited were using top-slicing 
rather than appropriate cost allocation. Other Universities replaced cost allocation 
with service level agreements, internal market prices, and market testing.  
 
As  a  result,  management  accounting  had  little  value  within  the  decision  making 
processes. As these studies demonstrate, there are mixed results regarding the impact 
of modern management accounting techniques within public sector organisations, and 
this  warrants  further  investigation.  In  general,  management  accounting  has  been 
applied in the public sectors of both developing and developed countries to a varying 
degree. Within the public sector, the practices are highly used by LGOs. Because 
public  sector  accounting  research  in  general,  and  management  accounting  in 
particular,  is  context  specific  (Broadbent  &  Guthrie,  1992,  2008;  Hopper  et  al., 
2009), the current study adds to our understanding of the manner in which aspects of 
management accounting, such as budget and performance measurement, are practiced 
in Tanzanian LGAs. 
2.5.5  Performance Auditing 
Performance auditing, or value for money auditing (VFMA), is one of the important 
components of the public sector accountability mechanisms (Jacobs, 2000). Whilst 
there  has  been  considerable  research  into  performance  auditing  in  central 
government, little attention has been paid to local governments (Johnsen, Meklin, 
Oulasvirta, & Vakkuri, 2001). This limits our understanding of the practice as applied 
in LGOs. The sparse performance auditing research carried out on local governments 
has tended to concentrate on the examination and evaluation of the various NPM 
initiatives, such as Public Private Partnerships (English, 2003; Johnsen et al., 2001; 
Pollitt, 2003; Torres & Pina, 2001). For example, the survey carried out by Torres 
and  Pina  (2001)  into  the  EU,  and  Spanish  local  governments,  observed  that  
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performance audit is very important when evaluating the projects carried out under 
PPP arrangements. This is attributed to the fact that most of the projects were not 
captured in the organisations’ balance sheets. Therefore, the absence of an effective 
value for money audit would cast doubt on the efficiency and transparency of the 
projects.  Similarly,  local  governments  in  Finland  and  Norway,  though  portraying 
different  patterns,  have  extensively  made  use  of  the  performance  audit  reports 
(Johnsen et al., 2001). Performance auditing practices were not decoupled and were 
actually used in the daily operations of the municipalities and counties studied. The 
practice is also important for cost saving and enhancing efficiency in the public sector 
modernisation agenda (Lapsley & Pong, 2000). 
 
Despite  its  potential,  there  are  concerns  about  the  effectiveness  of  performance 
auditing in the public sector in general, and local governments in particular. Johnsen 
et al. (2001) are of the opinion that the effectiveness of the performance auditing in 
local governments is dependent on the clarity of the goals. They asserted that when 
the  local  governments’  goals  are  neither  clear  nor  audit  oriented,  performance 
auditing becomes challenging and its value is debatable. A related concern was raised 
by Lapsley and Pong (2000), who were of the opinion that performance audit in the 
public  sector  is  constrained  by  clear  determination  of  best  practices  and  the 
unreliability of performance indicators. As a result, the practice is problematic and 
becomes more operational than strategic. Furthermore, performance auditing is also 
criticised for putting more pressures and demands on the auditee (Pollitt, 2003). This 
casts doubt on the efficiency of the exercise, and the possibility for the compliance 
games to be played is high. Lack of independence facing the public sector auditors 
also minimises the full potential of the performance audit within public organisations 
(Pollitt, 2003). As with any other audit, performance auditing is also regarded as a 
post-mortem  exercise,  which  is  sometimes  ignored  during  the  planning  phase 
(Johnsen  et  al.,  2001).  Notwithstanding  these  concerns,  performance  audit  is  an 
important  ingredient  of  the  accountability  and  efficiency  of  public  sector 
organisations.  It  is  even  more  important  in  the  current  reforms  to  public  sector 
organisations “especially in the development of performance reporting and whole-of 
government financial statements and to this extent can be regarded as legitimating 
them”  (Pallot,  2003,  p.  151).  That’s  why  government  auditors  are  consistently  
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consolidating  their  claims  to  expertise  to  undertake  performance  audit  through 
professional  networks  (Gendron,  Cooper,  &  Townley,  2007).  By  providing 
descriptions of the performance auditing in the Tanzanian Councils, the current study 
contributes to this literature. 
2.5.6  Accounting for Infrastructure Assets 
Accounting for infrastructure assets is an emerging issue in public sector financial 
accounting (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008). The deterioration of infrastructure assets 
and the adoption of accrual basis of accounting are claimed to be the major reasons 
for  the  growing  interest  of  accounting  for  infrastructure  assets  in  public  sector 
organisations (Pallot, 1997). The practice is more important to local governments as 
compared to the rest of public sector organisations, because in most countries, local 
governments  own  a  substantial  portion  of  the  total  public  assets  in  the  form  of 
infrastructures  (Pallot,  1997).  Therefore,  appropriate  accounting  for  infrastructure 
assets  has  the  potential  to  improve  the  management  of  public  assets  overall. 
However, there has  been  debate  about  the appropriate mechanisms to  be used to 
account  for  infrastructure  assets.  Pallot  (1997)  categorizes  the  debate  into  three 
camps. The first group regards infrastructure assets to be the same as any other assets, 
and thus argue that normal depreciation should be charged, while the other extreme 
group argues that infrastructure assets are completely different from other assets and 
should be treated completely different. Between these two extremes, he also identifies 
another camp who argue for a middle range. This group recognizes a peculiar feature 
of infrastructure assets which requires special considerations (see Pallot, 1992). In 
general, there is a continuing debate about how the infrastructure assets of public 
organisations should be accounted (see Aiken, 1994; Christiaens, Rommel, & Barton, 
2006; McCrae & Aiken, 2000; Pallot, 1992). 
 
Regardless  of  the  current  debate  about  accounting  for  infrastructure  assets,  the 
practice has been applied and some research has been carried out on the subject. For 
instance,  in  New  Zealand,  Pallot  (1997)  reports  successful  accounting  for 
infrastructure  assets  by  the  country’s  local  governments.  Despite  the  fact  that 
organisations had insufficient standards to accommodate the practice, they were able 
to  account  for  infrastructure  assets,  which  satisfied  not  only  the  technical 
requirements  but  also  the  political  context.  Similarly,  reporting  on  the  state  of  
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infrastructure  in  Australian  local  governments,  Walker,  Clarke,  and  Dean  (1999) 
observed that the Councils not only accounted for assets as per required by standards, 
but also detailed additional information concerning infrastructure assets in the form 
of supplementary reports. The additional information included the physical condition 
of the assets, an estimate cost of bringing it to a satisfactory condition, and an annual 
maintenance cost thereafter. Though there were concerns over the reliability of the 
cost  estimates  and  insufficient  understanding  of  the  guidelines,  the  additional 
information presented by the local governments was found to be more relevant to 
external parties and local government asset managers than that which was needed by 
the legal accounting standards (Walker et al., 1999). Despite this promising trend, 
Pallot  (1997)  is  of  the  view  that  the  political  dimensions  of  accounting  for 
infrastructure assets could be strengthened by adopting a comprehensive view of the 
ownership and control of public assets.  
2.6  Public Sector Accounting Research in Emerging Economies 
Although there has been widespread accounting research in developed countries, less 
has been undertaken in emerging economies (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008; Goddard, 
2010; Hopper et al., 2009; Rahaman, 2010). The few studies conducted in emerging 
economies tend to focus on the privatisation of state owned enterprises (Rahaman et 
al., 2004; Uddin, 2005; Uddin & Hopper, 2001, 2003; Uddin & Tsamenyi, 2005; 
Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005). These studies show that accounting practices are 
highly influenced by the funding agencies such as the World Bank (WB) and the 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  as  well  as  the  political  and  economic 
environments  of  these  countries.  For  instance,  Uddin  and  Tsamenyi  (2005)  and 
Tsamenyi et al. (2010) found that management and privatisation, and consequently 
accounting practices, in the Ghanaian public sector entities were highly influenced by 
the  World  Bank  and  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF).  As  a  result,  whilst  the 
privatised  entities  reported  improved  performance,  Tsamenyi  and  his  colleagues 
established that the trend had not effectively benefited the Ghanaian population. A 
similar observation was made by Rahaman et al. (2004), where accounting processes 
(environment management and reporting) in an electric company in Ghana saved the 
interest of the World Bank at the expense of the social population through increasing 
the  price  of  electricity.  It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  accounting  in  emerging 
economies is not only affected by the influence of transnational organisations such as  
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the  Word  Bank  and  IMF,  but  also  affects  the  policies  underpinning  these 
organisations.  This  has  manifested  in  various  Less  Developing  Countries  (LDCs) 
where  accounting  had  affected  and  been  affected  by,  the  Structural  Adjustment 
Programme  (SAP)  (Neu,  Rahaman,  Everett,  &  Akindayomi,  2010;  Uddin  et  al., 
2011). For example, it was observed in Nigeria that accounting was not only used 
symbolically  to  legitimize  the  structural  adjustment  policies,  but  also  to  provide 
important milestones for the effective implementation of the programme (Neu et al., 
2010). 
 
The influence of colonization on the accounting practices in emerging economies also 
receives considerable attention (Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008; Gujarathi & 
Dean, 1993; Hammond, Clayton, & Arnold, 2009; Hammond, Clayton, & Arnold, 
2011; Sian, 2006, 2007, 2011a; Uddin et al., 2011). These studies reveal the under-
developed  nature  of  the  accounting  profession  in  emerging  economies,  which 
constrain its effective undertaking. The shortage of competent accounting staff and 
ineffective  accounting  regulations  were  highly  cited  reasons  for  the  under-
development, and these were mainly attributed to colonization. For example, Sian 
(2006) found that Kenya had only 6 locally qualified CPA’s in 1973 (i.e. 10 years 
after its independence). These anomalies constrain the effective undertaking of the 
accounting practices in emerging economies.  
 
Furthermore, there has been a growing interest to study accounting history in the 
developing countries (Carmona & Ezzamel, 2007; Ezzamel, 1997, 2009; Ezzamel & 
Hoskin, 2002; Maltby & Tsamenyi, 2010). These studies focus on the relationships 
between early civilizations and accounting practices. For instance, Ezzamel (2009) 
noted that the accounting in ancient Egyptian culture was used to legitimize authority 
in the early years, by intertwining space and time to create a systematic and orderly 
society. Thus, accounting had an impact on the social, political, and economic order 
of the early Egyptian civilizations. Similarly, Maltby and Tsamenyi (2010) revealed 
the manner in which financial reporting had been used as a tool for domination and 
agent  for  exploitation  in  the  Gold  Coast,  Ghana  (see  also  Alawattage  & 
Wickramasinghe, 2008). Therefore, combining privatisation and accounting history 
provides  an  important  means  to  understand  accounting  practices  in  emerging  
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economies  in  both  colonialist  and  imperialist  periods.  Whilst  the  state  owned 
enterprises of the emerging economies have received the attention of researchers, the 
same  has  not  effectively  extended  to  central  and  local  governments,  with  the 
exception of few studies such as Tambulasi (2007), Jaber and Sabri (2010), and Sabri 
and Jaber (2007). The limited research about the central and local governments of 
emerging economies constrains our understanding of how accounting is implemented 
in these countries. The current study, which investigated accounting practices in the 
Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs), is an important step to address this 
lacuna. 
2.7  Synthesis of Accounting Research in Local Governments 
The  literature  documents  a  wide  spread  of  research  conducted  into  LGOs.  The 
research has been mostly focused on areas such as governance and accountability, 
performance measurement, financial reporting, management accounting, performance 
auditing, and accounting for infrastructure assets. These studies, to a large extent, 
have been driven by the reforms introduced into local governments as part of the 
overall public sector reform programs advocated and embraced by NPM. Parallel to 
what Likierman (1994) noted in central government, accounting is also an important 
element of local governments’ operations. Accounting has been involved throughout 
the adoption, implementation, and evaluation of the various reforms introduced into 
local governments. It has acted as an agent of the reforms, while, at the same time,  
‘legitimating’  them  (Kurunmaki  et  al.,  2003).  Furthermore,  accounting  in  local 
governments  is  affecting,  and  being  affected  by,  social,  political,  economic, 
institutional  arrangements,  and  the  cultural  settings  of  organisations.  It  is  in  this 
context  which  accounting,  and  its  related  output,  varies  amongst  the  local 
governments  both  within  the  country  and  outside.  In  general,  there  is  a  growing 
interest in researching accounting practices in local governments, and the frequent 
changes in the operations of local governments will increase research interest even 
further. 
2.8  Problem Statement 
Accounting information has been used by the public sector organisations for different 
purposes. The nature of the usage is normally changes responding to, and facilitating, 
the operational changes of the public sector organisations (Marwata & Alam, 2006; 
ter Bogt, 2008). This has expedited the increase of public sector accounting research  
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which focuses on aspects such as financial reporting and management accounting. Of 
the  public  sector  entities,  local  government  organisations  are  highly  affected  by 
reform programs (Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley & Pallot, 2000; Tambulasi, 
2007; ter Bogt  & Jan van Helden, 2000). This  is attributed to the fact  that local 
governments  are  accountable  to  both  central  government  and  their  community 
(Lapsley & Mussari, 2008). Therefore, accounting has been regarded as an important 
communication vehicle, and, as a result, there have been increasing trends to study 
accounting  practices  in  local  governments.  Despite  this,  there  are  three  related 
concerns. Firstly, the majority of the empirical accounting research into public sector 
entities has originated from the positivistic tradition (Goddard, 2010), normally using 
quantitative  instruments  such  as  questionnaires,  survey,  and  database  for  data 
collection.  The  ability  of  these  instruments  to  capture  accurately  the  complex 
meanings of accounting attached to multiple stakeholders in the public sector entities 
is questionable (Parker, 2008). As a result, little is known about how accounting is 
actually  practiced  in  public  sector  entities  in  general,  and  local  governments,  in 
particular. 
 
Secondly,  there  are  concerns  that  the  majority  of  the  public  sector  accounting 
research is descriptive and lacks theoretical foundations (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008; 
Goddard, 2010; Van Helden, 2005). For instance, a recent review of the public sector 
accounting research done by Goddard (2010) shows that public sector accounting 
research  without  theoretical  foundations  comprised  about  42.5%  (descriptive  and 
normative) of the total 188 papers reviewed. Despite the fact that the review had a 
wider scope than previous studies (see Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992, 2008; Scapens & 
Bromwich, 2001; Van Helden, 2005), there was still a high proportion of descriptive 
studies. This limits the theoretical understanding of accounting practices as applied in 
the public sector organisations. 
 
Thirdly, public sector accounting research has paid little attention to the emerging 
economies (Broadbent  & Guthrie, 1992, 2008; Goddard, 2010). Exemplifying the 
lack of engagement of critical accounting research in Africa as one of the highly 
marginalised domains of the emerging economies, Rahaman (2010) commented: 
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“[  ] since its inception in 1990 Critical Perspectives on Accounting has published 
651 articles in 108 issues, of which only nine articles [9] are focused specifically on 
African issues”(pp. 420-421) (emphasis added). 
 
Since public sector accounting research is context specific (Broadbent & Guthrie, 
1992,  2008),  lack  of  research  about  the  emerging  economies  constrains  our 
understanding on the manner in which accounting has been applied in these countries. 
This  may  be  attributed  to  the  cultural,  ideological,  institutional,  economic,  and 
political  differences  between developed and emerging economies, which arguably 
influence accounting practices differently (Hopper et al., 2009; Wallace, 1990). Also, 
unlike developed countries, where most of the public services have been privatised, 
public sector entities in emerging economies are highly involved in public service 
provisions  such  as  water,  electricity,  health,  and  education  (Ngwilizi,  2001). 
Therefore, lack of research into accounting practices in the public sectors of these 
countries reduces the practical and theoretical understanding of the role of accounting 
to address poverty and governance issues, which are regarded as the main problems 
of emerging economies (Hopper et al., 2009). 
 
The study under consideration has addressed the above concerns. The interpretive 
approach used in this study allowed full understanding of accounting in the public 
sector  organisations  in  which  it  is  practiced.  The  current  study  also  integrates 
grounded theory and institutional theory, which increases the theoretical ‘depth’ of 
the research findings by offering various theoretical explanations of the adoption of 
accounting practices and related consequences in the organisational operations. Also, 
by locating this study in Tanzania, it is hoped to increase the body of research into 
public sector accounting in the emerging economies, and also to address the unique 
issues pertaining to these countries. 
2.9  Research Questions 
This  study  investigated  accounting  practices  in  Tanzanian  LGAs.  It  adopted  the 
interpretive  mode  of  investigation.  This  enabled  the  researcher  to  solicit  the 
perceptions and shared meanings of the Councils’ officials on accounting practices. It 
also enabled to obtain multiple realities of accounting as practiced in the Councils. 
The tenet of the current research was that a full understanding of accounting practices  
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can  be  effectively  achieved  by  reference  to  the  particular  settings  in  which  it  is 
operated (Creswell et al., 2003).  It was in this context that the field based research 
approach was considered to be appropriate. Therefore, the current research studied 
accounting practices from the lived experience of the Councils’ officials (Parker & 
Roffey, 1997). Drawing from the interpretive line of inquiry, the study was guided by 
the following main research questions:  
 
1.  How do the members of LGAs in Tanzania perceive accounting practices in 
their daily activities? 
 
2.  How  do  accounting  practices  differ  among  the  levels  of  the  LGAs,  and 
between primary education and health services? 
 
3.  How do the members of LGAs in Tanzania describe the operational changes 
occurring in their organisations?  
 
4.  How do the external bodies influence undertaking of the accounting practices 
in the Tanzanian LGAs? 
2.10  Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the impact of NPM on local governments. The overall aim 
of the review was to obtain a deep understanding of the changes introduced into the 
public sector in general, and local governments in particular, and their impacts on the 
accounting practices. The literature shows that accounting is both an agent and an 
outcome of NPM practices. This has increased research interest in local governments 
in  areas  such  as  financial  reporting,  management  accounting,  auditing,  and 
performance measurement. Despite this positive trend, the chapter has highlighted 
three inherent limitations of public sector accounting research, which are that it has 
been positivisticly based, that there has been without theoretical foundations, and that 
there has been little research into accounting practices on local governments in the 
emerging  economies.  Based  on  these  inferences,  the  research  problem  was 
formulated  to  investigate  the  accounting  practices  in  the  Tanzanian  local 
governments. The research questions concluded the chapter. The following chapter 
provides detailed descriptions of Local Government Authorities in Tanzania. 
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Chapter Three 
Tanzanian Local Government Authorities 
3.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  offers  a  general  overview  of  the  Tanzanian  Local  Government 
Authorities (LGAs) and detailed descriptions of the four LGAs visited. It specifically 
covers the background information, levels as well as the political and administrative 
structures of the Tanzanian Councils. The chapter also discusses profiles of the main 
research sites. These include biographic characteristics, trends of own revenues and 
expenditures,  the  accounting  establishment,  and  their  education  and  health 
information. It concludes with brief descriptions of the Councils’ stakeholders and 
the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP). 
3.2  Background Information of the Tanzanian LGAs 
The United Republic of Tanzania (URT) is the union of the two former countries, 
Tanganyika  and  Zanzibar,  which  occurred  on  26
th  April,  1964.  Tanganyika  and 
Zanzibar separately obtained their independence from the British Protectorate System 
on 9
th December, 1961, and 10
th December, 1963 respectively. As at the end of the 
fieldwork, October 2011, the country had 26
3 regions comprising 21 in Mainl and 
Tanzania and 5 in Zanzibar. All local governments are located within these regions. 
However, local government affairs are not included in the articles of union and each 
part, Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, has its own system of local government. The 
study  under  considerat ion  was  conducted  in  Mainland  Tanzania  (henceforth 
Tanzania). The establishment of Local Government Authorities in  Tanzania can be 
traced back to 1962,  following the enactment of the Local Government Ordinance 
(Amendment)  Act  No.  4  of  1962.  The  Act  was   enacted  to  introduce  local 
governments and overturn the power given to the local leaders in the admini stration 
of local government by the  African Chiefs (Special Powers) Ordinance . The local 
governments were then abolished in 1972, but gradually reintroduced  from 1976-
1982. The establishment of  the local governments  then received  its mandate from 
articles 145 (1) & (2) and 146 (1) & (2) of the Constitution of the URT (URT, 1977). 
As operationalization of these articles, the Local Government (District Authorities) 
Act No. 7 of 1982 and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982 
                                                 
3 Sometimes later after the fieldwork, (i.e. March, 2012), 4 more regions were established 
making a total of 30 regions (Government Notice No. 72 of 2012).  
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were  enacted.  According  to  these  acts,  the  main  functions  of  the  LGAs  are  “to 
maintain and facilitate the maintenance of peace, order and good governance within 
its area of jurisdiction, to promote social welfare and economic well-being of all 
persons within its area of jurisdiction, and subject to the national policy and plans for 
rural and urban development, to further the social and economic development of its 
area of jurisdiction” (Section 111(1) of the Local Government (District Authorities) 
Act No.7 of 1982 and Section 54(1) of the Local Government (Urban Authorities) 
Act No. 8 of 1982). 
3.3  Levels of the Tanzanian LGAs 
There  are  two  main  levels  of  local  governments  in  Tanzania;  rural  and  urban 
authorities.  Rural  authorities  comprise  Village  Authorities,  Township  Authorities, 
and  District  Councils.  They  are  governed  by  the  Local  Government  (District 
Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982. Urban authorities form the other level, and include 
City, Municipal, and Town Councils. They are governed by the Local Government 
(Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982. Rural and urban authorities have power to 
enact by-laws, prepare annual budgets, and collect specified taxes within their area of 
jurisdiction.  The  following  paragraphs  provide  brief  information  about  rural 
authorities (Township, Village and District Councils), followed by urban authorities 
(City, Municipal, and Town Councils).  
 
Section 13(1) and section 22(1) of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act 
No.  7  of  1982  provides  a  legal  mandate  for  the  establishment  of  Township  and 
Village Authorities respectively. Administratively, Township Authority is headed by 
Executive Director, while Village Authority is headed by a Village Executive Officer 
(VEO). They consist of various departments for discharging various functions. Full 
Council and Village Assembly form the highest organs of the Township Authorities 
and  Villages  respectively.  Section  35  of  the  same  act  also  provides  for  the 
establishment of Village Committees dealing with matters such as planning, finance, 
economic affairs and social services. The Village Councils have a responsibility to 
propose the Village by-laws to be adopted by the Village Assembly, before being 
submitted  to  the  District  Council  for  approval.  A  Ward  Development  Committee 
(WDC)  provides  a  link  between  Villages/Suburbs  and  Districts/Municipals.  The 
Village Authority is the lowest level of rural authority in Tanzania. Below the Village  
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level,  there  are  hamlets  which  are  not  recognised  as  Councils  and  are  directly 
supervised by the Village to which they belong. On the other hand, the establishment 
of  the  District  Councils  is  provided  under  section  5(1)  of  the  Local  Government 
(District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982. Full Council, which consists of elected and 
appointed Councillors, form the supreme organ of the District Council. It is headed 
by  the  Council  Chairperson  from  amongst  the  Councillors.  Administratively,  the 
District Council is managed by a District Executive Director (DED), who reports to 
the  Full  Council  on  a  quarterly  basis.  District  Councils  are  responsible  for  the 
supervision of all social and economic plans within their jurisdiction. They are also 
responsible for approving the Village by-laws and coordinating the Villages’ plans, 
projects, and programmes.  
 
Urban Councils form the second level of the Tanzanian LGAs. Section 5(1) of the 
Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982 gives power to the minister 
responsible  for  local  governments  to  establish  urban  Councils.  Tanzanian  urban 
authorities include City, Municipal, and Town Councils. As with District Councils, 
urban  authorities  are  managed  by  Council  Directors  and  supervised  by  the  Full 
Council.  They  are  responsible  for  undertaking  a  variety  of  social  and  economic 
development  activities  in  their  areas  of  jurisdiction.  Their  departments  cover  the 
functions  of finance,  administration, planning, procurement,  education,  health and 
legal.  The  neighbourhood  or  suburb  is  the  lowest  level  of  urban  authority  in 
Tanzania.  All  LGAs  are  responsible  to  the  Prime  Minister’s  Office-Regional 
Administration  and  Local  Government  (PMO-RALG).  The  various  levels  of  the 
Tanzanian LGAs are represented in the figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Main Levels of Tanzanian LGAs 
 
Source: Internal Documents 
 
NB:  *Township  and  village  authorities  were  under  city,  municipal,  town,  or 
district Councils. 
  ** Selected LGAs 
 
At the end of fieldwork, October 2011, there were 134 local governments in the 
country, which comprised 4 City Councils, 17 Municipal Councils, 7 Town Councils, 
and  106  District  Councils.  There  were  also  97  designated  Township  Authorities, 
10,397 registered Villages, 2555 division Wards, 1755 Suburbs, and 50836 Hamlets 
which fall within 134 LGAs. The classification of the local government authorities 
depends on factors such as population, location, level of economic development, and 
the size of the territory. It is also important to note that some City Councils, such as 
TGCC (pseudonym) had no sole jurisdiction and were not actively involved in social 
and economic activities. Also, Town Councils and Township Authorities depend on 
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the  Councils  in  which  they  are  located  for  financial  support.  Therefore,  because 
District  and  Municipal  Councils  have  an  independent  jurisdiction,  local  specified 
taxes, and are actively involved in social and economic development activities, this 
study investigated accounting practices in two District Councils (KBDC and MCDC) 
and two Municipal Councils (KAMC and MDMC), all located in Mainland Tanzania. 
3.4  General Structure of the Tanzanian LGAs 
Tanzanian  LGAs  are  subjected  to  two  structures,  which  fall  into  political  and 
administrative  arrangements.  Politically,  all  Councils  are  supervised  by  the  Full 
Council, which is formed by elected and appointed Councillors, as well as Members 
of Parliament located in the Council’s jurisdiction. The Full Council is the supreme 
body of a Council and is headed by the Council Chairperson, who is elected from 
amongst the Councillors. Each Council has three permanent standing committees, 
namely, Finance and Administration, Economic Affairs, Health and Education,  as 
well  as  Urban  Planning  and  Development.  There  is  also  a  special  committee  for 
HIV/AIDS  and  ethics.  All  committees  meet  on  a  monthly  basis  to  discuss  the 
Council’s progress reports in their respective sections, and report to the Full Council 
on a quarterly basis. The Finance and Administration committee (henceforth, Finance 
Committee) is charged with all Council’s financial related matters. At the Ward level, 
there  is  a  Ward  Development  Committee  (WDC),  which  is  chaired  by  a  Ward 
Councillor. The WDC is made up of the social services, health and environment, law 
and  order,  economic  services  committees,  and  suburbs/village  committee.  The 
general political structure of the Councils is shown in the following figure. 
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Figure 2: Council Political Structure 
 
Source: Internal Documents 
 
Administratively,  all  Councils  are  headed  by  a  Council  Executive  Director.  The 
Directors  are  responsible  for  the  coordination  and  supervision  of  the  day  to  day 
operations of the Councils. The usual departments of the Councils are: Internal Audit, 
Legal and Security, Fire and Works services, Community Development and Social 
Services, Education and Culture, Finance, Trade and Industry, and Personnel and 
Administration.  The  administrative  functions  of  the  Councils  are  supervised  by  a 
Council Management Team (CMT), which consists of Heads of Departments and 
Sections, and it is headed by a Council Director. The CMT meets daily and usually 
reports to the standing committees on a monthly basis. The general administrative 
structure of the Councils is shown in the following figure: 
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Figure 3: Councils’ Administrative Structure 
 
Source: Internal Documents 
 
The operations of the Councils at the lower levels are closely monitored by a WDC, 
which acts as a link between the Council and Villages or Suburbs. WDC is headed by 
a Ward Councillor and administered on a daily basis by a Ward Executive Officer 
(WEO). Each WDC is composed of a Councillor, Chairpersons of all the Village 
Councils within the Ward, member(s) of the District Council who reside in the Ward, 
and invitees from any other voluntary groups involved in the development of the 
Ward
4. WDC has a  number of functional Departments, such as Trade, Agriculture 
and Livestock, Community Development, Health and Environment, Education, and 
Revenue collections. WDC is responsible for developing and subsequent monitoring 
of the general development plans of the Ward as well as reviewing and approving the 
projects to be executed at the Village level. However, the final approval of the 
Village’s  projects  is  made  by  District  Development  Committee  (DDC). 
Suburbs/Village Executive Officer reports to the WEO about social and economic 
matters  pertaining to  a particular Suburb/Village. The following  figure  shows the 
Ward administrative structure. 
 
                                                 
4 Section 31, Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 6 of 1999. 
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Figure 4: Ward Administrative Structure 
 
 
Source: Internal Documents 
3.5  The Profiles of the Main Research Sites Visited 
This study was undertaken in four LGAs located in Mainland Tanzania. These were 
KAMC, KBDC, MCDC, and MDMC. The actual names of the research sites have 
been  withheld  for  confidential  reasons.  KBDC  was  added  at  a  later  stage  of  the 
fieldwork, the study having had to drop BEDC due to the financial scandal within the 
Council, which led to the resignation, and subsequent prosecution, of key Council’s 
officials, including the Council Director, the Internal Auditor, and the Treasurer. The 
timing of the fieldwork coincided with the financial investigation, which created a 
hostile environment, and necessitated the dropping of the Council as a research site. 
In order to obtain in-depth understanding of the Tanzanian Councils in general, all 
four Councils covered in this study were located in different regions. The two district 
Councils  visited  acted  as  rural  representatives,  while  the  Municipal  Councils 
represented  the  urban  contexts.  All  the  Councils  fell  within  the  political  and 
administrative structures shown in figure 5, 6, and 7. The biographical characteristics, 
patterns of each Council’s self-generated incomes and expenditures, each Council’s 
accounting establishment, and statistics of the education and health facilities of the 
Councils visited are provided in the following sub-sections. 
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3.5.1  Biographic Characteristics of the Councils 
As at October 2011 (the end of fieldwork), KAMC had 4 divisions, 34 wards, and 
127 suburbs. According to the 2002 National Census, the Council had a population of 
1,088,867 inhabitants (549,929 males; 538,938 females) with a growth rate of 4.1%. 
It had an area of 531 square kilometres and the population density was estimated at 
2051 people per square kilometre. In contrast, MDMC was the smallest Municipal 
Council in the country with an area of about 58 square kilometres only. It had 2 
divisions, 16 administrative wards, and 60 suburbs. According to the 2002 National 
Census, the Council had 143,799 inhabitants (70,678 males; 73,121 females). Of the 
District Councils visited, KBDC was located in a peripheral area, although not very 
far away from a city centre. It had an area of 4464 square kilometres covering 4 
divisions, 14 wards, and 77 registered villages. The National Census of 2002 shows 
that the Council had a population of 95,323 inhabitants. Another District Council, 
MCDC,  was  located  in  a  very  peripheral  area  in  ‘up  country’.  It  was  a  newly 
established  Council,  which  started  its  operation  as  a  full-fledged  Council  only  in 
2005
5. The Council land area was 7325 square kilometres constituting 4 divisions, 17 
wards, and 101 registered villages. The C ouncil estimated population was 259,347 
inhabitants (131,256 males; 129,26 9 female) in 2005, with an  annual population 
growth rate  of  1.7%
6. Table  1  summarizes the biographical characteristics of the 
Councils visited. 
 
Table 1: Biographic Characteristics of the Research Sites 
LGAs  Area (Sq Km)  Population  Divisions  Wards  Village/Suburbs 
KAMC  531  1,088,867  4  34  127 
MDMC  58  143,799  2  16  60 
KBDC  4464  95,323  4  14  77 
MCDC  7325  259,347  4  17  101 
 
Sources:  United Republic of Tanzania Population and Housing Censuses: 1978, 
 1988, 2002, and Regional Commissioner’s Office, 2006. 
 
                                                 
5Government Gazette No. 366/02 of 02/08/2002. 
6 Regional Commissioners’ Office, 2006  
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3.5.2 Self-Generated Incomes and Expenditures 
The  Councils’  self-generated  incomes  were  mainly  obtained  through  specified 
sources, such as property taxes, service levy, crop cess, forest produce cess, guest 
house levy, billboard fees, and fines and penalties. The revenues obtained from these 
sources were locally referred to as ‘own sources’. In general, the own sources of the 
Tanzanian Councils were not sufficient to meet even their recurrent expenditures (see 
section 7.6.3). That’s why the Councils depended heavily from the Government and 
donors. An examination of own sources of the Councils visited compared with their 
total  income  (i.e.  own  sources  and  total  funds  from  the  Government  grants  and 
donors) revealed the same trend. The self-generated incomes of the Councils visited 
did not reach even a third of their total sources, as shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 5: The Councils' Own Sources as % of Total Sources 
 
Source:   Annual General Report of the CAG, FY 2006/07 to FY 2009/10. 
 
When compared to  District,  Municipal Councils  had had high  proportion of  self-
generated incomes to their total incomes for each of the four years. Their location 
contributed to this trend. Being located in urban areas, KAMC and MDMC were able 
to  raise  substantial  income  from  various  internal  sources,  such  as  billboard  fees, 
property taxes, city service levies, and hotel levies. The implications of this for the 
operation of the Councils in general, and the undertaking of the accounting practices 
in particular, are discussed further in the analysis chapters. 
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3.5.3 Accounting Establishment 
Accounting was well established in the Councils’ structures and operations. In terms 
of structure, accounting was undertaken and supervised by the Finance Department 
which was headed by a Council Treasurer. The Treasurer was indirectly accountable 
to the Finance Committee through the Council Director, reporting to him/her on a 
monthly  basis.  The  Finance  Department  had  five  main  sections  which  are 
Expenditure, Revenue, Stores and Procurement, Final Accounts, and Salaries. The 
Economic and Planning Department was also involved in accounting related matters, 
especially those associated with the budget. Accountants were also formally attached 
to the education and health departments. Other Departments, such as Agriculture and 
Works,  had  informal  special  accountants  dealing  with  matters  related  to  their 
departments.  Figure  6  shows  the  general  structure  of  the  Councils’  finance 
department. 
 
Figure 6: General Structure of Councils’ Finance Department 
 
Source: Internal Documents 
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In addition, KAMC had some informal structures within the Finance Department, 
where  its  revenue  section  had  been  divided  into  four  major.  These  revenue 
subsections were billboard fees, city service levies, property taxes, and hotel levies. 
Each  of  these  subsections  was  headed  by  a  revenue  accountant,  who  informally 
known as Manager. Each revenue manager had a minimum of three accounting staff 
to monitor and follow up revenue collection from each particular source. The revenue 
managers  reported  to  the  Council’s  Revenue  Accountant  on  a  daily  basis.  The 
informal structure of KAMC’s finance department is shown in the figure that follows. 
 
Figure 7: Structure of the Finance Department at KAMC 
 
Source: KAMC Internal Documents 
The structure shown in the figure above was claimed by KAMC representatives to be 
responsible for the increased collection of its own sources
7: 
 
“You know, our Council is very different. We have huge collections in terms of own 
source revenue. The internal sources of our Councils are more than any other Council 
in the country. Here, we have created the position of revenue managers for each 
                                                 
7The KAMC’s self-generated revenues (own sources) doubled from TZS 5,396,044,237 in 
the FY 2008/09 to TZS 11, 614,289,853 in the FY 2009/10 (LOGIN). The average exchange 
rates of Tanzanian Shillings (TZS) to USD were 1280.30 and 1313.29 for the period ended 
31
st December 2008 and 2009 respectively (BOT, 2011). 
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major source. This helps to strengthen the revenue collections. You may not even 
find these positions in the Council’s organisation structure” (Rela, Assistant Revenue 
Accountant: KAMC). 
 
High number of accountants in KAMC facilitated the practice. Being located in a 
business city where all essential services were easily obtained, the Council was able 
to  attract  large  numbers  of  workers,  including  accountants.  As  at  the  end  of 
fieldwork,  October  2011,  the  Council  had  45 accountants  of  different  ranks.  The 
study recorded the lowest number of accountants employed was by the MCDC (17), 
while KBDC and MDMC had 21 and 28 accountants respectively. Most of these 
were assistant accountants. 
3.5.4 The Councils’ Education and Health Information 
In terms of health and education statistics of the Councils visited, KAMC had 227 
primary schools as at October 2011, comprising 137 public owned schools and 90 
private schools. The Council also offered education to students with special needs, 
such as the mentally retarded, the deaf and the blind. For two years in a row (2007 
and 2008), KAMC emerged as the leading Council in the standard seven examination 
results.  The Council also  had 101 health facilities, of which 34 were  owned and 
operated by the Council, with the remaining 67 owned and operated by parastatal and 
private entities. The Council’s owned health facilities comprised 1 Hospital, 2 Health 
Centres, and 31 Dispensaries. There were also 34 Reproductive and Child Health 
Clinics. On the other hand, MDMC had 48 Primary Schools (35 public, 13 private), 
85 Dispensaries, 4 Health Centres (2 public, 2 private) and 4 Hospitals (1 public, 3 
private). Of the District Councils visited, KBDC had 74 Primary Schools in total, and 
all were public owned  schools.  It also  had 1  Hospital,  3 Health Centres,  and 15 
Dispensaries (13 public, 2 private). MCDC had 137 Primary Schools. It also had 43 
Dispensaries (35 public, 8 private), 4 Health Centres, and 3 Hospitals (1 public, 2 
private). Table 2 summarizes information of the primary schools and health facilities 
of the Councils visited. 
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Table 2: The Councils’ Primary Schools and Health Facilities 
Councils 
Primary Schools  Dispensaries  Health Centres  Hospitals 
Public  Private  Public  Private  Public  Private  Public  Private 
KAMC  137  90  31   0  2   0  1   0 
MDMC  35  13  85   0  2  2  1  3 
KBDC  74  0  13  2  3   0  1   0 
MCDC  137   0  35  8  4  0  1  2 
 
Source:   Councils Organisational Profile (2005-2010) and Regional  
  Commissioner’s Office, 2006. 
 
What emerged from the above statistics was the fact that the supply of social services 
in rural areas depended primarily on the facilities owned by the Councils. KBDC 
experienced the worst situation, as it had no private Primary School, Health Centre, 
or Hospital. This, together with other considerations, suggests that the LGAs and 
hence the Government remain the major source of public services in Tanzania. 
3.6  Major Councils’ Stakeholders 
In general, line ministries, Regional Administrative Secretaries (RAS), donors, the 
Controller and Auditor General (CAG), the  Local Authority Accounts Committee 
(LAAC),  and  the  general  public  were  the  major  stakeholders  of  the  Tanzanian 
Councils.  Meeting  expectations  and  requirements  of  these  stakeholders  ensured 
organisational legitimacy, which in turn boosted the Councils’ access to the resources 
necessary  for  their  operations.  The  manner  in  which  the  Councils  were  able  to 
manage  pressures  from  these  stakeholders  is  discussed  in  Chapter  7.  Brief 
descriptions of each of these stakeholders are given in the following six sub-sections. 
3.6.1  Line Ministries 
The Government controlled the operational affairs of the Councils through the Prime 
Minister’s Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG). 
The transfer of activities from the line ministries to LGAs also enabled a wide spread 
of  other  ministries,  such  as  Ministry  of  Education  and  Vocational  Training,  the 
Ministry  of  Health  and  Social  Welfare,  to  have  influence  over  the  Councils’ 
operations.  In  general,  the  Government  through  line  ministries  normally  issue 
circulars, policies, and guidelines, which govern the operation of the Councils. The 
Government was also responsible for financing of the Councils’ development and  
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recurrent expenditures. The relationship between the Government and the Councils 
and the reactions of the Councils’ officials on the same, are discussed in detail in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
3.6.2 Regional Administrative Secretariat 
The  Regional  Administration  Act  No.  19  of  1997  provided  a  legal  basis  for  the 
relationship between Regions and Councils. Each Region, through the Office of the 
Regional  Administrative  Secretary  (RAS),  provided  a  link  between  the  Councils 
located  in  a  particular  Region  and  the  Government.  The  Central  Government’s 
policies, directives, and guidelines were normally channelled to the Councils through 
the RAS’s Office, the same to some of the development funds. The Office was also 
the  custodian  of  the  Councils’  financial  and  technical  progress  reports.  Each 
Council’s budget was also required to be sent to the RAS’s Office for consultation 
before being submitted to the Treasury for scrutinization. A detailed discussion of the 
relationship between the office of RAS and the Councils is given in Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7. 
3.6.3 Donors 
Donors were the major financial stakeholders of the Councils. These donors were: the 
World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and individual countries such 
as  Belgium,  Netherland,  Sweden,  Ireland,  Germany,  Japan,  and  Finland,  which 
jointly formed a ‘basket funding’ arrangement. There were also other independent 
donors who financed earmarked projects in specific areas, such as Education, Road, 
HIV, and Water and Agriculture. Donors were directly and/or indirectly involved in 
financing various Councils’ projects in different areas, such as education and health. 
They  were  also  involved  in  a  variety  of  initiatives,  such  as  the  introduction  of 
EPICOR accounting package, the adoption of International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards  (IPSAS),  the  introduction  of  the  Comprehensive  Council  Health  Plan 
(CCHP), and the introduction of conditionally based performance grants under Local 
Government  Capital  and  Development  Grants  (LGCDG)  Systems.  The  detailed 
discussion  of  the  donors’  influence  on  the  Councils’  operations  is  included  in 
Chapters 5 to 7.  
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3.6.4 Controller and Auditor General 
Section 45 (1) of the Local Government Finances Act No. 9 of 1982 (amended 2000) 
gave legal mandate to the National Audit Office (NAO) under the Controller and 
Auditor  General  (CAG)  to  be  the  statutory  auditor  of  all  LGAs.  Therefore,  the 
relationship of the CAG and Councils is that of auditor-auditee. The CAG normally 
conducted  two  types  of  audit;  transactions  and  a  financial  statements  audit.  The 
transaction audit was conducted throughout the year, while the financial statements 
audit  was  normally  carried  out  after  30
th  September  annually.  Apart  from  the 
transaction and the financial statements audits, the CAG was also involved in the 
monitoring and evaluation of the Councils’ projects. It is important to note that the 
Councils’  officials  attached  high  importance  to  the  statutory  audit.  This  can  be 
attributed  to  the  fact  that  adverse  opinion  restricted  the  Councils  from  obtaining 
discretionary grants under the LGCDG Systems. The techniques employed by the 
officials  to  ensure  the  Council  obtained  clean  opinion  for  grants  purposes  are 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
3.6.5 Local Authority Accounts Committee 
The Local Authority Accounts Committee (LAAC) was involved in monitoring the 
Councils’ accounts, and reported its findings to the National Assembly for adoption 
and  implementation.  To  hasten  the  accountability  further,  the  Parliamentary 
regulations  were  amended  in  2007  to  allow  Members  of  Parliament  from  the 
opposition  party  to  lead  the  committee.  The  committee  also  undertook  physical 
monitoring  and  evaluation  of  the  Councils’  projects.  High  amount  of  publicity 
received by the Committee, and its ability to take disciplinary measures instantly, led 
the Councils’ officials to attach great importance to the Committee assessment. The 
strategies used by the Councils’ officials to impress and/or supress the Committee are 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
3.6.6 General Public 
The general public were the beneficiaries of the Councils’ projects, while at the same 
time being partners in public service provision. The introduction of a decentralization 
by devolution policy fostered the beneficiary relationship, whilst the NPM related 
practices  introduced,  strengthened  the  partnership  strand.  The  public  were  also 
involved in planning and reporting arrangements. In some cases, the general public 
were  highly  involved  in  subsidizing  the  Councils’  projects  through  physical  
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contribution.  Recognizing  this,  all  the  monthly  financial  reports  of  the  Councils 
visited  contained  section  titled  ‘Receipt  In  Kind’,  reflecting  the  community 
contributions as part of the Councils’ income. Regardless of this fact, the influence of 
the  general  public  on  the  Councils’  operations  was  minimal,  one  of  the  greatest 
contributory reasons for this being the low level of education of the general public, 
especially in the Councils located in rural areas. The trend was also associated with 
unwillingness of the Councils’ officials to involve the general public in the Councils’ 
decision making process. Figure 8 shows the major Councils’ stakeholders. 
 
Figure 8: Major Councils’ Stakeholders 
 
3.7  Tanzanian Local Government Reform Programme 
The recent changes in the operations of the Tanzanian LGAs were considered to be a 
product of the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), which started in 1998 
as part of the country’s Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP), started in the late 
1980s as part of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The overall objective 
of the LGRP was to improve the quality of, and access to, the public services through 
increased  citizen’s  participation  at  the  local  level  (Ngwilizi,  2001).    It  was 
spearheaded by the Local Government Reform Agenda (1996-2000), CCM
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Manifesto of 1995, and Government Policy Paper on Local Government Reform of 
1998. The Policy Paper on Local Government Reform summarizes the Government 
vision of reforming Local Government Authorities: 
 
“Local governments will be holistic, i.e. multi-sectoral, government units with a legal 
status (body corporate) operating on the basis of discretionary, but general powers 
under the legal framework constituted by the national legislation. Local governments 
have the responsibility for social development and public service provision within 
their jurisdiction, facilitation of maintenance of law and order and issues of national 
importance  such  as  education,  health,  water,  roads  and  agriculture.  Local 
governments are constituting a unitary governance system all over the country based 
on elected Councils and committees and a professional administration” (Policy Paper 
on Local Government Reform, October 1998, p. vi). 
 
The Government vision gave rise to the key elements of the LGRP. These were: 
decentralization  of  authority  and  responsibilities,  strengthening  accountability, 
increasing  the  availability  of  resources,  clarifying  the  framework  for  delivery  of 
services, and building capacity for effective resource management (Ngwilizi, 2001). 
These elements were further categorised into systematic and non-systematic reforms. 
Systematic  reforms  were  concerned  with  the  fiscal  decentralization,  legal 
harmonization  and  human  resources  autonomy,  while  non-systematic  reforms 
concentrated  on  governance,  restructuring,  capacity  building,  and  programme 
coordination. The actual implementation of the reforms started in 2000 under  the 
Local  Government  Reform  Team  (LGRT),  which  came  under  PMO-RALG.  The 
reform programme was divided into two phases. Phase I covered 10 years period 
from  1
st  July  1998 to  30
th June  2008 and was  mainly focused on  fiscal  reforms, 
human  resources  autonomy  and  political  decentralization  between  the  Local  and 
Central  Government  bodies.  The  establishment  of  the  Office  of  WEO,  the 
introduction of the formula based conditional grants in the FY 2004/05 for education 
and health, followed by agriculture, roads, and water in the FY 2005/06, are regarded 
as products of the LGRP I. Instead of having a special reform team, Phase II, which 
covers 6 years period from 1
st July 2008 to 30
th June 2014, aims to mainstream the 
reform activities into sectorial ministries and Councils. This, as reform Coordinator at 
the PMO-RALG claimed, “promises positive results”.  
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3.8  Summary 
The  chapter  has  given  a  general  overview  of  the  Tanzanian  LGAs,  and  specific 
information about the four Councils visited. It has also offered brief descriptions of 
the  Councils’  main  stakeholders  and  the  LGRP.  The  descriptions  offered  in  this 
chapter provide the organisational context of investigating accounting practices in the 
Tanzanian LGAs. The methodology used to execute this study is discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Methodology 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology employed in this study. It is divided into five 
major sections. Section 4.2 provides brief background information on the research 
methodology and the research methods. Research paradigms in social science are 
covered in section 4.3, providing brief explanations of the functionalist, interpretive, 
radical humanist, and radical structuralist paradigms. Of particular interest to this 
study  is  section  4.4,  which  discusses  the  research  paradigm  in  the  accounting 
discipline, exploring the mainstream, critical, and interpretive accounting research 
and  their  respective  philosophical  bases.  Recognizing  the  alternative  approach  to 
undertaking accounting research and the paradigmatic debate, this study positioned 
itself  in  the  interpretive  paradigm.  The  section  specifically  provides  a  detailed 
discussion  of  interpretive  accounting  research,  covering  the  rationale  for  its 
application,  empirical  studies,  and  its  underlying  research  methods.  Section  4.5 
provides detailed discussion about grounded theory. The section covers background 
information,  the  rationale  for  its  application,  empirical  studies  which  adopted 
grounded theory, and the alternative approaches to its application. Specific research 
methods employed in the current research are covered in section 4.6. The section 
provides discussion of the research process, the sampling method, data collection and 
analysis techniques, and the data management tools. It also discusses the validity and 
reliability issues  related to  the current  research. The section  concludes  with  brief 
descriptions of the ethical arrangements undertaken prior to, and after, the fieldwork 
as well as throughout the presentation of the research findings. 
4.2  Research Methodology and Methods-An Overview 
The  terms  research  ‘methodology’,  and  ‘methods’  are  sometimes  used 
interchangeably.  This  approach  creates  a  narrow  definition  of  the  research 
methodology, which ignores at the very outset the researcher’s ontological position 
(Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). This study recognises the differences between the two, 
and  research  methods  are  regarded  as  part  of  the  wider  concept  of  research 
methodology.  Therefore,  the  study  has  adopted  the  comprehensive  view  which 
regards  the  research  methodology  as  a  general  approach  to  conducting  research, 
comprising  not  only  research  methods  but  also  the  related  ontological  and  
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epistemological positions of the researcher (Elharidy, Nicholson, & Scapens, 2008; 
Silverman, 2006; Tomkins & Groves, 1983). In this sense, the choice of methodology 
reflected the researcher’s philosophical stand point, which in turn affected the mode 
of investigation (research methods) (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The current research 
subscribes  to  the  view  of  Burrell  and  Morgan  (1979)  who  regard  the  research 
methodology as the product of the researcher’s ontology, epistemology, and human 
nature assumptions. Therefore this chapter offers detailed discussion on the general 
approach  (methodology)  used  to  undertake  the  study  under  consideration.  The 
specific  techniques  (research  methods)  used  are  briefly  described  in  section  4.6, 
within the general framework of research methodology. 
4.3  Research Paradigms in Social Science 
Various scholars offer different explanations of the nature of the research paradigm in 
social science research. For instance, Bassey (1990) regards the research paradigm as 
the broad framework which connects theorists having common ideas about the nature 
of the social world. The paradigm is also linked to a belief and values which are 
shared by members within the paradigm (Schwandt, 1997). Additionally, Burrell and 
Morgan  (1979)  describe  paradigm  as  a  mode  of  theorizing  which  dictates  the 
investigation techniques. The current study adopted the Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
sociological framework, as it appreciates the uniqueness of each paradigm in terms of 
the theory generated, the concepts and the analytical tools used. A detailed discussion 
of the framework is provided in the following section.  
4.3.1  Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) Sociological Framework 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified four different philosophical assumptions about 
the nature of social science. These were ontology, epistemology, human nature and 
methodology. Ontological  assumptions  constitute assumptions  about  the nature of 
reality: whether the reality is something objective and whether it is external to the 
individual, or subjective and the product of one’s mind. Nominalism and realism are 
equated  to  subjective  and  objective  positions  respectively.  Epistemological 
assumptions are connected to the ontological position and elaborate the source of 
knowledge and how to communicate to others. These assumptions raise questions as 
to whether the knowledge is hard, real and can easily be transferred, or whether it is 
soft and subjective, cannot easily be transferred in a tangible form, and is the function 
of  personal  experience.  Positivism,  which  seeks  the  causal  relationship  of  the  
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phenomena as in natural science, subscribes to the former, while non-positivism, with 
the  emphasis  on  the  subjective  nature  of  social  science,  subscribes  to  the  latter. 
Human nature  assumptions  deal  with  the  relationship between  human  beings  and 
their environment. At one extreme, human beings are regarded as determinist, in the 
sense that their behaviour and activities are completely determined by their situation 
and  environment.  Voluntarist  constitutes  the  other  extreme,  which  views  human 
beings as completely autonomous and with free will.  
 
A methodological assumption is the function of the ontological, epistemological and 
human  nature  positions.  It  seeks  to  establish  general  ways  of  investigating  or 
approaching social phenomenon. Methodologies which seek to establish the causal 
relationship of items (nomothetic) assume that reality is objective and independent 
(ontology), that knowledge is hard and real (epistemology) and that human beings 
respond automatically to situations (human nature). Therefore, the task of the social 
scientist is to investigate the universal laws which explain established reality. On the 
other hand, ideographic methodology regards reality as subjective (ontology), soft 
knowledge (epistemology), and that human beings are independent (human nature). 
Combining  all  four  assumptions  about  nature  of  the  social  science,  Burrell  and 
Morgan  (1979)  located  objective  and  subjective  dimension  of  the  social  science 
research. 
 
Also, based on the study done by Dahrendorf (1959), Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
categorized two assumptions about the nature of society; the sociology of regulation 
and  the  sociology  of  radical  change.  The  sociology  of  regulation  represents  the 
writings  of  the  social  theorists  who  are  reluctant  to  change.  The  status  quo  is 
favoured,  with  the  emphasis  placed  on  unity  and  cohesiveness.  In  contrast,  the 
sociology of radical  change represents  theorists  who criticize the status  quo. The 
sociologies  of  regulation  and  radical  change  constitute  another  dimension  of  the 
framework. Combining the two dimensions, objective-subjective and the sociology of 
regulation and the sociology of radical change, Burrell and Morgan (1979) located 
four research paradigms within social science, as shown in the following figure. 
 
    
 
Accounting Practices in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs): Page 62 
 
Figure 9: Research Paradigms in Social Science 
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Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
 
Theorists  under  the  functionalist  paradigm  view  social  science  objectively  and 
assume  that  society  is  in  order.  This  is  a  paradigm  which  applies  a  deductive 
approach to social science research and focuses on establishing causal relationships 
for the sake of generalization. It is the paradigm which is shared with the interpretive 
paradigm, on the assumption that the status quo is favoured at the expense of change. 
It is also similar to the radical structuralist paradigm, with an objective assumption of 
social  science.  The  functionalist  paradigm  is  related  to  the  deductive/scientific 
approaches to social science research, which entails the researcher developing prior 
theories before approaching the researched phenomenon. The functionalist paradigm 
and  its  emphasis  on  scientific  approaches  is  highly  criticized  by  supporters  of 
naturalistic  approaches  (Chua,  1986;  Glaser  &  Strauss,  1967;  Hopper  &  Powell, 
1985; Ryan, Scapens, & Theobald, 2002; Tomkins & Groves, 1983). For example, 
Hopper  and  Powell  (1985)  criticised  the  application  of  scientific  or  positivistic 
methods to social science research. They claimed that the scientific approach limited 
the understanding of the researchers on how, for instance, accounting is applied in 
practice. Also, Ryan, Scapens, et al. (2002) argued against the application of a causal 
approach to explain human behaviour. They were of the opinion that social science 
research deals with human actions which are mainly derived from shared meanings  
 
Accounting Practices in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs): Page 63 
 
and interpretations, which are difficult to model and capture in a scientific mode of 
investigation. The criticisms of the functionalist paradigm have led to the emergence 
of other views about approaching social science research, such as the interpretive 
approach.  
 
The interpretive paradigm assumes that society is in state of order and that the social 
world is subjective. Unlike functionalists, interpretivists stress an inductive approach 
and seek to understand the explanations from individual consciousness. Assuming 
that there is no absolute truth, the researchers under this paradigm often investigate in 
depth meanings associated with the everyday lives of organisational actors (Parker, 
2008).  Therefore,  researchers  within  the  interpretive  paradigm  focus  on 
understanding  the  interpretations  and  meanings  which  participants  share  in  their 
everyday social settings (Ahrens & Mollona, 2007). In this sense, the interpretive is 
regarded  as  the  paradigm  which  focuses  on  naturalistic  research  methods  which 
allows  “research  findings  to  emerge  from  the  frequent,  dominant  or  significant 
themes  inherent  in  raw  data,  without  the  restraints  imposed  by  structured 
methodologies” (Thomas, 2006, p. 238). 
 
The radical humanist and the radical structuralist represent the last two paradigms in 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework. The radical humanist paradigm lies in the 
subjective  dimension  of  the  social  world,  with  a  view  that  society  is  in  need  of 
immediate change.  It  echoes  the interpretive approach to  the subjective nature of 
social science, which emphasizes human consciousness, but its view of the nature of 
society is different. Radical humanists criticize the status quo in favour of radical 
change, modes of domination, emancipation, deprivation and potentiality. It is the 
paradigm  which  is  refuted  by  a  number  of  social  science  researchers,  due  to 
differences  of  opinions  between  the  Marxists  and  the  Neo-Marxist.  On  the  other 
hand, the radical structuralist paradigm advocates  the sociology of radical change 
from an objectivist point of view. It is a paradigm which was highly influenced by 
later  thinking  by  Marx  and  Weber  after  they  shifted  from  the  radical  humanist 
paradigm. However, the separation of the radicals into radical humanist and radical 
structuralist,  as  shown  in  the  Burrell  and  Morgan’s  (1979)  framework,  has  been  
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refuted  by  a  number  of  social  science  researchers.  This  and  other  criticisms  are 
discussed in the following section.  
4.3.2 Criticisms of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) Sociological Framework 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) sociological framework received criticism from various 
social science researchers (Chua, 1986; Hopper & Powell, 1985; Kakkuri-Knuuttila, 
Lukka,  &  Kuorikoski,  2008;  Laughlin,  1995).  Chua  (1986)  criticized  the  strict 
dichotomy and the mutual exclusivity of the paradigms. She was of the view that 
neither the objectivists nor the subjectivists supported the mutual exclusivity of the 
paradigms. Chua (1986) also criticised Burrell and Morgan (1979) by embracing a 
relative  notion  of  scientific  truth  and  reasoning  and  claimed  that  the  choice  of 
paradigm cannot be justified scientifically. Chua (1986) and Willmott (1990) also 
criticized  Burrell  and  Morgan  (1979)  for  separating  the  radical  humanist  and  the 
radical structuralist. To them, separation between the radical humanist and the radical 
structuralist was not supported in the literature of sociology. However, to Burrell and 
Morgan  (1979),  there  were  major  differences  between  earlier  Marxists  and  Neo-
Marxists  which  warranted  the  radical  separation  between  the  subjective  (radical 
humanist) and the objective (radical structuralist). 
 
Further criticisms of the framework were raised by Laughlin (1995). He criticized the 
strict  dichotomy  of  the  objective  and  the  subjective  ends  of  the  continuum,  and 
suggested a middle range approach. His middle-range argument is associated with the 
claim  that  there  are  inherent  weaknesses  associated  with  the  objective  and  the 
subjective ends, which can only be remedied by adopting the middle position. More 
recent criticisms of the framework were offered by Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al. (2008). 
They  claimed  that  nominalism,  which  is  associated  with  subjectivism,  originated 
from the positivist philosophy of natural science. Therefore, they held the opinion 
that nominalism as presented in the Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework contains 
an element of positivism, which led them to conclude that there is neither a pure 
objective nor subjective approach. 
 
Despite  these  criticisms,  the  current  study  adopted  Burrell  and  Morgan’s  (1979) 
framework, as it provided an appropriate foundation for discussion of the research 
methodology in a deeper and wider context. Therefore, the interpretive approach used  
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in  this  study  fits  within  this  framework.  However,  it  should  be  clear  that  the 
framework  was  not  adopted  eclectically,  but  rather  was  regarded  as  “a  map  for 
negotiating the subject area, which offers a convenient means of identifying the basic 
similarities and differences between the work of various theorists and, in particular, 
the underlying frame of reference which they adopt” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 
24). Thus, the purpose of using the framework was to locate the research within the 
wider  research  paradigm  in  social  science.  A  discussion  of  accounting  research 
paradigms is provided in the following section. 
4.4  Research Paradigms in Accounting 
Following  the  criticisms  of  the  Burrell  and  Morgan’s  (1979)  framework,  some 
accounting scholars started to demand a peculiar paradigm for accounting research. 
In an attempt to find a peculiar paradigm in the context of accounting generally, and 
management  accounting  in  particular,  Hopper  and  Powell  (1985)  deconstructed 
Burrell  and  Morgan’s  (1979)  assumptions  about  the  nature  of  social  science  into 
objective  and  subjective  dichotomies.  They  also  categorize  society  into  two 
dimensions: radical change and regulation. Their point of difference rested on the 
separation of the radicals, as Hopper and Powell (1985) did not differentiate between 
the  radical  humanist  and  the  radical  structuralist.  This  classification  led  to  three 
categories of accounting research; mainstream, interpretive, and critical. A discussion 
on  each  of  these  categories  is  preceded  by  Figure  10  which  shows  taxonomy  of 
management accounting research. 
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Figure 10: Hopper and Powell's Taxonomy of Management Accounting Research 
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Source: Hopper and Powell (1985)  
 
4.4.1 Mainstream Accounting Research 
Mainstream  accounting  research  represents  a  traditional  research  approach  in 
accounting which emphasizes objective reality and the deterministic nature of human 
behaviour  (Chua,  1986).  It  is  based  on  a  deductive  approach,  which  requires  the 
researcher to  start  with  a theory (or model) before approaching  the field (Gill & 
Johnson, 2002). It normally favours scientific methods of inquiry, which are based on 
prior theory and testing of hypotheses. Mainstream accounting research is similar to 
the functionalist paradigm in Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework. Mainstream 
accounting research has been criticised by a number of accounting scholars (Baker & 
Bettner, 1997; Chua, 1986; Gill & Johnson, 2002; Parker, 2008). For example, Chua 
(1986) criticised mainstream accounting thinking as being inappropriate for certain 
problems  and  for  providing  little  insights  into  the  researched  phenomenon.  Also, 
Parker  (2008)  was  of  the  view  that  statistical  generalization,  which  is  the  major 
emphasis of mainstream accounting research, fails to account for intra-organisational 
issues,  such  as  culture,  power,  beliefs,  behaviours  and  morals.  Generally,  the 
approach abandons actors’ explanations and shared  meanings, which are considered 
to be important aspects of accounting as practiced in organisational settings (Miller & 
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Napier,  1993).  Furthermore,  mainstream  accounting  research  has  been  criticised 
under three main grounds: 
 
“First,  limitations  exist  in  the  fundamental  assumptions  underlying  the  research 
paradigms which adversely affect their ability to provide useful understandings of 
social  reality.  Second,  while  attempting  to  comply  with  the  strict  rigor  of  the 
scientific  method,  mainstream  research  has  placed  emphasis  on  measurement  for 
measurement’s sake. Third, research methods based on the analysis of quantitative 
data  have  been  so  exhaustively  employed  that  they  have  reached  a  point  of 
diminishing returns” (Baker & Bettner, 1997, p. 303). 
 
Given the limitations of mainstream accounting research, as early as the 1980s some 
accounting researchers called for alternative approaches (Morgan, 1983; Tomkins & 
Groves,  1983;  Willmott,  1983).  This  gave  impetus  to  interpretive  and  critical 
accounting research. As argued by Baker and Bettner (1997), “accounting’s essence 
can be best understood through its impact on individuals, organisations and societies. 
Hence, it is important that accounting research [makes] increasing use of interpretive 
and critical perspectives” (p.294). The following section discusses critical accounting 
research.  
4.4.2 Critical Accounting Research 
The  emergence  of  critical  accounting  research  can  be  partly  associated  with  an 
attempt to combine radical thoughts in one research paradigm. This evolved after 
pooling  the  radical  humanist  and  the  radical  structuralist  paradigms  elaborated  in 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) sociological framework. It was pioneered by Hopper 
and Powell (1985), as reflected below: 
 
“The mutually exclusive division of radical theories by Burrell and Morgan carries a 
danger  that  concerns  of  radical  structural  analysis  are  seen  as  incompatible  or 
irreconcilable  with  those  stressing  consciousness,  rather  than  seeing  both  as 
dialectical aspects of the same reality” (Hopper & Powell, 1985, p. 451). 
 
As  a  result  of  the  above  criticisms,  radical  structuralism  and  humanisms  were 
combined and labelled as the ‘critical alternative’ (Chua, 1986; Hopper & Powell, 
1985).  Since  then,  accounting  researchers  have  extensively  applied  and  offered  
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various  explanations  of  the  critical  perspectives  within  the  accounting  discipline. 
Critical accounting research normally questions the role of accounting, with the aim 
of changing accounting practices in general (Laughlin, 1999). It normally investigates 
accounting information in order to constructively challenge established understanding 
(Broadbent,  2002).  The  overall  aim  of  critical  accounting  research  is  to  increase 
knowledge, through generating and challenging ideas about the discipline, rather than 
accepting them as given. However, as opposed to interpretive, the critical approach 
has  been  criticised  for  occupying  a  certain  position  during  investigation  into  a 
researched phenomenon (Baker & Bettner, 1997). This limits thorough examination 
of the research phenomenon. Detailed discussion of interpretive approach, as adopted 
in this study, is provided in the following section. 
4.4.3 Interpretive Accounting Research 
The origin of interpretive research can be traced back to the works of interpretive 
sociology. In this regard, the interpretive approach is regarded as the philosophical 
tradition  which  focuses  on  the  “constructive  and  interpretive  action  of  people, 
whether it be their ability to organize sense data through forms of prior knowledge 
(Kantian  transcendentalism),  or  as  reflected  in  the  essentials  of  their  experience 
(Husserlian  phenomenology)”  (Chua,  1988,  p.  60).  In  accounting,  the  approach 
received an impetus in the late 1970s and early 1980s following consistent calls from 
accounting researchers for the need to study accounting in the organisational settings 
where it operates (Hopwood, 1979, 1983; Morgan, 1983, 1988; Tomkins & Groves, 
1983; Willmott, 1983). A more specific and clear plea for interpretive approach in 
accounting  was  made  by  Hopwood  (1979)  in  the  editorial  note  of    Accounting, 
Organizations and Society Journal, Volume 4, Issue No. 3, 1979. He emphasized the 
need for, and importance of, the interpretive approach to study accounting in the 
social context where it is practiced. He concluded the editorial note with a call for 
more  research  “describing  and  understanding  accounting  systems  in  action” 
(Hopwood, 1979, p. 147). Since then, the interpretive approach has been extensively 
applied to understand the everyday life of the actors involved in their organisational 
environment  (Tomkins  &  Groves,  1983).  The  rationale  of  using  the  interpretive 
approach in this research is provided in the following sub-section.  
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4.4.3.1  Rationale for Using Interpretive Approach 
The  interpretive  research  methodology  was  appropriate  for  this  study  for  the 
following  reasons:  Firstly,  the  application  of  the  interpretive  methodology  is  a 
response  to  the  early  calls  made  by  accounting  researchers  for  the  need  for 
accounting  to  be  studied  in  the  organisational  and  social  settings  in  which  it  is 
practiced (Hopwood, 1979, 1983; Tomkins & Groves, 1983). Secondly, the study 
investigated  the  perceptions  and  shared  meanings  of  the  Councils’  officials  on 
accounting practices  in  the Tanzanian  LGAs.  These subjective elements  could  be 
investigated thoroughly by using the interpretive mode of inquiry. Because Tanzanian 
Councils have multiple stakeholders, interpretive approach used helped to understand 
their  relationships  and  influences  on  the  accounting  practices.  Also,  interpretive 
approach  is  normally  occupying  a  neutral  position  when  approaching  researched 
phenomenon (Baker & Bettner, 1997). This facilitated a full understanding of the 
accounting practices in the Councils from the view point of the Councils’ officials. 
Moreover, as Goddard and Assad (2006) argued, “accounting is a component part of 
social  and  institutional  interactions,  affecting  and  being  affected  by  human 
interactions and institutional conditions” (p. 396). These interrelationships, equally 
evident in the Tanzanian LGAs, were effectively examined through the use of the 
interpretive approach. 
4.4.3.2  Empirical Interpretive Accounting Studies in Local Governments 
There  has  been  an  increasing  trend  towards  the  application  of  the  interpretive 
approach  to  study  accounting  practices  in  the  organisational  environment.  This 
section reviews some of these studies. Because the approach is highly used in many 
areas, this section focuses only on local governments. It is also important to stress 
that the section is aimed at appreciating the application of the interpretive approach, 
rather than the findings of the reviewed studies.  In this regard, the  review is not 
intended to be exhaustive, but rather elaborative, of the interpretive approach used to 
study accounting practices in local governments. 
 
The  interpretive  approach  was  used  by  Carlin  (2004)  to  investigate  performance 
management in the budget papers within the Australian state of Victoria. The same 
approach was applied by Monsen (2006) to trace the historical development of local 
government accounting in Norway and ter Bogt (2008) to assess accounting changes  
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in the Dutch public sector. Importantly, the interpretive approach used by ter Bogt 
(2008)  facilitated  to  capture  the  actors  perceptions  and  experiences  of  the  public 
sector  reforms.  Pilcher  (2005)  also  applied  an  interpretive  line  of  inquiry  to 
demonstrate the appropriateness of local government key financial indicators in New 
South Wales (NSW), Australia. The approach helped the researcher to elucidate the 
participants’ views of the key performance indicators used in the organisation. The 
interpretive approach was also used by Christiaens (2001) to investigate NPM and 
accounting practices in Flemish local governments. The overall aim of the study was 
to get a ‘deep understanding’ of the complexities associated with massive reforms 
introduced into accounting in the public sector in general, and local government in 
particular. These were clearly depicted through the interpretive scheme. A related 
study  was  conducted  by  Marwata  and  Alam  (2006)  to  investigate  the  process  of 
accounting changes in the Indonesian local government. The interpretive approach 
was able to discover actors’ views about the accounting changes, and the influence of 
the reforms on the same. An interpretive approach was also used by Ball et al. (2000), 
Pilcher and Dean (2009a), Nyamori (2009), and Kloot (1999). Ball et al. (2000) used 
the approach to explore the practical experience of benchmarking in the UK local 
governments, while Pilcher and Dean (2009a) used it to investigate the impact of 
IFRSs  on  management  decision  making  within  the  Australian  local  government. 
Nyamori (2009) used a wide range of interpretive data collection techniques, such as 
archival  data,  personal  encounters,  and  in-depth  interviews,  to  investigate  the 
emergence  and  impact  of  a  market  based  approach  in  the  New  Zealand  local 
authority.  Similarly,  Kloot  (1999)  used  an  interpretive  approach  to  examine 
performance measurement and accountability in the Victorian local government. 
 
In general, three main related conclusions can be derived from the above brief review 
of  the  interpretive  accounting  studies.  Firstly,  the  interpretive  approach  has  been 
widely  used  in  research  into  local  governments.  Secondly,  the  actors’  shared 
meanings, norms, culture, beliefs, and perceptions, and their related influences on the 
accounting practices can be effectively captured through the interpretive mode of 
investigation.  Lastly,  an  interpretive  line  of  inquiry  puts  more  emphasis  on 
unstructured  data  collection  methods,  such  as  interviews  and  observations.  These 
allow full examination of the multiple realities involved in accounting practices. The  
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interpretive approach used in this study is in line with these arguments. Given under 
representation of the emerging economies, as observed in the reviewed studies, this 
research helps to understand the perceptions, influences, and shared meanings, of the 
Councils’ officials attached to the accounting practices, and the manners in which 
those  attributes  have  affected  the  accounting  practices  in  emerging  economies  in 
general,  and  Tanzanian  Councils  in  particular.  The  interpretive  approach  can  be 
executed by using a variety of research methods, such as cognitive anthropology, 
ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism, ethnography, and grounded theory. This 
study  adopted  the  grounded  theory  approach,  a  detailed  discussion  of  which  is 
provided in the following section. 
4.5  Grounded Theory 
This  section  discusses  the  grounded  theory  approach  used  in  this  research.  The 
section includes background information about grounded theory and the rationale of 
its  application  in  social  science  research  in  general,  and  the  current  research  in 
particular. It also includes review of empirical accounting studies that have applied a 
grounded  theory  approach.  The  section  concludes  with  discussion  of  alternative 
approaches to grounded theory and the rationale of the approach used in this study.  
4.5.1 Grounded Theory-An Overview 
Grounded  theory  represents  a  research  approach  which  aims  to  develop  a  theory 
systematically from the raw data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). It was initially developed 
by  two  sociologists,  Barney  Glaser  and  Anselm  Strauss,  in  their  book  titled  The 
Discovery  of  Grounded  Theory  in  1967.  Grounded  theory  receives  its  theoretical 
underpinnings from pragmatics and symbolic interactionism, where researchers are 
interested in examining members’ interactions in their everyday life (Pickard, 2007; 
Strauss  &  Corbin,  1990;  Strauss  &  Corbin,  1998).  The  approach  has  also  been 
praised for being able to capture complex and social phenomenon as they emerge 
(Strauss, 1987). As Parker and Roffey (1997) highlighted, this is achieved through an 
interactive process of data collection and analysis, as well as the emergent nature of 
concepts and hypotheses. Normally, grounded theorists approach the field without 
any  pre-defined  operational  variables  and  allow  new  issues  of  interest  to  emerge 
directly  from  the  data  (Glaser  &  Strauss,  1967).  As  with  any  other  interpretive 
research method, the grounded theory approach also uses interviews, observation, and  
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archival data as data collection tools. Further to these, the researchers’ professional 
experience and educational background are also employed to make theoretical sense 
of the data collected and generated (Parker & Roffey, 1997). In grounded theory, data 
analysis is carried out in three interactive processes of coding, which are open, axial, 
and selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The focal 
core  code,  which  is  the  product  of  the  coding  process,  forms  a  basis  for  the 
formulation of a substantive theory. Justifications for the choice of a grounded theory 
approach are offered in the following section. 
4.5.2 Rationale for the Use of Grounded Theory 
This study adopted a field based case study using a grounded theory approach, as a 
response to the findings and recommendations of Humphrey and Scapens (1996) and 
Parker  and  Roffey  (1997).  Humphrey  and  Scapens  (1996)  advised  accounting 
researchers to use explanatory case studies with the aim of building theory from data. 
In addition, Parker and Roffey (1997) made a clear plea for accounting researchers to 
make use of grounded theory. They praised the method for being able to develop a 
theory which explains the everyday life of accountants, while they criticised others 
for imposing theory on social phenomenon “in isolation from the real experiences of 
actor’s involved” (Parker & Roffey, 1997, p. 216). A grounded theory approach is 
generally appropriate when the researcher is interested in developing a theory which 
explains the everyday life of the participants (Parker & Roffey, 1997), when the study 
involves a new area of interest which does not have a rich empirical literature base 
(Goulding,  1999),  and  when  the  researcher  is  addressing  a  research  phenomenon 
which  has  diverse  meanings  (Fernández,  2004).  Accounting  as  practiced  in  the 
Tanzanian LGAs met all of these pre-conditions. The small amount of research that 
has been carried out in emerging economies in general, and Tanzania in particular, as 
well as the diverse and complex meanings of accounting as practiced in public sector, 
made a grounded theory an appropriate approach for this study. It was also selected 
due  to  its  ability  to  develop  a  theoretical  understanding  of  the  investigated 
phenomenon (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
 
Also,  the  grounded  theory  approach  used  in  this  study  allowed  the  issues  of 
importance to the Councils’ members to emerge directly from the data. This was 
consistent  with  the  naturalistic  approach  of  an  interpretive  methodology,  which  
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believes that the role of accounting in an organisation can be effectively appreciated 
when it is developed in the setting which it is embedded (Hopwood, 1983; Morgan, 
1983; Tomkins & Groves, 1983; Willmott, 1983). In particular, it elucidated not only 
the  perceptions  of  the  Councils’  officials  on  accounting  practices,  but  also  their 
meanings,  shared  values,  and  cultural  orientations,  and  the  way  they  affected 
accounting practices. Furthermore, the use of a grounded theory in this study helped 
to  develop  a  theoretical  understanding  to  explain  the  accounting  practices  in  the 
Tanzanian Councils from the practitioners’ point of view without imposing any pre-
conceived  theoretical  framework.  The  following  section  provides  a  review  of 
empirical accounting research that has adopted a grounded theory approach. 
4.5.3 Empirical Accounting Research Using Grounded Theory 
Accounting literature has recorded the growing interest in the use of grounded theory 
to study accounting practices in organisational settings. This is associated with the 
potentialities of the method to investigate accounting practices in organisations, and 
the  consistent  appeals  made  by  some  accounting  researchers  for  the  use  of  the 
approach (see Parker & Roffey, 1997). These have led to the application of grounded 
theory  in  different  settings,  such  as  religious  organisations  (Abdul-Rahman  & 
Goddard, 1998; Lightbody, 2000; Parker, 2001, 2002), local governments (Goddard, 
2004,  2005a,  2005b),  Non-Government  Organisations  (Goddard  &  Assad,  2006), 
multi-national  companies  (Greenhalgh,  2000;  Tillmann  &  Goddard,  2008),  and 
public universities, health facilities, and private entities (Holland, 2002; Lye et al., 
2005;  Macrì,  Tagliaventi,  &  Bertolotti,  2002;  Solomon  &  Solomon,  2006).  In 
general, these studies show the power of grounded theory to examine accounting as 
practiced in organisational settings. For example, Goddard (2005a) used a grounded 
theory  to  capture  effectively  the  participants’  meanings  of  accountability  and 
governance. Also, the method helped Lye et al. (2005) to reveal the interplay between 
key  people,  axial  communication  ideas,  contextual  determinants,  echos  and 
knowledge of the process of change from cash based accounting to accrual based 
accounting in the core public sector in New Zealand. Furthermore, Holland (2002) 
developed  a  grounded  theory  model  which  explained  the  nature  of  corporate 
disclosures in the form of narratives, while the grounded theory applied by Solomon 
and Solomon (2006) helped to understand the manner in which institutional investors 
and  companies  in  the  UK  integrated  public  and  private  Social,  Ethical  and  
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Environmental  (SEE)  disclosures  into  institutional  investments.  Moreover,  the 
approach was successfully used by Hussey and Ong (2005) and Efferin and Hopper 
(2007) to examine the interplay between accounting and political, cultural, social, and 
environmental issues. 
 
Four main conclusions can be drawn from the above brief review of grounded theory 
accounting  studies.  Firstly,  grounded  theory  is  widely  used  in  the  accounting 
discipline to investigate the actors’ perceptions and shared meanings associated with 
accounting practices. The studies show that accounting is affecting, and is affected by 
the actors’ interpretations and meanings attached to them. Secondly, the grounded 
theory approach was effectively employed to examine the complex inter-relationships 
between  accounting  and  political  and  cultural  values  and  norms,  environmental 
factors,  as  well  economic  factors.  It  allowed  these  multiple,  and  sometimes 
conflicting, issues to emerge directly from the data, which consequently enhanced the 
understanding of the way accounting was practiced in the organisational setting. The 
reviewed studies also showed that intra-organisational factors, such as  power and 
trust  relationships,  can  effectively  and  theoretically  be  understood  through  a 
grounded  theory  approach.  Lastly,  the  above  review,  though  not  exhaustive, 
illustrated under-representation of grounded theory applied in emerging economies. 
Given the potential of the approach when building theory based on the everyday lives 
of the actors (Parker & Roffey, 1997), a theoretical understanding on how accounting 
is practiced in emerging economies has been lacking to date. The application of the 
grounded theory in this study was congruent to these observations. 
4.5.4 Alternative Approaches of Grounded Theory 
There are different approaches to the execution of grounded theory. These differences 
emerged and were propelled by the conflicting views of the founders of grounded 
theory, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss. This section briefly outlines the main 
areas of dispute and provides the rationale for the approach used in this study. Even 
though there are different approaches to grounded theory adopted by contemporary 
researchers which may warrant consideration, this section is confined solely to the 
basic approach propagated by Glaser and Strauss separately, having ceased to co-
write. Parker and Roffey (1997) and Cutcliffe (2000) regard the differences as minor 
and believe that they have no substantial effect on the grounded theory procedures.  
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However,  the  differences  were  so  fundamental  to  Glaser  and  Strauss  that  they 
publicly  attacked  each  other  (see  Glaser,  1992;  Strauss  &  Corbin,  1990).  The 
differences between them revolve around five major issues. These are the definitions 
of grounded theory, the role of prior knowledge, the application of analytical method, 
the validation of the emerging theory, and the development of a formal theory, and 
are discussed in the following two paragraphs. 
 
Firstly, Strauss regarded the grounded theory as the research method (technique)
9 
which is used to execute the qualitative study. Strauss’s definition of grounded theory 
excludes the possibility of executing the quantitative study by using the grounded 
theory approach. On the other hand, Glaser viewed grounded theory as a general 
methodology  which  could  be  applied  in  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  study. 
Secondly, Strauss favoured the researcher having prior knowledge of the phenomena 
or issues to be studied (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In contrast, 
Glaser recommended that the researcher should select an organisation and allow the 
issues or phenomena to emerge in the course of the research process (Glaser, 1992). 
Therefore, Glaser relied entirely on the observed data to understand the phenomenon 
studied,  while  Strauss  recommended  that  the  researcher  should  make  use  of  the 
existing literature. Thirdly, Glaser preferred the general approach to the analytical 
method, which causes the issue of interest to emerge in the field (Glaser, 1992). On 
the  other  hand,  Strauss  favoured  a  more  structured  analytical  method  (Strauss  & 
Corbin, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1998), which was regarded by Glaser as “forcing” 
issues  to  emerge  instead  of  emerging  themselves  in  the  research  process.  In  this 
regard, Glaser recommended an axial process as the last coding stage and to let the 
selective  coding  emerge  automatically,  while  Strauss  recommended  conducting  a 
selective coding. However, as Parker and Roffey (1997) have noted, both agree the 
difficulty of operationalizing the general frame of reference provided by Glaser. 
 
                                                 
9According  to  Strauss,  grounded  theory  is  “a  qualitative  research  method  that  uses  a 
systematic  set  of  procedures  to  develop  and  inductively  derive  grounded  theory  about  a 
phenomenon”  (Strauss  &  Corbin, 1990, p. 24).  On the other hand, Glaser regards 
grounded theory as “a general methodology of analysis linked with data collection that uses 
a systematically applied set of methods to generate an inductive theory about a substantive 
area (Glaser, 1992, p. 16).  
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Also, Glaser regarded theory developed in the grounded theory as the last process 
(Glaser, 1992). He was of the opinion that the subsequent testing of the theory should 
be left to other researchers. In contrast, Strauss allowed the researcher to undertake 
provisional  testing  in  order  to  check  the  validity  and  reliability  of  the  concepts 
established in the theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Finally, Strauss regarded formal 
grounded theory as elevating the “concept of the study up to a more abstract level 
where it can have broader applicability but at the same time remain grounded in data” 
(Corbin  &  Strauss,  2008,  p.  102).  In  contrast,  Glaser  described  formal  grounded 
theory  as  the  general  implications  of  the  core  categories  which  emerged  from  a 
substantive theory. He was of the opinion that the higher level of generality could 
also be available at the substantive level and, therefore, should not be used as the 
criterion (see Glaser, 2010).  
 
This  study  adopted  the  Strauss  view  of  grounded  theory.  It  was  regarded  as  an 
appropriate  approach  to  PhD  research  undertakings,  which  require  researchers  to 
have a prior knowledge of the existing literature on the researched phenomenon. The 
systematic  analytic  method  advocated  by  Strauss,  though  regarded  by  Glaser  as 
‘forcing’  (see  Glaser,  1992),  enhanced  clarity  during  the  coding  process.  The 
provisional testing of the substantive theory, as elaborated in Chapter 8, enriched the 
understanding  of  the  central  phenomenon  beyond  the  studied  organisations.  The 
approach used to develop a formal theory, as recommended by Strauss, was in line 
with the limited timeframe available for this research project. More importantly, the 
current study treated grounded theory as a method which could be applied within the 
interpretive paradigm. The following section discusses the specific research methods 
employed in this study. 
4.6  Research Methods 
This section presents the research process and sampling methods used in this study. It 
also  discusses  data  collection,  management,  and  the  analysis  technique  employed 
during the entire research process. Recognising potential limitations of field based 
research,  the  section  also  highlights  the  different  approaches  used  to  overcome 
potential problems in the research findings. Brief descriptions of the ethical issues 
involved in this study conclude the section.   
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4.6.1 Research Process 
The entire process involved in this research can be loosely divided into five stages: 
literature review, initial problem formulation, formulation of the research questions, 
data collection and analysis, and integration of the substantive theory into the extant 
literature. As with other grounded theory studies, data collection and analysis were 
conducted simultaneously. It is also important to stress that the research questions, 
data collection, data analysis, and the substantive theory informed the formal theory 
iteratively. The entire process involved in this research is presented in the following 
figure. 
 
Figure 11: Research Process adapted from Russell (1996) 
 
4.6.2 Sampling Method 
Purposive sampling  was employed to  select  the Councils  studied (Bernard, 2000; 
Mack,  Woodsong,  MacQueen,  Guest,  &  Namey,  2005).  Two  Municipal  Councils 
(KAMC and MDMC) and two District Councils (KBDC and MCDC) were selected 
as the main research sites. These Councils were actively involved in development and 
social  activities,  which  allowed  the  manifestation  of  accounting  practices.  The 
selection of two sites for each category was intended to enhance comparison across 
the case studies. KAMC was selected due to its high level of self-generated incomes 
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(own  sources)  and  its  special  location  (a  business  city),  while  MDMC  was 
representative of Municipals with relatively low self-generated incomes. MDMC was 
also chosen for political reasons, as being run by opposition Councillors, it presented 
unique  examples  of  the  influence  of  different  political  parties  on  Councils’ 
management  in  general,  and  accounting  practices  in  particular.    Of  the  District 
Councils, KBDC and MCDC represented rural Councils which depended heavily on 
cash  crops.  Given  the  volatility  of  the  cash  crops  and  the  substantial  number  of 
District Councils which depend on them, it was thought important to investigate the 
manner  in  which  accounting  was  implemented  in  these  Councils.  PMO-RALG, 
MoHSW, MoEVT, and LAAC were visited due to their peculiar role in administering 
the Tanzanian LGAs in general and more specifically in accounting practices. The 
PMO-RALG  was  the  Ministry  responsible  for  administration  of  the  local 
governments  in  the  country,  while  MoHSW  and  MoEVT  were  the  ministries 
responsible for Health and Education respectively. On the other hand, LAAC was the 
Parliamentary Committee which was accountable to examine the accounts of local 
governments and report to the National Assembly. Within the Councils, theoretical 
sampling was used to determine the interviewees. The sampling was ‘theoretical’ in 
the sense that it included only interviewees who could potentially contribute to the 
development  of  theory  (Parker  &  Roffey,  1997).  Even  though,  the  ‘snowball’ 
approach was used initially, the proposed interviewees were theoretically evaluated 
before  an  actual  interview  took  place,  and  some  were  even  abandoned.  The 
interviews continued until no new insights were obtained from additional interviews; 
‘theoretical saturation’ (Parker & Roffey, 1997; Phillips & Phillips, 2007). This was 
reached towards the end of the second phase of data collection. 
4.6.3 In-depth Interviews 
In-depth  interviews  were  conducted  with  all  Councils  visited.  Semi-structured 
interviews were mainly employed in the first phase of data collection which started 
from  July  2010  to  January  2011,  while  a  combination  of  semi-structured  and 
structured interviews was employed in the second phase which covered a period of 
three months from August to October 2011. The researcher’s former students played 
a  crucial  role  in  facilitating  the  access  and  familiarising  the  researcher  with  the 
Councils’ accounting practices in general. In order to obtain full understanding of the 
accounting practices, the interviews were conducted with the Councils’ officials of  
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different  professional  backgrounds  and  positions.  The  researcher  stayed  in  the 
researched Councils for some days before undertaking the interviews. This enhanced 
trustworthiness (Lightbody, 2000). A total of 71 interviews were conducted, of which 
38 were tape and digital recorded, while the remaining were hand-written. The hand-
written  interviews  were  expanded  immediately  after  the  interview  session.  The 
longest interview was with Assistant Revenue Accountant of KAMC, which took 83 
minutes (1 hour and 23 minutes), while the shortest one was with Assistant Medical 
in Charge of KBDC which lasted for 31 minutes. The provisional analysis of the 
interview was done before conducting any subsequent interview. 
 
Apart from interviews involving the Members of Parliament, where some of them 
were conducted at the weekend, the remainder of the interviews were conducted in 
normal working days. Four interviews involved more than one interviewee, and three 
members  were  interviewed  twice  in  two  different  phases  of  data  collection.  The 
overall  focus  of  the  interviews  was  on  the  Councils’  officials.  However,  a  few 
interviews were conducted with  three  Ministries (i.e. PMO-RALG, MoHSW, and 
MoEVT), and a Parliamentary Committee (i.e. LAAC). The roles of these entities in 
LGAs’ accounting practices emerged during the first phase of data collection and 
were thoroughly examined during the second phase. More interviews were conducted 
in the first research site (i.e. KAMC) to establish patterns and, as the issues became 
clear,  less  were  conducted  with  the  rest  of  the  Councils.  The  profile  of  the 
interviewees and their corresponding organisations are shown in the following table. 
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Table 3: List of Interviews 
 
Fieldwork-1
st Phase: July 2010-January 2011 (7 months) 
I: Main Research Sites  Total 
Interviewee's Profile  KAMC  KBDC  MCDC  MDMC   
Council Treasurers  1  1  1  1  4 
Council Accountants  7  4  2  2  15 
Council Internal Auditors  3  1  1  1  6 
Council Planning Officers  1  1  1  0  3 
Health Planners & Secretaries  2  1  1  0  4 
Ward Education Officers  1*  1  0  0  2 
Council Medical Officers  1  0  1  0  2 
Head Teachers-Primary  1  2  0  0  3 
Medical In Charges   2  2  1  1  6 
Fieldwork-2
nd Phase: August-October 2011 (3 months) 
Interviewee's Profile  KAMC  KBDC  MCDC  MDMC   
Medicals In Charges  2  0  0  1  3 
Councils Accountants  4  0  0  2  6 
Head Teachers-Primary  2  0  0  1  3 
Ward Executive Officers  1  0  0  1*  2 
Councillors  1  0  0  1*  2 
II: Regulatory Organs   
Interviewee's Profile  PMO-RALG  MoHSW  MoEVT  LAAC   
Officials  4**  1  2  3***  10 
Total Interviews  71 
 
*Focus group (2 respondents) 
**Focus group (3 respondents) 
***Members of Parliament 
4.6.4 Non-Participant Observation 
The observation of the various Councils’ activities and important meetings was done 
overtly. A non-participant observation mode was employed. The nature of the current 
research restricted the researcher from being a participant observer. Access to the 
important meetings was granted, and five (5) meetings were attended. These exclude 
briefing and debriefing meetings, which were formally and informally conducted in 
all  organisations.  The  field  notes  were  used  instantly  to  document  all  relevant 
information and events which took place during the observation. Field notes were 
also taken during informal conversations and interactions with participants. The draft 
field notes used were expanded immediately after observation.   
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4.6.5 Documentary Sources 
Different types of documentary sources were used, including administrative laws and 
regulations,  financial  regulations  and  guidelines,  financial  reports,  and  audited 
accounts. Councils’ assessment manuals and assessment reports, as well as policy 
documents, were also examined. Access to the Councils’ minutes was also granted 
and minutes of the Finance Committees and Full Councils of all LGAs visited were 
thoroughly reviewed. The website
10 hosted by the Local Government Working Group 
(LGWG)  provided  additional  and  corroborative  financi al  information  about  the 
Councils. The list of main documents used in this research is provided in Appendix 5. 
4.6.6 Data Management 
The proper arrangement of data management was carried out. 38 interviews which 
were taped and digitally recorded were transcribed and transferred to software for 
further analysis. Written interviews and observation notes were also transferred to the 
software.  Qualitative  software  (QSR  Nvivo  Project,  Version  9)  was  used  for 
transcription of recordings and for coding all other data sources. Apart from coding, 
the software was also used for ranking, summarizing, linking, graphing, and other 
data management activities. The software enabled the safe custody of the data and 
simplified the data retrieval process. 
4.6.7 Data Analysis 
Data analysis was conducted using the three iterative processes of grounded theory 
analysis advocated by Strauss and Corbin (1990), Strauss and Corbin (1998), and 
Corbin and Strauss (2008). These are open, axial, and selective coding processes. 
Open coding involved examination of the interview scripts, observation notes, and 
documents ‘word by  word’, ‘sentence by sentence’ and ‘paragraph by paragraph’ 
(Strauss  &  Corbin,  1998).  The  open  coding  processes  produced  many  concepts 
initially. The emerged concepts were linked each other, classified into subcategories 
and properties, modified, and some, especially redundant ones, were abandoned. This 
process reduced the provisional concepts to 67 relatively major concepts (Appendix 
3). Then, the major concepts which portrayed similar themes were combined, and a 
theme  name,  a  category,  was  assigned.  This  process  led  the  emergence  of  21 
categories  which  are  known  as  open  categories  (Appendix  3).  The  detailed 
                                                 
10http://www.logintanzania.net/monitor6b.asp  
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descriptions of these are given in Chapter 5. The data was later subjected to further 
analysis at the axial coding stage. This was done by establishing the relationships 
between  the  categories  and  subcategories,  along  their  properties  and  dimensional 
range  (Strauss  &  Corbin,  1998).  The  categories  depicting  related  themes  were 
combined and a theme name was assigned to them. Finally, this process produced 13 
main  categories  (see  Chapter  6).  The  final  coding  process,  selective  coding,  was 
completed by selecting a central phenomenon for the study. The paradigm model was 
used to integrate the structure and process, and all other core categories were related 
to the central phenomenon as either conditions, strategies, or consequences (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998). Chapter 7 provides detailed discussion of the selective coding and 
the substantive theory which emerged in this research. The validity and ethical issues 
involved in this research are discussed in the following two sections. 
4.6.8 Ensuring Validity and Reliability 
The validity and reliability of the field based research are normally disputed by some 
quantitative  researchers.  They  hold  the  opinion  that  qualitative  based  research 
instruments lack rigor and scientific precision (Yin, 2003). In contrast, qualitative 
researchers claim that validity and reliability issues originate from the positivistic 
tradition and should not be embraced in  qualitative research  (Ahrens & Mollona, 
2007;  Chua,  1986;  Gill  &  Johnson,  2002).  Rather  than  validity  and  reliability, 
qualitative  researchers  normally  favor  “plausibility”  and  “trustworthiness”  of  the 
conclusions  (Covaleski,  Dirsmith, Heian,  & Samuel, 1998). As  Locke and  Locke 
(2001) argued, “in the theory building mode, by contrast, where researchers move 
from  empirical  observation  to  the  development  of  concepts  and  their  proposed 
relations, claims are made about plausibility of the theorized elements-not about the 
extent of their expression in a population” (p.39). Regardless of the conflicting views 
about the reliability and validity of qualitative research, the current study undertook a 
variety of steps to ensure the reliability of the research findings. For example, the 
multiple data sources (interviews, observation, and documents) used in this research 
enhanced  the  cross  comparison  of  the  information  and  boosted  ‘theoretical 
sufficiency’ (Dey, 1999). Also, ten months’ fieldwork allowed the researcher to be 
treated as an ordinary member of the organisations. Without imposing bias on the 
research findings, this not only facilitated the interview process, but also simplified 
access to other information and meetings which were deemed to be confidential.  
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Furthermore,  quotations  have  been  extensively  used  in  this  thesis  as  part  of  the 
evidence of the reported findings. This not only ensures the reliability and validity of 
the research findings, but also explains the ‘everyday life’ of the Councils’ officials 
in their normal interactions (Parker & Roffey, 1997). In addition, the preliminary 
findings of this research were presented to some of the Councils’ officials during the 
second phase of data collection. The officials’ reactions were integrated into the final 
analysis and, in some cases, additional information that would substantiate certain 
findings,  were  sought.  The  current  research  also  used  quantitative  financial 
information  to  augment  the  qualitative  data  obtained.  Moreover,  cross  interviews 
were  used  to  counteract  interview  bias.  This  was  exercised  by  asking  the  same 
questions  to  different  interviewees  from  the  same  Council,  and  sometimes,  from 
different  Councils.  In  some  cases,  the  responses  of  the  Councils’  officials  were 
carefully  checked  with  others  for  consistencies  and  differences  and,  more 
importantly,  any  related  implications  were  investigated.  This  not  only  lifted  the 
research validity, but also helped to establish patterns which were used during the 
development of theory.  
4.6.9 Ethical Consideration 
The current research took into consideration important ethical issues. Free consent for 
participation  in  this  research  was  sought  in  advance  from  the  potential  research 
participants.  Neither  coercion  nor  financial  rewards  were  used  to  force  or  attract 
individuals to participate in this study. Prospective research participants were fully 
informed about  the  research  objectives  and procedures.  In this  regard,  a  research 
synopsis  was  made  available  to  all  the  organisations  visited.  The  purposes  of 
interviews were highlighted during the sessions and an advance request for recording 
was  made  for  each  interview.  The  timing  of  the  interviews  was  decided  by 
prospective interviewees, and every attempt was made to avoid disturbances to work 
or personal  life. A declaration of confidentiality  and anonymity was  made to  the 
interviewees before the interview, and in this thesis, all interviewees and the four 
Councils  visited  have  been  assigned  fictitious  names.  Furthermore,  an  ethical 
clearance letter from the University of Southampton and a clearance letter from the 
University of Dar es Salaam were used to safeguard the researcher, the organisations, 
and the research participants against potential legal implications.  
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4.7  Summary 
The  chapter  has  discussed  the  methodology  used  to  undertake  this  study.  After 
providing  brief  descriptions  of  the  various  social  science  research  paradigms,  the 
chapter  has  provided  deep  discussion  of  the  interpretive  paradigm,  covering  its 
background, rationale, empirical studies, and the underlying research methods. The 
chapter also has offered a comprehensive review of grounded theory, detailing its 
approach as well as the rationale of its application in the current study. The empirical 
accounting  studies  reviewed  under  the  section  of  grounded  theory  suggested  the 
appropriateness of the approach in this study. The last section of the chapter has 
discussed the specific research techniques employed in the current research, detailing 
the research process involved, the sampling techniques employed, the data collection 
methods as well as the data analysis techniques. The section also highlighted tools 
used in the data management, strategies used to enhance the research validity and 
reliability,  and  the  ethical  issues  which  were  taken  into  account.  The  next  three 
chapters present research findings using grounded theory approach.     
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Chapter Five 
Open Categories 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter has two major sections which provide detailed descriptions of the open 
categories  which  emerged  throughout  the  open  coding  process.  The  first  section 
elaborates upon the procedures used in the process of open coding, while the final 
section offers a detailed discussion of the emerged open categories. A discussion of 
the  open  categories  provided  in  this  chapter  provides  the  foundations  for  the 
development of the core categories in the following chapter. 
5.2  Open Coding and Generation of the Open Categories 
The open categories which emerged in this  research were  obtained through  open 
coding,  a  process  which  involved  a  detailed  examination  of  all  the  interview 
transcripts, relevant Councils’ documents, and the field notes line by line, sentence by 
sentence, and paragraph by paragraph (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998).  The  words,  sentences,  paragraphs,  events,  and  the  situations  which 
demonstrated  similar  themes  were  assigned  a  particular  name,  a  concept.  For 
instance, during an interview with a member of the Parliamentary Committee, the 
researcher  sought  to  understand  the  management  of  the  Councils’  outsourcing 
arrangements. The interviewee remarked: 
 
“The  management  of  the  Councils’  revenue  outsourcing  arrangement  was  poor, 
because some of the Executives and the Councillors normally collude with revenue 
collecting agents through ill-formulated contracts. These contracts end-up benefitting 
the collecting agents, Councillors and the technocrats and not the Councils” (Mise, 
Member of Parliament: LAAC). 
 
Self-interest  and  collusion  were  some  of  the  concepts  generated  from  the  above 
response.  The  process  of  assigning  concepts  to  the  responses  of  the  Councils’ 
officials  produced many concepts  initially, which were subjected to  modification, 
abandonment, and linking, a process which reduced the number to 67 major concepts 
(see Appendix 3). The major concepts were subjected to further analysis through the 
formation of clusters (Chesler, 1987). The concepts which depicted similar themes 
were combined and a cluster label was assigned. For example, the concepts such as 
‘uncoordinated  funding  sources’  and  ‘inappropriate  funding  allocations’  were  
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clustered  together  into  the  inefficient  fund  management  category.  The  process 
continued iteratively for the all concepts until 21 clusters (open categories) emerged. 
All the data sources described the emerged categories in terms of their properties 
and/or dimensions. The following is the list of the emerged open categories. 
 
i.  The role of accounting and accountants 
ii.  Budgetary practices 
iii.  Deficient financial reporting practices 
iv.  Outdated accounting provisions 
v.  Weak administrative regulations 
vi.  Donors’ practices 
vii.  Inherent weaknesses of the internal control systems 
viii.  Unpleasant working conditions 
ix.  Deficient financial and administrative structures 
x.  Ineffective auditing processes 
xi.  Low fiscal capacity 
xii.  Inefficient fund management 
xiii.  Collusion 
xiv.  Accountability arrangements 
xv.  Transparency measures 
xvi.  Disguised participants’ behaviours 
xvii.  Language barriers 
xviii.  Performance measurement practices 
xix.  Domination and autonomy 
xx.  Perceived political interference 
xxi.  Professional dilemmas 
 
A detailed description of each category, as manifested in this research, is provided in 
the following sections, together with the testimonials of the organisational members 
and archive information, in order to support the general statements of each category. 
5.2.1 The Role of Accounting and Accountants 
Because  the  Councils  depended  substantially  on  external  sources  of  finance, 
accounting was an important mechanism for communicating the Councils’ plans, and  
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justifying their use of the entrusted resources. In this regard, accounting practices, 
such as budgeting, financial reporting, and auditing were used in the bargaining for, 
and justification of, resources. For instance, the budgets were used effectively to seek 
resources,  while  the  financial  reports  justified  their  use.  Similarly,  the  auditing 
processes were utilised to ensure the Council’s compliance, which in turn, attracted a 
variety of resources. In general, accounting practices had been used to legitimize the 
Councils’ operations in order to obtain resources from the Government and donors. In 
the  Primary  Education,  for  example,  accounting  had  been  used  to  legitimize  a 
Primary  Education  Development  Programme  (PEDP)  through  providing  the 
necessary inputs to the programme in the areas such as reporting, monitoring, and 
evaluation. Similarly, in the Health Services, accounting had been highly involved, in 
order to facilitate the undertaking of the Cost Sharing Scheme
11: 
  
“In  the  past,  there  were  no  accountants.  All  accounting  related  matters  were 
undertaken by the Medical in Charge. As the cash collections increases, Medical 
Doctors became so confused and things were very difficult for them to handle...Then, 
the Council decided to allocate accountants to the dispensaries with high collections” 
(Meha, Hospital Doctor In-charge: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
 
This  was  illustrative  of  the  precedent  role  of  accounting  and  accountants  when 
addressing  the  increase  in  cash  collections,  which  subsequently,  extended  the 
accountability of the funds collected and spent at the health facilities. For example, at 
the  KAMC,  accounting  staff  were  allocated  to  the  Municipal  Hospital,  Health 
Centres,  and  its  two  Dispensaries,  all  of  which  had  shown  high  collections. 
Unexpectedly, the medical practitioners accepted the role of accounting in the Health 
Services  but  they  did  not  accept  the  presence  of  the  accounting  staff  within  the 
medical facilities: 
 
“We don’t need an accountant here. The daily collections are very low and the kinds 
of accounting works we are doing are very minimal, and do not require a special 
accounting knowledge. Maybe the Council may arrange for the accountants to come 
                                                 
11 A Cost Sharing Scheme, where the public are required to pay for health services at the 
point  of  delivery,  was  introduced  into  the  country  in  1990s  as  part  of  the  Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP), which was started in the country in the late 1980s under the 
influence of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
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in the specific time, handle what is available, and go” (Aia, Dispensary Medical In-
charge: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
 
The tension which existed between the accountants and the medical practitioners is 
discussed in general terms in section 5.2.21 of this chapter, while specific discussion 
of the same is given in section 6.2.12 of the following chapter. Notwithstanding the 
role  of  accounting  in  the  Councils,  its  effective  undertaking  was  constrained  by 
various factors, including a shortage of accounting staff. The maximum number of 
the accounting staff was recorded in the KAMC (45), while the MCDC had only 17 
accountants. The KBDC and the MDMC had 21 and 28 accountants respectively. 
Being  located  in  the  rural  areas,  the  KBDC  and  MCDC  lacked  the  reliable 
infrastructures  and  other  essential  services  to  attract  a  substantial  number  of 
accounting  staff.  Additionally,  the  accounting  staff  demonstrated  a  low  level  of 
competence  to  undertake  their  activities  efficiently.  Majority  of  the  Councils’ 
accountants  held  certificate  of  accounting.  Furthermore,  the  Councils,  especially 
those  located  in  the  rural  areas,  lacked  appropriate  facilities  such  as  computers, 
transport facilities, and the necessary recording documents. 
 
In general, accounting as practiced in the Tanzanian LGAs was claimed to be clerical, 
procedural, and reactive in nature, and performed by individuals who had insufficient 
competence  to  undertake  the  accounting  functions  appropriately.  As  a  result,  the 
accounting  practices  were  limited  to  routine  practice,  while  all  major  financial 
decisions  were  made  by  the  politicians  without  accounting  justifications.  At  the 
Council level, accountants were regarded as ‘problem solvers’, and in some cases, 
were used by the line managers to bend the accounting procedures. The data shows 
that an effective undertaking of accounting practices was also constrained by the self-
interested behaviour of the Councils’ officials, the presence of weak regulations, and 
political  interference.  Section  6.2.1  of  the  following  chapter  discusses  the 
implications of these issues to the operations of the Councils in general, and to the 
accounting practices in particular. 
5.2.2 Budgetary Practices 
This category described the budgetary practices within the Councils. It describes the 
way in which the Councils’ officials managed to use budgeting information to chase  
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resources, with little regard for the need for planning or control. For instance, the 
Councils’ budgets were supposed to follow a bottom-up approach, where issues of 
importance were raised at the very low levels of the Wards, Villages, and the Service 
Delivery  Units  (SDUs).  However,  effective  participation  by  the  members  at  such 
levels was constrained by their inadequate knowledge, and the financial interests of 
the officials at the Council level: 
 
“Frankly speaking, I am not aware of the information included in the budget and 
especially the codes [GFS codes]. Even if you give me the budget documents of my 
Health Centre, I am not going to use them. The terms used in the budget documents 
are too technical for a Medical professional like me to understand” (Maki, Health 
Centre Medical In charge: KBDC) (emphasis added). 
 
As a result, there was only superficial involvement of the low level in the budget 
preparation  in  order  to  be  able  to  comply  with  the  budgeting  requirements. 
Additionally, the Councils’ budgetary practices were characterized by a number of 
problems, such as untimely and inappropriate budget guidelines, a late disbursement 
of approved budget documents, the existence of non-budgeted expenditures, and the 
presence of informal budget revisions. For example, the budget guidelines in general, 
and the ceilings in particular, were lately disbursed to the Councils. In some cases, 
the  Councils  were  informed  of  the  budgetary  ceilings  towards  the  end  of  the 
preparation  process,  a  situation  which  significantly  interrupted  the  budget 
preparation. Also related to this were the shared concerns of the Councils’ officials 
that the ceilings were unrealistic: 
 
“The Government should ensure that the budget priorities and ceilings reach us on 
time, and, at the same time, they have to increase the ceilings. The current ceilings 
are not realistic at all. The figures are very small and we have huge expenditures in 
our Council” (Tihe, Municipal Economist: KAMC). 
 
A  similar  situation  was  observed  regarding  the  approved  budget  documents.  The 
documents normally did not reach the Councils on time, and, as  a result, the re-
allocations were used for reconciliation purposes. As was noted in the all Councils 
visited, a re-allocation of the budgeted funds was a permanent agenda item of the  
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Finance Committee
12. Furthermore, budgetary malpractices, such as informal budget 
revisions and non-budgeted expenditures were evident. Interestingly, Councils which 
were under manual system s, KBDC and MCDC,  associated the presence of  non-
budgeted expenditures  with the  absence of a  computerized accounting system.  A 
Health Accountant of the KBDC commented that, “under manual systems, which we 
are in, it is very difficult to abide by the Council’s budget”. However, non-budgeted 
expenditures and informal budget revisions were also prevalent in the KAMC and 
MDMC, where the computerized accounting system, EPICOR, was in operation. In 
general,  the  presence  of  weak  budgetary  controls,  political  interference,  deficient 
administrative  structures,  and  inadequate  competence  constrained  the  Councils’ 
budgeting processes.  However, it was  observed  that  the budgetary practices  were 
somewhat improved in the urban Councils in comparison to the rural ones. This was 
associated  with  the  improved  levels  of  understanding  of  the  urban  actors  in 
comparison to their rural counterparts. Also, high involvement of the donors with the 
primary  Health  Services  had  led  the  Councils’  health  budgets  to  be  more  open, 
transparent, and participatory, unlike that of Primary Education. 
5.2.3 Deficient Financial Reporting Practices 
This category depicted the inherent problems associated with the Councils’ financial 
reporting practices. The frequent change of the financial reporting framework was 
one such problem. The Councils’ financial reporting framework began as the cash 
basis under the Tanzania Statement of Standard Accounting Practices No. 3 (TSSAPs 
3) issued by the National Board of Accountants and Auditors (NBAA)
13. Following 
the wholesale adoption of the  International Financial Reporting Standards ( IFRSs) 
made  by  the  NBAA  with  effect  from  1
st  July,  2004,  the  Councils’  financial 
framework was changed to the IFRSs. Again, with effect from the FY 2008/09
14, the 
                                                 
12 In the MDMC, TZS 25,600,000 were re-allocated in one Finance Committee’s meeting 
(Minute No. 31/2010 of 3
rd July, 2010). An extreme situation was found in the KAMC, where 
in one meeting, a total of TZS 1,447,470,034 was re-allocated (Minute No. 7/10 of 27
th 
January, 2010). The average exchange rates of TZS to USD for the year ended December 
2010 were TZS 1453.54 (BOT, 2011). 
13 National Board of Accountants and Auditors (NBAA) is the supreme body of accounting 
regulations in Tanzania.  
14 This was in accordance with the directive from the Prime Minister’s Office vide circular 
letter with reference No. CA: 26/307/01A/79 dated 28 September, 2009 directing all LGAs to 
prepare their accounts based on IPSAS the accrual basis of accounting starting from FY  
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Councils’  financial  reporting  was  changed  to  the  International  Public  Sector 
Accounting Standards (IPSAS). The Councils’ officials were of the opinion that the 
frequent  changes  of  the  financial  reporting  frameworks  created  unnecessary 
compliance problems, and, in most cases, the changes were not sufficiently backed up 
by  a  supporting  environment.  For  example,  regarding  adoption  of  IPSAS,  one 
member commented: 
 
“We don’t have adequate knowledge to conform to the IPSAS...We are not even 
conversant  with  how  certain  items  are  recognized  and  disclosed  in  the  books  of 
accounts. As a result, we fail to include a lot of items. In my opinion, IPSAS need the 
support  of  all  Departments  and  Sections…But  also,  IPSAS  require  a  lot  of 
disclosures. This means that we have to invest in building the Council’s information 
base” (Gefi, Final Accounts Accountant: KAMC). 
 
The  above  quote  shows  that  the  Councils’  officials  lacked  adequate  technical 
competence for an effective compliance with  IPSAS. It also suggests that  IPSAS 
were left solely to the Councils’ Finance Department, and within the Department, the 
application of the framework was only evident in the Final Accounts section. The 
above comment also shows that the Councils lacked IPSAS’ supporting environment, 
including training. For instance, the training for IPSAS was conducted once in the FY 
2008/09 when the framework was introduced, and it was attended by the Councils’ 
Treasurers and Internal Auditors only. Further to this was the concern that IPSAS, as 
International Standards, failed to take into account the Tanzanian local context. The 
Councils’ officials were of the opinion that the effective involvement of the NBAA in 
the contextualization of the standards, could have increased the level of compliance. 
In general, the challenges facing the Tanzanian Councils cast doubt on the reliability 
of their financial statements, which were claimed to be fully IPSAS compliant. 
 
In  addition,  there  has  been  limited  application  of  the  Integrated  Financial 
Management Systems (IFMS) using the EPICOR accounting package. As at October, 
                                                                                                                                           
2008/09.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  Councils’  financial  year  ends  on  30
th  June  and  the 
deadline for the submission of the financial statements for audit purposes is 30
th September. 
Therefore,  the  manner  in  which  the  Councils  complied  with  IPSAS,  as  a  new  financial 
reporting framework, within three days (28th Sept -30th Sept, 2009) remains unclear.  
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2011, KBDC and MCDC had yet to install the system. In KAMC and MDMC, where 
the  system  had  been  installed  in  2003  and  2007  respectively,  its  application  was 
limited to the production of the trial balance, the Councils’ budget, the issuing of 
vouchers, and the preparation of the cheque lists. The Councils’ financial statements 
and other accounting reports were still prepared in the Excel format. It was apparent 
here that this limited usage was the result of a combination of the officials’ reluctance 
to use the system due to the self-interest, and technical problems associated with the 
system. For instance, the system was not capable of generating a Local Purchase 
Order (LPO), and it was also not configured to produce IPSAS-compliant financial 
statements.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  in  the  KAMC  and  the  MDMC,  Internal 
Auditors had no access to the system. These anomalies cast doubt on the reliability 
and trustworthiness of the Councils’ financial reports generated from the system. This 
category  and  budgetary  practices  are  discussed  together  in  the  following  chapter 
under section 6.2.2. 
5.2.4 Outdated Accounting Provisions 
‘Outdated  accounting  provisions’  describes  the  deficient  nature  of  the  Councils’ 
accounting regulations. In general, the accounting regulations contained provisions 
which  were  outdated  and  ineffective  in  the  support  of  efficient  and  effective 
accounting practices. For instance, Section 41(1) of the Local Government Finances 
Act  No.  9  of  1982  (amended  2000)  and  Order  No.  52  of  the  Local  Authority 
Financial Memorandum (1997) stipulate 31
st December as the Councils’ financial 
year end, while, with effect from 2003, the Councils’ financial year end was changed 
to 30
th June. Furthermore, the adoption of the IFRSs and IPSAS was not mentioned in 
any of the Councils’ accounting regulations, and Order No. 57 of the Local Authority 
Financial Memorandum (1997) still regarded the TSSAPs as the financial reporting 
framework of the Councils. The changes to the financial year end introduced in 2003 
and that of reporting frameworks introduced in 2004 and 2008, had not yet been 
incorporated into the regulations. 
 
The outdated nature of the accounting provisions had also affected the transparency 
and accountability of the lower levels, such as the Villages and Township authorities. 
Although these Lower Local Governments (LLGs) had substantial allocations from  
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the Central Government, the Councils’ own sources, and donors, their external audit 
remained unclear. This was manifested in the following provision: 
 
“The  accounts  of  a  village  council  shall  be  audited  by  such  public  officers  or 
organizations as the district council or as the case may be, an urban council may, in 
writing direct” (Section 45(3) of the Local Government Finances Act No. 9 of 1982 
(amended 2000)). 
 
In fact, there was no external audit of the Village Councils, and according to Order 
No.  93  of  LAFM  (1997),  their  accounting  records  were  neither  required  to  be 
incorporated  into  the  Councils’  financial  statements,  nor  aggregated  with  other 
Village Councils. A similar situation existed in the audit of Township Authorities, 
where section 45 (2) of the Local Government Finances Act No. 9 of 1982 (amended 
2000), did not clearly specify the auditor of the authority. Therefore, the manner in 
which  the  Village  Councils  and  Township  Authorities  utilised  the  public  funds, 
remained unclear.  
 
The  revenue  collections  had  also  been  affected  by  the  outdated  regulations.  The 
Councils were not allowed to charge any local tax and rates which had not been 
approved by the Government. Therefore, they operated under ‘closed-list’ of local 
sources,  and,  at  the  same  time,  revenue  collection  rates  were  observed  to  be 
unrealistic. The regulations require the changes of rates to be approved by higher 
organs,  a  tendency  which  was  claimed  to  be  too  bureaucratic.  As  a  result,  the 
Councils operated within a low tax base with low collection rates, a situation which 
affected their self-generated incomes. Therefore, it was apparent that the Councils 
were utilising accounting regulations which had not been sufficiently amended to 
support  their  operations.  Where  amendments  had  been  made,  they  were  not 
sufficiently  harmonized  with  the  regulations  themselves,  and  other  related 
regulations, and this created a compliance challenge. These anomalies facilitated the 
occurrence of accounting manipulation. 
5.2.5 Weak Administrative Regulations 
As well as the deficiencies of the accounting regulations, there were also inherent 
weaknesses  in  the  Councils’  general  administrative  regulations.  The  regulations  
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contained weak, repetitive, and sometimes contradictory provisions which failed to 
supervise  the operation of the Councils.  For example, the regulations specifically 
qualify any citizen who has attained the age of 21 years to serve as a Councillor, 
regardless of academic qualifications
15. As a result, the ability of the Councillors to 
supervise the Councils’ financial and other matters, was significantly limited. This 
was because the Councillors were not sufficiently qualified to undertake such work. 
The inherent weaknesses in the regulations were also responsible for the formation of 
parallel structures as observed in the KAMC, where TGCC (pseudonym), which was 
a City Council, existed in parallel with other three Municipal Councils. The City 
Council had no sole territory,  and merely represented the total areas of the three 
Municipal Councils  located in  the city.  It  is  also worth noting that there was  no 
formal reporting relationship between the Municipal Councils and the City Council, 
with all entities reporting directly to the PMO-RALG. The reactions of the Councils’ 
officials to this arrangement are given below: 
 
“We have three Municipal Councils and a City Council. Actually, I don’t see the 
value of the City Council here. All development activities are done by the Municipal 
Councils and the City is normally involved with fire services and waste management, 
which we [Municipal Councils] can do as well…You may be  surprised, it has a 
substantial  budget  with  very  little  activities  to  do”  (Muma,  Municipal  Treasurer: 
KAMC). 
 
There had also been a dispute between the City Council and the Municipal Councils 
about  the  revenue  collected  from  the  joint  sources,  as  well  as  the  expenditures 
incurred for cross-cutting issues. The rights and responsibilities of each Council in 
the  joint  ownership  were  not  clearly  defined  in  the  regulations,  which  created  a 
loophole  for  one  Council  to  undermine  the  others.  A  similar  situation was  noted 
between the urban Councils and the Tanzania Road Agency (TANROAD) regarding 
the fees for billboards installed on the regional roadsides. Whilst the TANROAD 
claimed to have sole rights for the billboard fees, as per the Roads Act No. 13 of 
2007, the Councils insisted that they had full rights for the same, as per Councils 
                                                 
15 Section 38(1) of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982, Section 
21(1) of the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982, and the Section 39 of 
the Local Authorities (Elections) Act No. 4 of 1979.  
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regulations. By  the  end of October  2011, the  matter had  yet  to  be resolved, and 
largely, the Councils continued to collect the fees. In general, the deficient regulatory 
systems were the main reason for problems such as political interference, low fiscal 
autonomy, and the language barrier. A combination of this category with the outdated 
accounting provisions, suggests the existence of a deficient regulatory framework. A 
detailed discussion of this main category is given under section 6.2.3 of the following 
chapter. 
5.2.6 Donors’ Practices 
Along  the  Councils’  self-generated  incomes  and  the  Government  transfers,  funds 
from donors also financed a significant number of the Councils’ operations. These 
donors  were:  the World Bank (WB), and  countries  such as  Belgium, Netherland, 
Sweden,  Ireland,  Germany,  Japan,  and  Finland,  which  jointly  formed  a  ‘basket 
funding’  arrangement.  There  were  also  other  independent  donors  who  financed 
earmarked projects in specific areas, such as Education, Road, HIV, and Water and 
Agriculture. Funds from donors were normally disbursed directly to the Councils, or 
through the donor-funded projects managed by the sectorial ministries. The donors’ 
influence originated from these funds, and was manifested through practices such as 
the adoption and implementation of the Integrated Financial Management Systems 
(IFMS) using the EPICOR accounting package, the establishment of the Councils’ 
Audit  Committee,  the  introduction  of  the  Local  Government  Capital  and 
Development  Grants  (LGCDG)  systems,  and  the  adoption  of  IFRSs  and  IPSAS. 
Regarding IPSAS, one member confessed: 
 
“Donors are responsible for the adoption of IPSAS in our Councils. They wanted to 
know clearly how their funds are spent. You know, IPSAS have more disclosures 
than the IFRSs. So, under IPSAS, they are able to see the Councils’ expenditure on 
an item basis for all Councils and they will be able to know clearly how their funds 
are spent” (Gefi, Final Accounts’ Accountant: KAMC). 
 
In the Health Services, where donors were highly involved, all planning and reporting 
requirements were governed by the Comprehensive Council Health Plan (CCHP), 
which  originated  from  the  Councils’  donors  after  they  had  introduced  the  health 
basket funding arrangement. Prior to the basket funding, each donor had a separate  
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influence on the Councils, a situation which had increased the compliance burden. 
Despite the fact that the basket funding had reduced the volume and frequency of the 
reports,  the  differing  requirements  of  each  donors  and  the  Government  was  still 
burdensome for the Councils. 
 
“As for the Council’s health budget, donors require an Excel format and not the 
PlanRep which is required by the Treasury.  Also, the technical and financial reports 
needed by the donors are different from those needed by the PMO-RALG and other 
sectorial ministries. As a result, the work becomes very difficult and tedious due to 
the  backlog  of  different  reports  required  by  different  organs”  (Ahm,  Health 
Secretary: KBDC). 
 
The reporting burden was also high when donors embarked on projects which did not 
pass  through  the  Government  Exchequer  System.  In  this  situation,  the  donors 
required  separate  reporting  and  budgeting  arrangements,  something  which  the 
Councils’ officials felt to be an additional compliance burden. It was also observed 
that some donors required a minimum competence before disbursing funds to the 
SDUs, something which the Councils’ officials regarded to be inappropriate in the 
local context, where the level of competence was generally low. It is also interesting 
to  note  that  the  donors’  influence  was  not  only  limited  to  their  funds,  but  also 
extended  to  the  Councils’  own  funds  and  the  Government  transfers.  This  was 
exercised by the requirements of donors to combine their funds with others into one 
account, and subjected to the same scrutiny. As an Internal Auditor of the KBDC 
commented, “they want to know their funds and ours as well”. 
 
An examination of the Councils visited shows that the donors’ involvement with the 
Councils’ operations was higher with the urban Councils than with the rural ones. 
Because population size represented a 70% share of the allocation of some of the 
donors’ funds, the urban Councils which were highly populated, accrued a substantial 
amount when compared to the rural areas. The donors were also more involved with 
Health Services than Primary Education, and so, in the Health Services the donors 
had dictated the planning, reporting, and the auditing processes, which had limitedly 
happened with  Primary  Education. This  category is  discussed further in  the axial 
coding chapter.  
 
Accounting Practices in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs): Page 97 
 
5.2.7 Inherent Weaknesses of the Internal Control Systems 
All the Councils visited demonstrated apparent weaknesses in their internal control 
systems, inadequate segregation of the accounting works being a major reason. For 
instance, in the KAMC and MDMC, where a computerized accounting system was 
limitedly  used,  all  accounting  activities  were  controlled  by  one  person,  the  Final 
Accounts’  Accountant.  It  was  noted  that  the  Final  Accounts’  Accountants  were 
involved in the posting of the Councils’ budget into the system, revising the budget 
allocations,  authorizing the cheque lists in  the system,  posting  the payments,  and 
preparing  the  final  accounts.  The  worst  situations  were  found  in  the  KBDC  and 
MCDC, where a combination of the manual system which was in operation, and the 
scarcity  of  accounting  staff  allowed  the  same  individuals  to  handle  the  multiple 
accounting tasks manually. Similarly, at the Ward level, all accounting activities were 
executed  by  one  non-accounting  member  of  staff,  the  Ward  Executive  Officer 
(WEO). A similar trend was noted at the Village level, where the Village Executive 
Officer (VEO) undertook all accounting functions.  
 
Inadequate internal controls were also noted in the social service facilities, where, for 
example in some of the health facilities, all accounting activities were done by the 
Medicals in Charge. Medicals in Charge were involved in the cash collections, the 
recording, and  the  banking  of the collected amounts.  A related practice was  also 
observed  in  the  Primary  Schools,  where  Head  Teachers  undertook  all  accounting 
functions. Nevertheless, the internal control systems were significantly better in the 
urban areas than in the rural ones. Being located in major cities and towns, the urban 
Councils had managed to attract a relatively large number of staff, which enabled the 
segregation of duties, unlike the situation with the rural Councils. Also, as opposed to 
the internal control systems used in Primary Education, the high influence of donors 
had somewhat improved the internal control systems of the Health Services. 
5.2.8 Unpleasant Working Conditions 
This  category  encompassed  the  unfavourable  nature  of  the  Councils’  working 
conditions.  In  general,  the  staff  of  the  Tanzanian  Councils  had  been  exposed  to 
unfavourable working conditions, and more particularly in the rural Councils, such as 
KBDC and MCDC. Essential services such as water, electricity, a transport system, 
and accommodation facilities were not adequately available in the rural Councils.  
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Also, there were insufficient equipments and supplies, especially in health facilities, a 
situation which exposed the practitioners to potential health risks. Similarly, with the 
exception of the KAMC, which managed to have offices for each Ward, some WEOs 
and Ward officials in other Councils visited, were located in Primary Schools and 
other public places, such as markets. Furthermore, the inadequacy of the security at 
the  lower  levels  of  Wards  and  Villages/Suburbs,  increased  security  risks  for  the 
officials of the LLGs. As the WEO of the MDMC commented, “sometimes our life is 
in danger”. This was the case when the WEOs were mandated to collect local taxes 
on behalf of the Councils without sufficient security protection. Also, there was a 
concern  expressed  by  the  Councils’  officials  that  the  recruitment  and  promotion 
criteria  subjected  on  them  were  unfair  and  discriminatory.  This  is  when  the 
employment and promotion criteria differ between the Councils’ officials and those 
of Central Government: 
 
“Our promotion criteria are different from those who serve at the Ministerial level of 
the Central Government. We have the same qualifications and sometimes we are 
even more qualified, but we are not promoted as compared to our colleagues in the 
Central Government” (Fiac, Final Accounts Accountant: MDMC). 
 
Only a limited staff development programme was evidenced in the studied Councils. 
Training was only provided at the introduction of a new system or programme, with 
no  follow-up  or  on-going  staff  development.  For  instance,  formal  financial 
administration training was provided for all Head Teachers of the Primary Schools 
and Chairpersons of the Primary School Committee (PSC) on the FY 2002/03 when 
the PEDP I was introduced. Related to the unfavourable working conditions was the 
bureaucratic  nature  of  the  Councils’  operations.  Because  all  authorization  and 
approval of funds was made at the Council level, the technocrats of the rural Councils 
spent  many  hours  in  the  Councils’  offices  following-up  their  payment  requests, 
something  which  was  described  by  technocrats  as  “too  bureaucratic  and 
discouraging”.  In  general,  the  technocrats  were  subjected  to  low  salaries  and 
unpleasant  working  environments,  which  discouraged  a  sufficient  number  of 
qualified staff to work for the Councils, especially the rural ones. The unpleasant 
working conditions observed in the Councils demoralized working morale, and led to 
a high allocation of allowances in the Councils’ budget. This, and the above category  
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(the  inherent  weaknesses  of  the  internal  control  systems),  had  substantially 
contributed  to  the  emergence  of  fraud  and  corruption,  a  core  category  which  is 
discussed in section 6.2.5 of the following chapter. 
5.2.9 Deficient Financial and Administrative Structures 
This category emerged after careful examination of the financial and administrative 
structures of the Councils. The analysis showed that the structures were unable to 
accommodate their operations efficiently. For instance, the daily operations of the 
Councils were administered by the Council Management Team (CMT), which was 
composed of members who lacked an adequate understanding of financial matters. 
Excluding  the  Treasurer  and  the  Internal  Auditor,  other  members  including  the 
Council Director, demonstrated extremely inadequate knowledge of financial matters, 
something  which  suggests  the  deficient  nature  of  the  CMT
16.  As  a  result,  the 
important financial decisions  were endorsed  without sufficient scrutiny. A similar 
trend was noted at the lower level of Wards and Villages, where  WEOs and VEOs 
lacked adequate knowledge of the financial matters which  they were entrusted to 
administer. An absence of statutor y audit at these low levels had  increased the 
financial administration weaknesses even further.   Similarly, the  Councillors, who 
formed  the  C ouncils’  standing  committee,  demonstrated  apparent  ignorance  of 
financial matters, a situation which cast doubts on their supervisory role. Thus, there 
were inherent internal weaknesses in the Councils’ administrative arrangements, and 
the  superficial  supervisory  role  of  the  Councillors’  Finance  Committee.  Only 
infrequently,  the  Councillors  critically  questioned  the  internal  financial  decisions 
made by the CMT. Furthermore, the administrative structures in the primary schools 
and health facilities were also weak, and the financial administration of these units 
rested on individuals who lacked understanding of financial matters. These anomalies 
had a negative impact on the reliability of the Councils’ financial information overall. 
                                                 
16This was physically observed in the CMT’s special meeting held on 28
th September 2010 to 
discuss and endorse the draft Final Accounts of the KAMC for the FY 2009/10. It was noted 
during the meeting that, apart from the Internal Auditor and the Treasurer, other members 
concentrated  on  issues  such  as  SWOT  analysis  of  their  respective  Departments,  the 
construction  of  sentences  and  grammar,  the  physical  and  postal  address  of  the  Council, 
names of the Councillors, and the organizational profile. Within a short period of time, the 
Council Director confessed that ‘we don’t need to spend our time here while we don’t know 
what is going on, let us leave these issues to the Treasurer’ (Researcher: Observation Notes, 
28/09/10).  
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5.2.10  Ineffective Auditing Processes 
This category was generated after a thorough examination of the internal auditing 
processes of the Tanzanian LGAs, which was under the control of the Internal Audit 
Unit. The effectiveness of the auditing practices, as one of the Councils’ governance 
mechanisms,  was  constrained  by  a  number  of  problems,  such  as  inappropriate 
reporting  arrangement,  low  levels  of  competence,  outdated  regulations,  and  the 
inadequate working facilities. For instance, the Internal Auditors were required to 
report  to  the  Council  Director,  a  tendency  which  had  increased  auditors’ 
independence threats. Also, the internal audit reports were channelled to the higher 
bodies through the Council Director, but because the Director was the accounting 
officer  of  the  Council,  there  remained  a  question  about  the  reliability.  As  the 
Assistant Internal Auditor of the MCDC confessed, “sometimes we are forced to drop 
queries which involve the Council Director in order to maintain a good relationship 
with  the  boss”.  There  was  also  an  inadequacy  of  audit  working  tools,  such  as 
computers and transport facilities. With the exception of the KAMC, which had three 
computers  for  the  Internal  Audit  Unit,  the  remainder  had  only  one  computer 
designated to the Audit Unit for each Council. Additionally, the Internal Audit Unit 
of the KBDC and MCDC had no independent transport, and they had to use the 
transport facilities of the audited section or department. In the MCDC, for example, 
the  audited  department  was  also  responsible  for  the  allowances  of  the  Internal 
Auditors. These factors had compromised the independence of the Internal Auditors 
and limited the value of the internal audit functions. 
 
The Councils were also faced with a shortage of internal auditors, which cast doubt 
on  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the  Councils’  internal  audit  functions.  For 
instance,  the  KAMC  and  MDMC  had  four  (4)  Internal  Auditors  each,  while  the 
KBDC and MCDC had only one (1) and two (2) respectively. Related to this was the 
fact that most of the Internal Auditors lacked sufficient and appropriate expertise to 
undertake audit work efficiently. In all of the Councils visited, only the KAMC had 
an Internal Auditor who was a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
17. Therefore, the 
                                                 
17 Certified Public Accountant (CPA) is the highest level of qualification given to accountants 
in Tanzania after passing the professional examinations conducted and supervised by the 
country accounting regulatory board, NBAA.  
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focus of the internal audit was on the financial statements based audit, where more 
attention was paid to vouching. The performance audit, which traditionally has been 
the audit emphasis of the public sector, was largely ignored and performance games 
were played instead (see Chapter 6, section 6.2.2). The existence of the major audit 
queries  in  the  LGAs  was  a  testimony  of  the  ineffective  nature  of  the  Councils’ 
internal audit functions. For instance, the absence of an effective payroll audit had 
led,  among  other  things,  to  a  huge  non-remittance  of  unclaimed  salaries  to  the 
Treasury, and a substantial amount of the funds being paid to retired, absconded and 
terminated employees
18. What emerged from this category was that the effectiveness 
of the Councils’ internal audit functions was constrained by the inadequacy of the 
audit  working  tools,  the  shortage  of  the  staff,  lack  of  sufficient  expertise,  and 
independence threats of the Internal Auditors. Unsurprisingly, donors and the CAG 
placed less reliance on the work done by the Councils’ Internal Auditors. This and the 
preceding  category  are  discussed  jointly  in  the  following  chapter  under  general 
heading fragile supervisory bodies (section 6.2.6). 
5.2.11  Low Fiscal Capacity 
‘Low fiscal capacity’ was the category which depicted the financial problems facing 
the Councils. The research suggested that both internal and external sources of the 
income available to the Councils were unreliable, leaving them with an extremely 
low financial ability to finance their operations. For instance, funds from the external 
sources, such as the Government and donors, which financed more than 90% of the 
Councils’  operations,  were  neither  reliable  nor  sufficient.  There  were  many 
incidences  whereby  donors  cancelled  their  pledged  funds  during  the  budget 
implementation. On the other hand, the funds from the Government were normally 
disbursed to the Councils very late, which led to a substantial amount of them being 
unspent. It is worth noting that the ‘unspent fund balances’ was one of the common 
external audit queries for all the Councils. For instance, the report of the Controller 
                                                 
18 Councils with unclaimed salaries not remitted to the Treasury in the FY 2009/10 include 
KBDC (TZS 15,356,114.07), MCDC (TZS 17,751,283) and MDMC (TZS 6, 604, 238). In 
the same period, TZS 56,014,740.38 and TZS 3,341,543 represent payments made to retired, 
absconded, and terminated employees of the KAMC and the MDMC respectively (Annual 
General Report of the CAG on the Financial Statements of the LGA for the FY ended 30
th 
June 2010). Average exchange rates of TZS to USD for the year ended December 2009 and 
2010 were TZS 1313.29 and TZS 1453.54 respectively (BOT, 2011).  
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and Auditor General (CAG) for the FY 2009/10 shows that out of 134 LGAs, it was 
only Masasi Town Council which had no unspent fund balances. Thus, the Councils 
made some efforts to strengthen their self-generated incomes in order to counteract 
the unreliability of the external sources. However, their efforts were curtailed by the 
presence of multiple impediments, such as the outsourcing problems, low collection 
rates, the abrupt directives of the Government, and the self-interested behaviour of 
some  of  the  Councillors  and  technocrats.  For  example,  the  revenue  outsourcing 
arrangements were highly affected by the collusion between the Councils’ officials 
and the collecting agents, a practice which had significantly reduced the Councils’ 
internal revenue. Related to this were the low collection rates, which were charged by 
the  Councils  in  their  revenue  sources.  Changing  the  collection  rates  required  the 
approval  of  the  higher  organs,  which  was  perceived  to  be  too  bureaucratic.  The 
absence of effective revenue regulations was a problem for all the Councils visited. 
 
In addition, some of the Government’s decisions had been taken in isolation from the 
Councils assessments, and had had a negative impact on the internal revenue raising 
ability of the Councils. For instance, the amendments to the Local Government Acts 
made in 2003 and 2004 had taken substantial revenue sources from local, to central 
government, and restricted the Councils from levying any local taxes which were not 
listed in the regulations. Connected to this was the decision made by the Government 
in 2006 to ban the importation of forestry products. This source accounted for more 
than 80% of the total of the KBDC’s self-generated incomes, and the decision was 
announced  during  the  budget  implementation,  a  situation  which  had  a  significant 
impact  on  the  Council’s  operations.  Furthermore,  self-interested  behaviour  of  the 
technocrats and the Councillors was one of the obstacles which constrained the self-
generated incomes. In this regard, the inherent weaknesses of the Councils’ revenue 
systems  allowed  dishonest  individuals  to  tamper  with  the  Councils’  revenues.  A 
combination  of  these  factors  had  reduced  the  fiscal  capacity  of  the  Councils 
significantly, as evidenced in the figure that follows. 
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Figure 12: Councils’ Fiscal Capacity for FY 2009/10 
 
Source:   Local Government Finance Information, Tanzania Mainland, 
PMO-RALG (LOGIN)
19 accessed on 1st February, 2012. 
 
Figure 12  shows that the total self-generated incomes of the  Councils for the FY 
2009/10 financed only 6.1% of the total expenditures, leaving 93.7% to be gained 
from  donors  and  the  Government,  with  the  remaining,  0.2%,  financed  through 
borrowings. This trend casts doubt on the ability of the Councils to attain a target of 
financing at least 50% of their total expenditures by the year 2025, as stipulated in the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In general, the unreliability of the external 
funds from  the  Government  and  donors,  the  inherent  problems  associated  with 
internal sources, and inefficient management of the funds, had contributed to the 
funding uncertainties to the Tanzanian LGAs .  Nevertheless,  the degree of  fiscal 
capacity was relatively higher for  the urban when compared to the rural Councils. 
Being located in urban areas, the KAMC and MDMC enjoyed a substantial amount 
of income, in form of city service levies, property taxes, and billboard fees.  In fact, 
KAMC’s self-generated revenues were the highest of all the Councils in the country, 
counted separately. The success of the KAMC in this can be attributed to its location 
and the initiatives implemented to reform its revenue section (see Chapter 3, section 
3.5.3). On the other hand, the KBDC and MCDC depended heavily on the collection 
                                                 
19 http://www.logintanzania.net/monitor6b.asp 
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fees from sugar cane and cashew nuts respectively. The volatility of these seasonal 
cash crops had affected the Councils’ own revenues significantly. Also, the KAMC, 
MDMC, and KBDC had accrued sizeable amounts of the revenues from the Cost 
Sharing Scheme, where patients were charged for the health services rendered. The 
MCDC had yet to introduce the scheme into its health facilities.  
5.2.12  Inefficient Fund Management 
Inefficient management of the funds was evidenced through the manner in which 
Councils dealt with the internal and external sources of funds. The budgets of all the 
Councils  visited  demonstrated  high  allocations  to  recurrent  expenditures  when 
compared to the development expenditures. Interestingly, substantial amounts of the 
recurrent funds were in the form of personal allowances, suggesting that technocrats 
allocated a major part of the public funds for personal benefits: 
 
“You  know,  the  Government  is  disbursing  a  lot  of  funds  for  the  development 
projects.  There  are  also  Councils’  own  sources…But  the  big  problem  is  the 
technocrats. They are not ethical…They allocate more funds to OC [Other Charges] 
when compared to the development. If you look at the nature of the expenditures, 
you may be surprised, there are more allowances…” (Mise, Member of Parliament: 
LAAC) (emphasis added). 
 
A similar concern was  raised by  the Councils’ donors, the CAG, the supervisory 
section  of  the  PMO-RALG,  and  the  Parliamentary  Committee
20.  A  sector-wise 
comparison shows that  the  recurrent expenditures of the Primary Education and 
Health Services were extremely high when compared to other sectors, while funds for 
Agriculture,  Roads  and  Water,  were  fairly  allocated  between  the  recurrent   and 
development expenditures.  
 
                                                 
20 LAAC’s report for the FY 2008/09 submitted to the National Assembly on 6
th April, 2011, 
shows that out of TZS 1,418,371,855,698 disbursed to all LGAs as the Government grants, 
71.6% (TZS 1,014,297,041,910) were allocated for recurrent expenditures and only 28.4% 
(TZS 404,074,813,788) were allocated for development expenditures.  
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Figure 13: Councils’ Recurrent and Development Spending 
 
Source:   Local Government Finance Information, Tanzania Mainland,  
PMO-RALG (LOGIN) 
 
The  Councils  also  appeared  to  have  a  problem  coordinating  multiple  sources  of 
funds.  This  was  especially  the  case  for  funds  which  were  channelled  directly  to 
earmarked projects. For example, the Parliamentary Committee’s assessment noted 
that one Council had claimed that it had constructed a Primary School, whereas in 
reality the building had been entirely financed by a Government agency. Similarly, 
all the Councils visited demonstrated weak coordination of internal funds between 
departments  and  sections.  For  instance,  in  a  situation  where  one  particular 
Village/Ward  had  a  variety  of  projects,  the  respective  departments  had  not 
synchronized their schedules, which would have minimised the costs of supervision. 
Motivated by the personal allowances associated with supervision, each department 
undertook its own supervision, something which not only increased the supervision 
costs, but also affected the quality of other projects which had no specific funds for 
supervision.  
 
Maintenance of their bank accounts also appeared to have been burdensome for the 
Councils. All the studied Councils had numerous bank accounts with different banks, 
a practice which increased their operating costs. This practice was largely associated 
with the tendency of the Councils’ financiers to require separate bank accounts for 
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their  respective  funds.  Interestingly,  some  of  these  accounts  such  as  the  Election 
account, the Youth Development account, and the HIV account, had nil balances. 
Paradoxically, the Government decision to close all accounts and fix a limit of only 
six, was not welcomed by some of the Councils’ officials who feared a reduction in 
their financial power: 
 
“We have been told that the Councils should remain with only six accounts. I don’t 
know how this is going to work. Currently, we have so many accounts and we still 
have more problems, and sometimes we are not even aware about the availability of 
funds in our accounts. I don’t know who are going to be the signatories of those few 
accounts. I think this decision  is going to bring  more problems to the Councils’ 
operations” (Herh, Municipal Primary Education Officer: MDMC). 
 
5.2.13  Collusion 
Collusion was the category which described the inappropriate arrangements between 
the Councils’ officials and third parties, with procurement arrangements being the 
most affected area. As part of the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), the Councils 
were required to outsource some of their activities to private entities, a practice which 
had led some of the Councillors and technocrats to collude with potential suppliers. 
The revenue outsourcing arrangements were identified as having been highly affected 
by collusion: 
 
“I noted weaknesses on revenue collections outsourced to agents on behalf of the 
Councils.  This  area  was  noted  to  reflect  unfavourable  contracts  which  benefited 
agents more than the Councils. The ability of the Councils to funds its operation 
using internal sources of revenues is hampered by inadequate internal controls over 
revenues  collection”  (Annual  General  Report  of  the  CAG  on  the  Financial 
Statements of LGAs for the Financial Year ended 30
th June 2010; p. 105) (emphasis 
added). 
 
This  indicates  the  existence  of  unfair  dealings  to  the  detriment  of  the  Councils, 
something  which  had  led  to  the  non-remittance  of  the  collected  funds.  Non-
remittance of collected revenue had become a dominant practice in the Tanzanian 
LGAs in general, as shown in the following figure. 
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Figure 14: The Councils’ Revenue Not Remitted by Collecting Agents 
 
Source:   Annual General Report of the CAG, FY 2005/06 to FY 2009/10. 
 
The  above  graph  shows  an  increasing  trend  in  the  revenue  not  remitted  by  the 
collecting agents from TZS 0.22 billion in the FY 2005/06 to TZS 2.8 billion
21 in the 
FY 2009/10, while in the same period, the  number of the Councils involved in this 
anomaly increased from 14 to 43.   Of the four C ouncils visited,  the  KAMC was 
significantly  affected by non-remittances
22.  Being located in a  business city,  the 
KAMC had a high level of own revenues, which also had  attracted a high level of 
collusion. 
 
Collusion practices were also prevalent in construction projects, where it was claimed 
that the Councils’ Engineers are normally provide  confidential information to the 
private contractors. As evidence of this, it was observed during the Parliamentary 
Committee’s supervision that the Bills of Quantities (BOQ) of the Council’s Engineer 
was similar in all respects to that of one of the private contractors, indicative of the 
collusion  between  them.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  issue  of  the  low  quality 
(substandard) of the Councils’ development  projects, which was  partly  associated 
with a high level of collusion, was one of the repeated audit queries for the Tanzanian 
                                                 
21 Annual inflation rates were 4.4%, 7.3%, 7%, 10.3%, 12.2%, and 7.2% for the year ended 
December 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 respectively. On the same period, the 
exchange rates  of Tanzanian Shillings (TZS) to US Dollar (USD) were 1165.51, 1261.64, 
1132.09, 1280.30, 1313.29, and 1453.54 (BOT, 2011). 
22 The CAG reports show that the KAMC’s revenue collecting agents failed to remit TZS 
27,500,000,  TZS  326,506,358,  and  TZS  1,132,294,000  in the  FY  2007/08,  2008/09, and 
2009/10 respectively. 
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LGAs. A related problem was also evidenced in the Councils’ investments, where a 
contract  entered  into  between  the  Council  and  the  private  investors  favoured  the 
latter. This was noted in the contract between one Council and an investor to develop 
the Council’s property, where the contract stipulated that the Council would earn an 
after tax profit of 25%, while the investor would earn 75% forever. Interestingly, at 
the end of the fieldwork, October 2011, this investment had been existent for two 
years, but the Council had not yet received even the small share indicated in the 
contract.  It  was  apparent  that  collusion  practices  have  contributed  to  the  funding 
uncertainties  and  poor  quality  of  the  Councils’  services.  The  implications  of  the 
collusion practices are discussed further in the following chapter (see section 6.2.13). 
5.2.14  Accountability Arrangements 
‘Accountability  arrangements’  represented  the  engagements  between  the  Councils 
and  other  stakeholders,  and  normally  included  engagements  such  as  the  revenue 
sharing between Higher Local Governments (HLGs) and LLGs, and the Councils’ 
responsibility for the supervision of the projects undertaken at the lower  level of 
Wards and Villages. The rationale behind these practices was that the arrangements 
were  part  of  the  funding  conditions  of  the  LGCDG  Systems.  As  the  Councils 
experienced shortages of the self-generated incomes to finance their expenditures, an 
undertaking of the formal accountability measures assured them of the availability of 
financial resources from the Government and donors. An examination of the LGAs’ 
Minimum  Conditions  (MCs)  and  Performance  Measures  (PMs)  revealed  that  the 
Councils which demonstrated high level of accountability were given bonuses,  while 
sanctions  were  applied  to  those  who  demonstrated  low  levels  of  accountability. 
Despite this, some of the Councils were unable to comply with the accountability 
measures: 
 
“As part of the requirements, LGAs are required to remit 20% of their own revenues 
to  the  village/suburbs.  However,  in  FY  2008/2009  only  54  [40.9%]  LGAs  fully 
complied with the requirements and 14 [10.6%] LGAs did not remit any funds to the 
village/suburbs. The same trend for the General Purpose Grant [GPG] where only 50 
[37.9%] LGAs remit 20% of the fund to the lower councils. Also, 4[3%] LGAs did 
not remit any amount of Capital Development Grants [CDG] to the wards” (National 
Synthesis Report, Annual Assessment for Council Development Grants and Capacity  
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Building Grants for FY 2010/2011 under the Local Government Development Grant 
[LGCDG] System, May 2010). 
 
The above trend was associated with the absence of a supporting environment for 
enhancing the accountability measures, as well as the absence of any real intention to 
strengthen the Councils’ accountability to the lower levels.  Related to this was the 
lack of clarity of the Councils’ accountability to the lower levels. It appeared that the 
decentralisation  by  devolution  policy  emphasized  Councils’  accountability  to  the 
lower  levels,  but  the  actual  implementation  of  the  policy  was  overshadowed  by 
regulation deficiencies, a situation which created a loophole for the Councils to be 
seen not directly accountable to the lower levels. As a result, all the Councils visited 
were more accountable to the fund providers, and their accountability to the LLGs 
was limited to the point of fiscal transfers. For example, in the Health Services, where 
donors were highly involved, the Councils were more accountable to the donors than 
to the general public. The situation was noted to be different in Primary Schools, as, 
because the community contributions through the school fees formed a reasonable 
part of the finance, the Primary Schools’ accountability arrangements were highly 
focused on the school beneficiaries, the general public. The implication of this trend 
for the emergent central phenomenon of this study is specifically discussed in the 
axial coding (section 6.2.11). 
5.2.15  Transparency Measures 
‘Transparency measures’ was the category which depicted the interactions between 
the  Councils  and  other  stakeholders,  mainly  the  general  public.  The  interactions 
normally took the form of practices such as the disclosure of income in kind in the 
Councils’ financial reports, posting remittances on the public notice boards, and the 
translation of the financial reports into Swahili. Interestingly, as was observed in the 
accountability arrangements, these measures formed part of the Councils’ funding 
conditions. In this context, the successfulness of the Councils to access discretionary 
grants depended on their ability to effect these arrangements. Therefore, utmost care 
was  normally  taken  by  the  Councils’  officials  to  ensure  that  the  measures  were 
undertaken,  especially  a  posting  of  the  remittances  on  the  public  noticeboards. 
Interestingly, the practice was also used as a strategy to boost the contribution morale 
of the general public:  
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“The overall aim of announcing the remittances from the Government is to clear the 
public's doubt on the amount received, and at the same time, it increases the public 
awareness  and  participation…More  importantly,  the  practice  builds  the  public's 
confidence on the way the funds are managed, so that they will be able to contribute 
on the deficit. You know, the Government funds are not enough to cover the School 
operations” (Ahr, Head Teacher: KBDC). 
 
It can be inferred from the comment that the transparency arrangements were merely 
aimed at addressing funding uncertainties which were prevalent in the Councils. It is 
also of interest to note that the accounting practices were influencing, and were being 
influenced  by,  the  Councils’  transparency  arrangements.  Across  the  Councils, 
transparency measures were, surprisingly, better in the rural areas than in urban ones. 
This can be attributed to the increase in voluntary contributions from the general 
public, and that the Councils’ officials seemed to provide more information to the 
general public in order to attract more funds. In contrast, the urban Councils did not 
depend  as  much  on  the  voluntary  contributions  from  the  general  public,  which 
appeared  to  have  reduced  their  commitment  to  strengthening  the  transparency 
measures.  A  related  pattern  was  noted  in  Primary  Education  where  all  primary 
schools  visited  had  a  separate  bank  account  for  voluntary  contributions,  and  the 
Parents’ Assembly was  used to communicate financial information to the general 
public. This was further evidence of the attempts by the technocrats to use accounting 
practices to strengthen transparency measures which ensured the availability of funds 
from the Councils’ financiers. 
5.2.16  Disguised Participants’ Behaviours 
This  category  detailed  the  ‘blaming’,  ‘fear’,  and  ‘self-interested’  behaviours 
demonstrated  by  the  technocrats.  ‘Blaming’  was  manifested  in  the  interactions 
between the technocrats and politicians, with each party blaming the other. Whilst the 
technocrats  blamed  the  politicians  for  interfering  with  Councils’  operations,  the 
politicians blamed the technocrats for the mismanagement of Councils’ funds: 
 
“Politicians are destroying the smooth operations of the Council. They tend to reject 
issues  which  are  very  crucial  to  our  operations.  As  a  result,  instead  of  making 
important Council’s decisions, we are spending more time on debate about trivial 
issues” (Coab, Municipal Treasurer: MDMC).  
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“Lack of ethics is the main problem of our Councils’ officials. The majority of these 
technocrats are not ethical. They are involved in fraudulent acts…Sometimes; they 
even  report  fictitious  projects  in  the  books  of  accounts…”  (Mise,  Member  of 
Parliament: LAAC). 
 
Because the Councils experienced apparent regulatory deficient, the ‘blaming’ was 
used as a mechanism for shifting the responsibility between the politicians and the 
technocrats.  In  the  end,  no-one  was  felt  to  be  responsible  for  rectifying  the 
operational problems which existed in the Councils. Also, the Councillors, Members 
of the Parliament, Central Government Officials, statutory auditors, and the LGCDG 
Assessment Team, were highly feared by the technocrats: 
 
“Let me tell you the truth, 99.99% of technocrats are not clean. That’s why they tend 
to fear the Councillors. Councillors know this through their Standing Committee and 
other Council financial reports… The Councillors have power to make resolutions 
against them. Therefore, they are trying to protect their employment” (Jofe, Council 
Mayor: MDMC) (emphasis added). 
 
This suggests that fear of technocrats was indicative of the apparent weaknesses in 
the Councils’ operations, and its application was intended to deflect pressure from the 
politicians and supervisory bodies. Another behaviour which existed in the Councils 
was selfishness, evidenced in a tendency of the technocrats and Councillors to give 
priority to their individual interests at the expense of the Council. This behaviour had 
negative impacts on the various dealings, including the revenue collections and the 
development projects. In the revenue collections, for example, the technocrats and the 
Councillors  colluded  with  the  collecting  agents,  a  practice  which  reduced  the 
Councils’  self-generated  incomes.  In  the  Councils’  development  projects,  the 
collusion between technocrats  and  the private contractors had led to  poor quality 
construction  projects.  It  is  note-worthy  that  the  self-interested  behaviour  of  the 
Councils’ officials was observed to be the main interactional strategy  of, and the 
driving force for, the central phenomenon which emerged in this study.  
5.2.17  Language Barriers 
It was observed that language was an obstacle in the process of communicating the  
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financial information to the Councillors and to the general public. English, being the 
transaction and reporting language of the Councils, was not clearly understood by the 
Councillors and the general public, something which necessitated the translation of 
the  financial  and  other  important  reports  into  Swahili
23. The translated fin ancial 
reports were: the budget guidelines, the statutory audit reports, the Councils’ budget, 
the  financial  statements,  and  the  quarterly  internal  audit  reports.  It  was  further 
observed that the translated financial reports lost the original content significantly. 
Given the technical nature of accounting reports, the reliability of the Councillors’ 
decisions  which  were  based  on  the  translated  financial  reports,  is  doubted. 
Furthermore, the translation exercise increased the workload: 
 
“The Council’s budget and other plans are required to be prepared in two different 
languages, Swahili for the Councillors and English for the Government and donors. 
This is very challenging. Even during the implementation, we are required to prepare 
implementation reports in two different languages, and at the same time we don’t 
have enough staff and facilities…” (Buh, Planning Officer: KBDC). 
Inadequate working tools such as computers, and related facilities especially in the 
rural  Councils,  and  the  shortage  of  competent  staff,  broadened  the  translation 
problem.  This,  together  with  the  previous  category  (disguised  participants 
behaviours), represent the cultural attributes of the Councils, a behavioural pattern 
which mediates the strategies of the emerged central phenomenon. This is discussed 
in detail in section 6.2.8 of the following chapter. 
5.2.18  Performance Measurement Practices 
This category described the meanings attached to, and the actual undertaking of, the 
performance measurement practices in the studied Councils. As the country overall 
experienced low levels of development, the meaning of the Councils’ performance 
was confined to the undertaking of development projects. In this regard, the Councils 
were deemed to be performing when they undertook development projects efficiently. 
The successful completion of development projects was also the main focus of the 
performance  assessment  exercises  carried  by  the  Parliamentary  Committee, 
Councillors’ Standing Committee, CAG, RAS, and the LGCDG Assessment Team.  
                                                 
23 Swahili is the Tanzanian national language  
 
Accounting Practices in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs): Page 113 
 
Performance  measurement  exercises  were  initially  introduced  as  a  process  for 
examining  records,  where  the  Councils’  plans  and  progress  reports  were  used  to 
evaluate their performance. Later, following the introduction of the LGCDG systems 
and the effective involvement of the Parliamentary Committee in the performance 
assessment,  the  emphasis  was  changed  to  the  actual  physical  inspection  of  the 
projects. The main reason was the unreliability of the Councils’ records: 
 
“You know, these technocrats are very tricky. If you examine the books of accounts 
only,  you  will  not find  anything…If  you  go  physically  to the  projects,  you may 
surprise. There are so many forgeries and some of the projects are not existing at all” 
(Mise, Member of Parliament: LAAC). 
 
Therefore, there was great emphasis on the performance measurement practices in the 
Councils,  which  was  attributed  to  the  Government  decision  to  introduce  the 
performance-based discretionary grants. The system started in the FY 2004/05 for 
Primary Education and Health Services, while in the FY 2005/06 other sectors, such 
as  Agriculture,  Roads,  and  Water,  were  incorporated  into  the  system.  Under  the 
performance based system,  the amount of discretionary grants  which the Council 
received  depended on  the fulfillment  of the  Minimum Conditions  (MCs) and  the 
score  of  the  Performance  Measures  (PMs).  The  Minimum  Conditions  comprised 
conditions such as filling the position of the Council Director, regular production of 
financial reports, and the nature of an audit opinion. They were further divided into 
primary  and  secondary  conditions,  where  failure  to  meet  the  primary  conditions 
disqualified Councils automatically from accessing the discretionary grants, while a 
Council  which  failed  to  meet  the  secondary  conditions  could  still  receive  grants, 
subject to providing proof within two months following assessment that the problems 
had been resolved. On the other hand, Performance Measures involved the scoring of 
the  performance  indicators  in  nine  (9)  functional  areas  (Appendix  1).  A  Council 
which  demonstrated  a  good  performance  in  these  areas  would  be  given  a  bonus, 
while sanctions were applied to the poor performing Councils. It is of note that the 
scores of the Performance Measures applied only to the Councils which had met the 
Minimum Conditions. 
 
From all of the performance measurement criteria, the audit opinion received a great  
 
Accounting Practices in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs): Page 114 
 
deal  of  attention  from  the  Councils’  officials,  regulatory  authorities,  politicians, 
general public, and the media. This was attributed to the fact that any Council which 
received  an  adverse  opinion,  was  not  only  disqualified  from  accessing  the 
discretionary grants, but also would not obtain any grants bonuses under performance 
measures.  Because  the  funds  attached  to  the  performance  assessment  were 
substantial,  the  general  reaction  was  that  the  condition  was  inappropriate,  as  it 
deterred  the  general  public  from  enjoying  development  projects,  as  the  result  of 
mistakes made by the technocrats. Of interest to this research were the techniques 
used by the Councils’ officials to ensure an appropriate opinion for grants purpose 
(Chapter 7, section 7.5.2.2). In general, the technocrats were keen to ensure that the 
Councils met the performance criteria required for grants purposes, something which 
motivated  manipulation  techniques  such  as  compliance  games  and  lobbying.  In 
reality, performance assessment was treated as a ‘resource grabbing’ exercise, with 
little impact  on the improvement of the Councils’ performance. The performance 
criteria were not adequately integrated into the daily operations, and the Councils 
normally undertook a mock assessment as preparation for the annual assessment. The 
theoretical implication of this tendency is discussed in detail in Chapter 7 and 8. 
 
Nevertheless,  the  Health  Services  were  more  systematic  in  the  application  of  the 
performance  measurement  practices  than  the  Primary  Education  sector.  The 
performance of the Health Services was consistently and systematically monitored 
from the lower level of the Dispensary up to the Hospital. In this, the Council Health 
Management  Team  (CHMT)  was  responsible  for  the  performance  of  all  health 
facilities  located  in  a  Council,  while  the  Regional  Health  Management  Team 
(RHMT) supervised the CHMT. There were also Cascade Supervision and Mobile 
Clinics, which ensured the performance of health facilities at the lower levels. The 
success of these practices was attributed to the sensitivity of the Health Services and 
the high influence of donors in primary health delivery. A further discussion of this 
category is provided in the following chapter (section 6.2.9). 
5.2.19  Domination and Autonomy 
Domination  and  autonomy  was  the  category  which  denoted  the  two  opposing 
attitudes observed in the studied Councils. ‘Domination’ describes the practice of the 
officials  at  the  Council  level,  as  well  as  the  Government,  to  dictate  important  
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decisions  to  the  lower  levels.  ‘Autonomy’,  in  contrast,  portrays  the  desire  of  the 
members at the Council and lower levels to make their own decisions. Domination 
and autonomy, therefore, denotes the influence of higher levels to control the lower 
levels and the desires of the lower levels to be independent. For instance, despite the 
fact that the health facilities maintained their own banking arrangements, the use of 
any part of the funds, including those collected under the Cost Sharing Scheme, were 
required to be duly approved and authorised at the Council level. Whilst the officials 
at the Council level maintained that the arrangement was an important ‘check and 
balance’ mechanism, members at the low level viewed the arrangement as a form of 
domination which increased unnecessary financial bureaucracy: 
 
“For the Cost Sharing Scheme, everything in terms of the management and collection 
of the funds are done here. Though, expenditure of any amount should be authorized 
and approved by the Council Medical Officer and the Council Director… We have 
teeth but we cannot bite. This is the big problem in our Council” (Reme, Health 
Centre Medical in Charge: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
 
The situation was worse in the KBDC, where all funds from the Cost Sharing Scheme 
were maintained in one account at the Council level
24, a practice which contradicted 
the  financial  regulations  of  the   scheme,  which  required  each  health  facility  to 
maintain  its  own  account s.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  Council’s  higher  officials 
regarded the practice as necessary in the early stage of the scheme
25, officials at the 
low level were not convinced. A  similar trend was noted in MCDC,  where a Cost 
Sharing Scheme had yet to be introduced, as all health funds were still maintained, 
authorised, and approved at the Council level. Interestingly, the same trend was noted 
in relation to some  donor funded projects such as Health Basket Fund,  where the 
authorisation, approval, as well as the maintenanc e of the funds remained at the 
Council level. This had led to discontent amongst the technocrats: 
 
“All  funds  [Health  Basket  Fund]  are  just  maintained  in  a  single  account  at  the 
Council level. We don’t know even our balances. We are not even sure as whether 
                                                 
24As  at  the  end  of  the  fieldwork  (October  2011),  the  Council  had  18  health  facilities 
comprised of 14 Dispensaries, 3 Health Centres, and 1 District Hospital. 
25 The Council started to implement the Cost Sharing Scheme in 2007.  
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they use our funds to finance other activities or not? It could be appropriate if we 
have  our  own  funds  to  our  own  account  and  let  Council  officials  come  for 
supervision. We have two qualified accountants here, I don’t know why they cannot 
give our portion of the Basket Fund” (Meha, Hospital Medical In-charge: KAMC) 
(emphasis added). 
 
Among other things, the quote illustrates the legitimating role of accounting in the 
health facilities. When accounting practices were perceived to have improved, the 
technocrats felt that the Hospital were legitimate to handle, and accounted for their 
own funds without passing through the Council. The implication of the legitimating 
role of accounting is explored further in the following three chapters.  
 
A high level of domination was noted in the MDMC, where the health practitioners 
were not even aware of the availability of the Health Basket Fund allocated to their 
health facilities. The low level of participation in the health budgets, and the absence 
of budget feedback contributed to this anomaly. Of the four Councils visited, it was 
only the MDMC where the Comprehensive Council Health Plan was not available in 
the all health facilities visited. In general, high levels of Councils’ domination had 
had  a  negative  impact  on  the  delivery  of  the  public  services,  especially  in  the 
outreach Councils,  such as  KBDC  and MCDC.  Because the primary schools and 
health facilities of these Councils were located in very remote areas which could not 
accessed  easily,  centralization  of  the  payment  procedures  normally  delays  the 
provision  of services.  This  was  the major  reason for an  ‘under-banking strategy’ 
noted  in  some  of  the  health  facilities.  Nevertheless,  autonomy  was  somewhat 
improved in the Primary Education sector. Compared with the health facilities, all 
primary schools maintained their own and separate bank accounts for the capitation 
and development grants, and schools’ financial decisions were made by the Primary 
School  Committee  (PSC).  However,  as  with  the  health  facilities,  the  final 
authorization and approval of the funds was made at the Council level. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  operations  of  the  Councils  were  directly  and  indirectly 
controlled by the Government. The Government, through the PMO-RALG and other 
sectoral ministries, exercised direct and indirect control of the Councils’ operations 
through  the  enactment  of  relevant  laws,  approval  of  the  Councils’  by-laws  and  
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regulations, approval and monitoring of the Councils’ budgets, issuing the relevant 
policies and guidelines, and the disbursement of a variety of funds. The Government 
was  also  responsible  for  performance  monitoring,  capacity  building,  and  human 
resource development. The overall reaction among Councils’ officials was for the 
Government and other regulatory authorities to refrain from interfering with the daily 
operations of the Councils. 
5.2.20  Perceived Political Interference 
‘Perceived  political  interference’  is  the  category  which  emerged  following 
examination  of  the  interactions  between  the  politicians  (Councilors,  Members  of 
Parliament  and  Higher  Government  Officials)  and  the  technocrats.  Political 
interference is an ‘in-vivo code’, which reflected the perceptions of the technocrats 
about  the  involvement  of  elected  officials  in  the  Councils’  operations.  The 
Councillors were highly criticized for interfering with the Councils’ operations, and 
the nature of the interference was largely associated with budget: 
  
“Councillors are destroying the smooth running of the Councils…After the end of the 
budget preparation, the Mayor normally demand certain projects to be implemented 
in his Ward… As a Council official, you have to find a means to do that, otherwise, 
you  will  enter  into  an  endless  trouble  with  these  powerful  politicians”  (Sega, 
Economist: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
 
Whilst  the  rest  of  the  Councils  demonstrated  the  similar  pattern  of  a  hostile 
relationship  between  the  Councillors  and  technocrats,  the  MDMC  experienced 
somewhat  different  trend.  Being  led  by  Councillors  of  the  opposition  party,  the 
Councillors and technocrats were in constant clashes. The Councillors felt that the 
technocrats undermined their decisions because of their different political ideology 
from that of the country’s ruling party: 
 
“We have a big problem here. Technocrats are corrupt and there is no place to make 
them accountable…Higher Government bodies are not ready to take actions based on 
our recommendations…We are coming from a different mother and whatever we 
recommend to them, is simply treated as ‘politics’. They want to show the general 
public that opposition is nothing” (Jofe, Council Mayor: MDMC) (emphasis added). 
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On the other hand, the technocrats blamed the opposition Councillors for proposing 
unnecessary changes to the Council’s operations, and disregarded everything which 
had been done in the past: 
 
“In my view, politicians destroy our Council. Here we have the opposition party 
ruling  the  Council  and  their  Councillors  are  blocking  some  of  the  development 
projects only for political reasons […].They abandon even already started projects 
and change others and, mind you, some of these projects are part of the National 
Development  Policy,  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  politics”  (Coab,  Municipal 
Treasurer: MDMC) (emphasis added). 
 
The  tension  demonstrated  above  had  had  a  negative  impact  on  the  Council’s 
operations,  to  the  extent  that  the  Council  failed  to  conduct  some  of  its  Finance 
Committee’s meetings, and there was a threat from the Minister responsible for local 
governments  that  the  Council  could  be  dissolved  if  the  tendency  continued
26.  In 
addition to the self-interested behaviour of the technocrats and Councillors, as well as 
their different political ideology, it appeared also that the contradictory provisions of 
the  Councils’  regulations  had  fuelled  a  hostile  relationship  between  them.  For 
instance, Order No. 3(h) of the Local Authority Financial Memorandum (1997) gave 
power to the Finance Committee to be the Council Tender Board, while the Public 
Procurement  Act  No.  21  of  2004  in  general,  and  Section  7(2)  of  the  Local 
Government Authorities Tender Boards (Establishment and Proceedings) Regulations 
of 2007 in particular, limited the membership of the Council’s tender board to the 
technocrats. As each part claimed to have the right to form the board, the clashes 
continued and the Councils’ procurement arrangements were affected.  
 
The  Councils’  operations  were  also  subjected  to  political  interference  from  the 
Higher Government Officials at the Regional level and the Central Government. The 
interference from these sources was in the form of the funding requests, which were 
not only budgeted for, but also in some cases, were intended for personal benefits. 
                                                 
26 Section 171 (1) and 172 (1) of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No.7 of 
1982 and section 75 (1) and 76 (1) of the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 
1982 gives power to the Minister responsible for local governments to dissolve authority pre-
maturely and by default.  
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This category and domination and autonomy suggest that the Tanzanian Councils 
were subjected to high levels of political and hierarchical interference from the local 
politicians, Regions, and officials from the Central Government. This is discussed in 
section 6.2.10 of the following chapter. 
5.2.21  Professional Dilemmas 
‘Professional  dilemmas’  is  the  category  which  emerged  after  examining  the 
interactions of the non-accounting staffs who discharged accounting activities, and 
their related perceptions of the same. The involvement of non-accounting staff in 
undertaking  accounting  functions  was  associated  with  the  shortage  of  accounting 
staff faced by the Councils in general. Apart from KAMC, where accountants were 
allocated in the Hospital, Health Centres, and two Dispensaries
27; the other Councils 
visited,  had no accountants  in any of the  Health Centres and Dispensaries.  All 
accounting activities in these facilities  were performed by the Medicals in Charge. 
Also, there were no accountants allocated to any Primary Schools in the country, and 
all accounting functions fell on the Head Teachers. Both the Medicals in Charge and 
the  Head  Teachers  demonstrated  an  extremely  weak  knowledge  of  accounting 
functions. It was further observed that the Head Teachers and the Medicals in Charge 
who  performed  accounting  functions  faced  deadlock.  Because  accounting  was 
different from their respective professions, they lacked the necessary competence and 
desire to undertake it  efficiently. As a result, accounting t asks were given second 
priority, and the quality of the accounting output was compromised: 
 
“As a Medical Doctor, I am not enjoying to perform accounting works. However, I 
am required to do so as part of my responsibility as the Medical in-Charge. After all, 
it is not my profession...Sometimes, the Council needs financial reports and at the 
same  time  I  have  more  patients  to  attend.  I  don’t  know  what  to  do.    I  usually, 
undertake  the  accounting  matters  in  the  late  evening”  (Aia,  Dispensary  Medical 
Doctor in Charge: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
 
An impressive initiative to address the knowledge gap of non-accounting staffs was 
evidenced in the KAMC, where the Health Accountant, in collaboration with the 
                                                 
27 As at the end of the fieldwork (i.e. October, 2011), the Council had 37 Dispensaries, 2 
Health Centres, and 1 Municipal Hospital.  
 
Accounting Practices in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs): Page 120 
 
Municipal Medical Officer (MMO), had introduced a ‘mobile accounting services’. 
The arrangement involved a weekly visit by the Health Accountants to all health 
facilities to undertake any accounting functions which appeared to be a challenge to 
the Medicals in Charge. Having a relatively substantial number of accountants at the 
Council level facilitated the practice. It is also worth noting that some of the Head 
Teachers and Medicals in Charge were blamed for using their lack of knowledge as 
an excuse to violate what appeared to the Councils’ auditors to be ‘obvious’ financial 
rules. In one case, for instance, an Auditor noted, the practice of one Head Teacher 
purchasing school  equipments in small quantities, in order to avoid the tendering 
procedures.  In  general,  a  high  level  of  distortion  of  accounting  information  was 
observed in the medical facilities and Primary Schools, which questions the overall 
reliability of the Councils’ accounting information. Paradoxically, despite the fact 
that there were no effective daily transactions in the Primary Schools, in contrast to 
the health facilities, the Head Teachers evidenced a greater need for accounting staff 
than Medicals in Charge. What emerged during the fieldwork was the reluctance of 
the medical practitioners to work with accountants in the health facilities, which had 
led to potential conflict between the accountants and the medical practitioners. This is 
the subject of discussion in section 6.2.12 of the following chapter. 
5.3  Summary 
This chapter has described the 21 open categories which emerged throughout the 
open coding process. The categories were obtained following a careful examination 
of the interview transcripts, observation of the researched phenomenon, and analysis 
of the important documents. The detailed descriptions offered in this chapter create 
the foundation for the development of core categories in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
Axial Categories 
6.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  discusses  the  axial  coding  process  and  the  main  categories  which 
emerged  from  this.  Drawing  upon  the  open  categories  discussed  in  the  previous 
chapter, this chapter elaborates on the mechanism used to derive the core categories, 
and discusses the relationship of the emerged categories along with their properties 
and dimension range. The discussion provided in this chapter forms the basis for the 
development of the substantive grounded theory in the following chapter. 
6.2  Axial Coding and Development of Main Categories 
The development of the core categories in this research involved two related and 
iterative stages. The first stage involved combining the open categories which were 
theoretically  related.  In  this  stage,  the  open  categories  which  depicted  similar  or 
related themes were combined together, and a particular name, which represented a 
core  category,  was  assigned.  This  approach  is  highly  recommended  for  efficient 
analysis of the data:  
 
“As clusters are reduced in number and combined, comparisons constantly are made 
at the boundaries of each cluster. Decisions about which entries go (and stay or be 
moved) into which cluster involve more implicit and explicit comparisons, and thus 
increasing level of interpretation” (Chesler, 1987, p. 12). 
 
At the conclusion of the first stage, the 21 open categories were merged to become 13 
core categories (see Appendix 3). The core categories obtained were the higher order 
categories, and were theoretically denser than the open categories discussed in the 
previous chapter. The second stage involved establishing the relationship between the 
core categories and the subcategories together with their properties and dimension 
range (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). For example, during an interview with the LGAs’ 
Inspector from the PMO-RALG, the researcher wanted to understand the nature of 
the  LGAs  regulations.  The  interviewee  replied  that  the  LGAs’  regulations  were 
‘conflicting’  and  ‘outdated’.  Thus,  conflicting  (alignment)  and  outdated  (timely) 
represent  the  dimensions  of  the  main  category  named  the  deficient  regulatory 
framework. Similarly, the KAMC’s Health Accountant claimed that donors’ financial 
conditions were ‘excessive and inappropriate’. In this case, ‘excessive’ (high) and  
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‘inappropriate’  represent  the  dimensions  of  the funding  condition,  which  was  the 
property of the main category labelled donors’ influence. The process of identifying 
the  dimensions  and  properties  of  the  core  categories,  and  establishing  their 
relationship, was carried out for all core categories. A detailed explanation of each 
core category, and its embedded properties and dimensions, follows the list of the 
core categories which emerged throughout the axial coding process. 
 
The following are the main categories which emerged from the axial coding: 
 
i.  Accounting subordination 
ii.  Ceremonial conformity and compliance games 
iii.  Deficient regulatory framework 
iv.  Donors’ influence 
v.  Emergence of fraud and corruption 
vi.  Fragile supervisory bodies 
vii.  Funding uncertainties 
viii.  Organisational cultural attributes 
ix.  Performance management 
x.  Political and hierarchical interference 
xi.  Improving accountability and governance 
xii.  Professional conflict 
xiii.  Lobbying 
6.2.1 Accounting Subordination 
Accounting subordination, which synthesized the role of accounting and accountants, 
was  the  main  category  to  reveal  relegation  of  the  accounting  practices  in  the 
Tanzanian Councils. Subordination was highly evidenced in three major aspects of 
the accounting functions, which were: budgetary practices, auditing processes, and 
financial reporting. For example, the bottom-up budget approach and the top-bottom 
priorities of the Government and donors, had led to informal budget revisions, which 
questioned the reliability of the Councils’ budgets. The high level of interference 
which existed in the Councils also undermined its budgetary practices:  
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“You know, we are working under in a very difficult environment. Sometime, you 
may receive a personal financial request from the Regional Commissioner, and he 
knows for sure that the amount was not budgeted for, but it is very difficult to tell 
him so. In order to maintain a good relationship with the boss, you are forced to 
comply with the requests” (Muma, Municipal Treasurer: KAMC). 
 
Also, the reliability of the Councils’ financial reports was  constrained by lack of 
segregation of duties and the absence of sufficient qualified accountants. Related to 
these was the presence of weak controls, both manual and computerised. In both 
situations, the preparation of the financial reports, and even the financial statements, 
was  left  to  one  individual  and  without  appropriate  scrutiny  at  higher  levels.  In 
general,  issues  such  as  high  level  of  political  interference,  deficient  regulations, 
shortage of the Councils’ self-generated incomes, self-interested behaviour, and the 
presence of incompetent staff, constrained the effective undertaking of the accounting 
practices. As a result, accounting was merely used as a device to legitimise funding, 
of  little  value  for  internal  decision  making.  This  also  applied  to  the  role  of 
accountants in the Councils. Despite the fact that the accountants were considered to 
be important, they were merely record keepers, while the major financial decisions 
were made by politicians. As the Internal Auditor of the KAMC commented, “in 
order to work smoothly in the Councils, you have to unlearn your profession, and 
follow the instructions of the politicians”. 
 
Accounting subordination was more prevalent in the Primary Education sector than in 
the  Health  Services,  because  the  high  influence  of  the  donors  over  the  Health 
Services had somewhat reduced the extent of subordination. Similarly, the presence 
of relatively competent staff and Councillors, as well as frequent supervision from the 
regulatory  authorities,  had  reduced  the  degree  of  accounting  subordination  in  the 
urban Councils. Accounting subordination, which was one of the consequences of the 
central phenomenon which emerged in this study, was partly contributed to by the 
deficient  regulatory  framework,  funding  uncertainties,  organisational  cultural 
attributes, political and hierarchical interferences, and professional conflict between 
the accountants and the medical practitioners.  
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6.2.2 Ceremonial Conformity and Compliance Games 
Ceremonial conformity and Compliance games are not in-vivo codes. These are terms 
borrowed  from  the  literature  to  describe  the  reactions  of  the  Councils’  officials 
regarding  compliance  with  the  regulations.  In  the  extant  literature,  ‘ceremonial 
conformity’ represents attempts of the institutionalised organisations pretending to 
comply with external demands mainly for the sake of resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983), while ‘compliance games’ involve techniques employed by the organisational 
members in order to achieve a certain desired objectives (see, for example, Uddin et 
al., 2011; Uddin & Hopper, 2001). These explanations mirror the findings of this 
research. Because the Councils were the recipients of many demands from a variety 
of external bodies, their effective compliance with these requirements became more 
challenging and problematic, but necessary if they were to ensure the availability of 
support. It was in this context that compliance games were played in order to conform 
to the requirements ceremonially. Therefore, the ‘compliance games’ illustrated the 
ceremonial conformity stands taken by the Councils’ officials in order to satisfy the 
regulatory  bodies  at  face  value,    and  create  a  favourable  portfolio  with  them. 
‘Ceremonial  conformity  and  compliance  games’  is  the  main  category  which 
synthesized  the  two  related  sub-categories,  budgetary  practices  and  deficient 
financial  reporting  practices,  where  ceremonial  conformity  and  the  compliance 
games were highly practiced. 
 
For instance, the nature of the Councils’ budgets required the active involvement of 
the officials at the lower levels. However, the effectiveness of this arrangement was 
constrained by other factors, such as the top-down priorities from the Government, 
the inadequate knowledge of the officials at the lower levels, and the unwillingness of 
the  technocrats  at  the  Council  level  to  involve  the  lower  levels.  Despite  these 
anomalies,  the  Councils’  budgets  were  ceremonially  labelled  as  ‘Mpango 
Shirikishi
28’, a practice which was intended to convince the Government and donors 
that  the  Councils’  budgets  were  participatory,  as  required  by  the  regulations. 
Similarly,  despite  the  fact  that  the  effective  implementation  of  the  IPSAS  was 
                                                 
28‘Mpango Shirikishi’ is the Swahili term which means participatory planning. In the context 
of the Tanzanian LGAs, it refers to a plan which would have been prepared through an 
effective  dialog  between  the  Council  and  the  officials  at  the lower levels  of  Wards  and 
Villages or Suburbs.  
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problematic, all the Councils’ financial statements were claimed to be fully IPSAS 
Compliant. A similar situation was observed in the internal auditing practices, where 
the  quarterly  internal  audit  reports  included  statements  about  the  effective 
undertaking of performance audits, although they had not actually been undertaken. 
These  practices,  which  were  made  possible  by  the  weaknesses  in  the  Councils’ 
governance structures, were aimed at building a favourable image of the Councils, in 
order  to  attract  more  funds  from  their  financiers.  This  core  category  provided 
strategies for the emergent central phenomenon. 
6.2.3 Deficient Regulatory Framework 
The  combination  of  the  sub-categories  ‘weak  administrative  regulations’  and 
‘outdated  accounting  provisions’  forms  this  main  category.  ‘Weak  administrative 
regulations’ indicated inherent weaknesses in the general administrative regulations, 
while  ‘outdated  accounting  provisions’  described,  more  specifically,  the 
ineffectiveness  of  the  financial  regulations.  Therefore,  the  deficient  regulatory 
framework revealed the existence of a feeble administrative and financial legislative 
framework  which  governed  the  Tanzanian  Councils.  This  was  manifested  by  the 
existence of the multiple, uncoordinated, and sometimes contradictory, provisions in 
the regulations. Because the majority of the laws were enacted as far back as 1982, 
their frequent amendments had not been sufficiently harmonised, a situation which 
had led to managerial and operational problems. One such problem was the hostile 
relationship between the Councillors and technocrats that existed in the Councils. 
This was partly attributable to the failure of the regulations to specify clearly their 
roles and responsibilities. As a result, what technocrats claimed as a ‘high level of 
political interference’ was viewed by the Councillors as their ‘legitimate role. As one 
Councillor commented: 
 
“We have a full mandate to seek clarification on each and everything that happens in 
the Council. We are the representatives of the people, and we should be able to know 
everything, and there is no demarcation on that. What we can’t do, off course, is to 
sign on behalf of the Council Director” (Diwe, Councillor, KAMC). 
 
The major flaws in the Councils’ legal and regulatory framework were evidenced in 
the accounting practices. All main accounting regulations
 had contained outdated,  
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and sometimes conflicting provisions, which had limited the efficient undertaking of 
accounting practices. For example, the Local Government Authorities’ Internal Audit 
Manual of 2005, which was the most current regulation, contained provisions which 
contradicted  other  regulations  in  many  ways.  This  was  partly  because  the  Local 
Government Finances Act No. 9 of 1982 was amended in 2000, while the LAFM and 
LAAM had never been amended since their inception in 1997 and 1992 respectively. 
As a result, there were many contradictions in areas such as the financial reporting 
framework, the position of the Internal Audit Unit, the responsibilities of the Finance 
Committee, and the budgetary practices. The regulations anomalies had prompted a 
high desire for change from both the LGAs and the external stakeholders, such as the 
Parliamentary Committee and the CAG. In this regard, some research participants 
argued  for  an  ‘overhaul’  of  the  LGAs  system,  thus  indicating  a  high  level  of 
dissatisfaction  with  the  current  regulations.  This  category,  which  represents  the 
macro conditioning context of the central phenomenon, had contributed to the fragile 
supervisory bodies, political and hierarchical interference and funding uncertainties 
which existed in the Councils. 
6.2.4 Donors’ Influence 
Because the donor funds formed a relatively major part of the Councils’ sources of 
finance, their influence on the Councils’ operations had been clearly evidenced. The 
Councils’  donors  directly  and  indirectly  controlled  the  operational  affairs  of  the 
Councils  through  conditions  such as  limitations  on the type of  expenditure  to  be 
incurred,  multiple  planning  and  reporting  requirements,  and  by  limiting  the 
administration of the funds at Council level. The Councils’ officials regarded these, 
and other conditions, as unnecessary interference and inappropriate: 
 
“We have a problem with the donor’s conditions. They normally restrict the type of 
expenditures to be incurred. Sometime, you may find that the funds are available but 
cannot be used in a certain expenditure, which is required urgently…As you know, 
we  are  very  strict  on  their  funds”  (Meha,  Hospital  Medical  In-charge:  KAMC) 
(emphasis added). 
 
It is also interesting to note that there was no dialogue between the Councils and the 
donors. All dialogue was done at the Ministerial level, a situation which increased the  
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sense of domination by the donors. Additionally, at the Ministerial level, negotiation 
with the donors was perceived to be time consuming and costly. Related to this was 
the issue of disagreement with the donors’ priorities as they were different from the 
Country’s Development Plans. However, the Councils and the respective Ministries 
were normally forced to accept the donors’ priorities in order to receive the funds: 
 
“You know, sometimes we have problem with some donors, especially those who 
financed  earmarked  projects.  You  may  find  their  priorities  are  not  part  of  our 
National Development Policy, and they don’t like to change theirs. Since we need 
their  funds,  then  we  are  forced  to  accept  their  priorities  and  conditions,  which 
sometimes are not addressing our main budget priorities at all” (Mima, Health Policy 
and Planning Officer, MoHSW). 
 
This comment demonstrated the high influence of the donors on both the Councils 
and the Government, and this was evidenced in all of the Councils visited. However, 
the extent of dissatisfaction with donors’ conditions was higher in the rural Councils 
than in the urban ones. Their inadequate supporting environments and lack of staff, 
made it difficult for the rural Councils to comply with donors’ requirements, which 
had  increased  their  levels  of  dissatisfaction.  Because  donors  had  contributed  a 
substantial amount of funds to the Health Services, they were actively involved in 
monitoring  the  various  Councils’  health  funds  through  the  CCHP  Guidelines. 
Therefore, compared with primary education, donors’ influence was higher in the 
health  services.  Whilst  the  donors’  influence  represents  the  macro  conditioning 
context of the emergent theory, the techniques used by the Councils’ officials to deal 
with their influences and obtain funds from them, forms the interactional strategies 
for the emergent theory. These are discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
6.2.5 Emergence of Fraud and Corruption 
Fraud and corruption was a recurring theme in the Tanzanian LGAs. The Councils’ 
audited accounts from the FY 2005/06 to the FY 2009/10 show a number of fraud 
and corruption related incidences in areas such as development and social projects, 
revenue outsourcing arrangements, and salaries. The fraud and corruption incidences 
had largely affected both the efficient undertaking of the Councils’ development and 
social projects, and the internal revenue raising ability of the Councils. For example,  
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the  CAG  reports  of  the  last  five  financial  years  showed  that  the  majority  of  the 
LGAs’ projects were below standard, and the substantial revenues of the Councils 
were not remitted by the collecting agents. The emergence of fraud and corruption 
was partly attributed to the presence of unfavourable working conditions and inherent 
weaknesses of the internal control systems, while the technocrats and the Councillors’ 
personal interests facilitated its occurrence: 
 
“During the assessment, the Council officials are very anxious. As you know, most 
of our technocrats are not clean. In one of the Council, I caught two members of the 
Parliamentary Committee taking financial bribery from the Council’s officials. You 
know, the technocrats are ready to give everything in order to portray impressive 
performance” (Miv, Member of Parliament: LAAC) (emphasis added). 
 
The truth of this comment was demonstrated shortly after the end of the fieldwork, 
when the Prevention and Combating Corruption Bureau (PCCB) caught one of the 
Parliamentary Committee members taking a financial bribe from the officials of the 
Council which was going to be visited by the Committee
29. Because the Councils had 
weak internal structures and fragile governance units, the chances of controlling the 
corrupt practices were  negligible.  As was observed in the  SEDC  (pseudonym), 
bureaucratic and weak enforcement bodies had allowed alleged individuals to collude 
with some  of  the  Councils’  officials  and  had  destroyed  evidence  regarding  the 
incidences of fraud. Also, there was doubt about the effectiveness of measures such 
as  the  surcharges,  normally  employed  by  the  Parliamentary  Committee,  and 
employee transfer, as exercised by the PMO-RALG, taken to address the incidences 
of fraud and corruption. 
 
An  examination  of  the  Councils  visited  showed  that,  for  the  past  five  years,  the 
KAMC  had  had  more  audit  queries  related  to  fraud  and  corruption  than  other 
Councils.  In  the  Social  Services,  the  Primary  Education  sector  was  more  highly 
subjected to fraud and corruption than the Health Services. The inherent weaknesses 
of the internal control systems exhibited in the Primary Schools, enabled dishonest 
Head Teachers to forge the Minutes of the Primary School Committee, and draw 
                                                 
29Daily News, 4
th June 2012.  
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funds from the School account for personal benefits. There were also claims that 
some of the Head Teachers colluded with the suppliers of Schools’ equipments. The 
emergence  of  fraud  and  corruption  is  one  of  the  consequences  of  the  central 
phenomenon which emerged in this study. 
6.2.6 Fragile Supervisory Bodies 
‘Fragile supervisory bodies’, which synthesised deficient financial and administrative 
structures and ineffective auditing processes, described the inherent weaknesses of 
the  Councils’  administrative  and  supervisory  bodies.  It  is  a  core  category  which 
suggests that both, internal and external arrangements were too weak to supervise the 
Councils’ operations efficiently. Internally, the CMT, the Finance Committee, and 
the  Full  Council,  lacked  enough  competent  individuals  to  make  sound  financial 
management decisions. At the Regional level, the RAS’s Office, which was supposed 
to supervise all Councils located in a particular Region, lacked the working tools, 
sufficient  manpower,  and  the  appropriate  competencies  to  monitor  the  Councils 
operations: 
 
“The Regional staff do not have full understanding of their Councils. It is surprising 
that we know much about Councils operations than RAS’s Office…They don’t have 
enough capacity to supervise the Councils. Otherwise, some of the issues could have 
been  sorted  out  at  the  Regional  levels  without  requiring  the  intervention  of  the 
Ministry” (Nas, Inspectorate: PMO-RALG). 
 
The apparent weaknesses of the LGAs and their immediate supervisory body (i.e. 
RAS) suggest that the Councils’ decisions remained unchecked. Related to this was 
the  fact  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  external  bodies,  such  as  the  Parliamentary 
Committee,  was  also  low.  For  example,  the  Committee  lacked  members  with 
specialised disciplines, such as law, procurement, and engineering, a situation which 
constrained its over-seeing role. Additionally, the Committee’s power to address fund 
mismanagement was limited to a surcharge (15% deduction of one month’s salary), 
the commissioning of a special audit, and verbal and written warnings, actions which 
were perceived to be too weak to address the high magnitude of fund mismanagement 
which existed in the Councils. As one member of the Committee confessed, “this 
Committee is powerless”.  
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The ineffective nature of the supervisory bodies also extended to the internal audit 
function.  Inherent  problems  faced  the  Internal  Audit  Unit,  such  as  insufficient 
independence, an absence of appropriate competences, and a lack of audit working 
tools,  constrained  its  supervisory  role.  For  example,  notwithstanding  the  level  of 
competence, all the Councils visited experienced a shortage of internal auditors. The 
maximum  number  recorded  was  in  the  KAMC  and  MDMC,  four  (4),  while  the 
KBDC  and  MCDC  had  only  one  and  two  Internal  Auditors  respectively. 
Furthermore, the Councils’ Audit Committee reported to the Council Director, which 
constrained its effectiveness. On the whole it appeared that the Councils’ auditing 
function was maintained primarily for building organisational legitimacy rather than 
improving organisational performance. 
 
Nevertheless, the KAMC and MDMC demonstrated an improvement in their internal 
structures. Being located in major towns and cities, these Councils were subjected to 
frequent  supervision  and  visits  from  Government  Officials,  which  forced  the 
Councils’ officials to improve their internal arrangements. Also, the Councillors of 
these Councils demonstrated relatively higher levels of financial understanding than 
their  rural  counterparts,  which  somewhat  improved  the  Councils’  supervisory 
arrangements.  An  examination  of  the  Social  Services  revealed  that  the  health 
supervisory  bodies  were  relatively  better  than  those  for  education.  This  can  be 
attributed to the high levels of influence of donors in the Health Services, and the 
intense  involvement  of  the  Health  Ministry  in  health  delivery.  The  existence  of 
ineffective supervisory bodies, which were the product of the deficient regulatory 
framework, created the opportunities for the occurrence of fraud and corruption in 
the Councils. 
6.2.7 Funding Uncertainties 
‘Funding  uncertainties’  is  the  main  category  which  synthesized  the  two  related 
subcategories; low fiscal capacity, and an inefficient fund management. Low fiscal 
capacity described the internal and external funding inadequacies facing the Councils, 
while inefficient fund management suggested that the available Councils’ funds were 
not efficiently managed. The combination of the two suggests that the Tanzanian 
LGAs were faced with internal and external funding uncertainties. The timing and  
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amount of the external funds from the Government and from donors, which financed 
more than 90% of the Councils’ operations, were unreliable. The funds were not 
disbursed in time, and, in some cases, were not disbursed at all. For instance, in the 
FY  2009/10,  donors  withdrew  more  than  30%  of  their  pledged  funds  from  the 
Government budget,  a  situation which severely  affected the Councils’ operations, 
particularly the Health Services. 
 
Also,  some  of  the  conditions  imposed  by  donors,  such  as  restricting  the  type  of 
expenditures to be incurred, had increased funding uncertainties. In this regard, there 
were incidences where funds were available but the Councils could not use them to 
finance important and urgent expenditures, thus facilitating the practice of teeming 
and  lading  (see  Chapter  7,  section  7.5.2.1).  In  addition,  the  introduction  of  the 
formula based conditional grants in the FY 2004/05, meant that the amount of the 
discretionary  grants  which  a  Council  received  depended  on  the  fulfilment  of  the 
funding conditions. As a result, to ensure attainment of the conditions demanded by 
the  grants,  compliance  games,  aggressive  fund  management,  and  lobbying,  were 
practiced  by  the  Councils  (see  Chapter  7,  section  7.5.2).  Because  the  Councils 
experienced greater unreliability from the external funds, more emphasis was put on 
the  internal  sources.  However,  the  ability  of  the  Councils  to  generate  their  own 
revenues was also constrained by high degrees of collusion, political interference, 
weak revenue controls, a low tax base, and inappropriate collection rates. The studied 
Councils  also  depicted  weak  internal  funding  coordination,  which  depleted  the 
already  scantily  available  resources.  A  high  allocation  of  allowances  for  the 
technocrats  and  Councillors  was  also  evidenced.  Furthermore,  Government 
interference, such as the abolition  of the local  taxes made in June 2003, and the 
decision to ban the importation of forestry products made in 2006, had significantly 
reduced the revenue raising ability of the LGAs. 
 
Funding uncertainties were more prevalent in the rural areas than in the urban ones. 
Located in major towns and cities, the urban Councils enjoyed a substantial amount 
of own sources, in the form of city service levies, billboard fees, and property taxes. 
The rural Councils, in contrast, depended heavily on crop cesses which were highly 
vulnerable and seasonally dependent. The deficient regulatory framework, political  
 
Accounting Practices in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs): Page 132 
 
and hierarchical interference, and the organisational cultural attributes were partly 
responsible for the high level of the funding uncertainties observed in the Councils. 
This  core  category  is  one  of  the  micro  and  macro  conditioning  contexts  for  the 
occurrence of the central phenomenon of this research. The actions and reactions of 
the Councils’ officials when addressing the funding uncertainties represent strategies 
of the emerged central phenomenon. These are discussed in detail in the following 
chapter. 
6.2.8 Organisational Cultural Attributes 
‘Organisational cultural attributes’ is the core category which synthesised the two 
related subcategories; ‘language barriers’ and ‘disguised participants’ behaviours’. 
The  ‘language  barriers’  exposed  the  Councillors’  language  problem,  while  the 
‘disguised  participants’  behaviours’  described  the  common  behavioural 
characteristics of the Councils’ officials within the Councils. The integration of the 
two  subcategories  describes  the  cultural  attributes  that  existed  in  the  Tanzanian 
LGAs, traits which constrained the efficient undertaking of the Councils’ operations. 
For example, the language problem had limited the Councillors’ understanding of the 
financial reports, while, at the same time, the translated reports were neither complete 
nor  reliable.  Thus,  financial  decisions  made  by  the  Councillors,  based  on  the 
translated reports, were questionable. 
 
Also,  the  technocrats  and  the  Councillors  were  observed  to  be  self-interested 
individuals,  where  personal  goals  were  given  preference  over  the  organisational 
goals. The participants’ trustworthiness was low, due to their dominating desire for 
quick gains,  and, as  the Councils  experienced  ineffective governance bodies,  less 
effort was put into controlling these behaviours. Relationships across Departments 
and Sections were unfriendly and formal, with a high level of distrust, especially with 
regard  to  financial  matters.  Friendly,  and  sometimes  informal,  relationships  were 
confined  to  professional  peers  across  the  Departments  and  Sections,  largely 
attributable  to  the  self-interested  behaviour  of  the  officials,  and  the  hierarchical 
nature of the Tanzanian Councils. 
 
The  mode  of  communication  was  formal,  with  internal  memos  being  the  prime 
method of communication. Guidelines and instructions emanated from top to bottom,  
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while the dokezo
30, followed the bottom-up approach. It is important to stress that the 
dokezo was the main source document which was normally used to initiate payments. 
The participants attached high importance to the dokezo, particularly when it was 
used to initiate personal payment requests. The sense of togetherness was very high 
in the MDMC when compared to the other organisations visited. Being under the 
control  of  the  opposition  political  party,  Councils  officials  of  the  MDMC  were 
strongly united against the opposition Councillors. High levels of ‘blaming’ between 
the technocrats and the politicians, and the technocrats’ fear were also evidenced. It is 
also interesting to note that accountants, who were allocated to the Education and 
Health Departments were culturally adapted to the respective professionals: 
 
“When they [Accountants] came here for the first time, they found very difficult to 
cope with this [Hospital] environment. But after we orient them and being here for 
some  time,  they  become  comfortable  and  even  their  behaviours  are  changed 
completely. They become like Medical Doctors” (Meha, Hospital Medical In-charge: 
KAMC) (emphasis added). 
A change of behaviour was regarded as necessary for the seamless application of the 
accounting  functions  in  the  respective  departments.  However,  in  some  health 
facilities, this behavioural change was associated with violation of the accounting 
procedures.  In  these  facilities,  the  change  in  the  accountants’  behaviour  was 
associated with their willingness to give out cash without following the necessary 
authorization procedures. With the exception of the language problems, which were 
somewhat improved in the urban Councils, the other cultural attributes were found to 
be  similar  in  all  of  the  Councils  visited.  The  cultural  attributes  discussed  in  this 
category, act as the mediating strategies for the emergent theory.  
6.2.9 Performance Management 
Under  the  performance  based  grants  systems  which  were  introduced  in  the  FY 
2004/05, the amount of discretionary funding which each Council received depended 
on  its  fulfilling  the  performance  indicators.  However,  effective  fulfilment  of  the 
performance indicators was constrained by the unconducive operating environment 
that existed in the Councils. For example, the political interference which permeated 
                                                 
30 ‘Dokezo’ is the Swahili-accounting word which describes the document used to initiate 
payment.  
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the  Councils,  especially in  the revenue outsourcing  arrangements,  constrained  the 
attainment  of  the  collection  targets.  As  a  result,  the  officials  normally  under-
estimated the collection targets to ensure easy attainment of the required threshold for 
grants purposes (i.e. 80%). The Councils also defended their performance through 
techniques such as aggressive fund management, compliance games, and lobbying. 
Only  infrequently,  did  performance  management  have  any  credibility.  This  was 
specifically  observed  in  the  Health  Service  delivery,  where  its  performance  was 
carefully managed from the Dispensary level to the Hospital. Health targets were set 
in advance, and then compared to the actual performance on a weekly basis, monthly, 
quarterly,  and  annually.  The  improvements  were  partly  associated  with  the  high 
levels of involvement by donors. 
 
The examination of the Councils visited revealed that the rural Councils were highly 
involved in performance manipulation in contrast to the urban ones, where pressure 
from the relatively educated Councillors and other Governments’ Officials minimised 
the application of the ‘harsh’ performance management techniques. The inappropriate 
performance  management  practices  observed  in  the  Councils,  which  were  highly 
motivated by the funding uncertainties and fuelled by the fragile supervisory bodies, 
represent the main strategies for the occurrence of the central phenomenon of this 
study. The process of performance management can also contribute to the emergence 
of fraud and corruption in the Councils.  
6.2.10  Political and Hierarchical Interference 
‘Domination  and  autonomy’  and  ‘perceived  political  interference’  formed  the 
components of this main category. ‘Domination and autonomy’ depicted the top to 
bottom  nature  of  the  decision  making  processes  of  the  Councils  and  the  Central 
Government, while the ‘perceived political interference’ signposted the existence of 
potential conflict between the elected officials (especially the Councillors) and the 
technocrats.  The  integration  of  the  two  subcategories  suggests  that  the  Councils’ 
operations were subject to high levels of political and hierarchical interference from 
the politicians and the  Government,  and that  the interference was  directed to  the 
accounting practices. For example, during the budget session, the Councillors, driven 
by political interests, were involved in diverting resources to their respective Wards 
through informal instructions to the Councils’ officials. At the KAMC, for example,  
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despite the need for schooling being the same in all Wards, the Ward belonging to the 
Deputy Mayor had more Secondary Schools compared to others. The Councils also 
depicted other incidences of interference with the daily operations of the Councils, 
such as Councillors making follow-up payments on behalf of the Councils’ suppliers. 
 
The LGAs were also highly dominated and controlled by the Government and its 
related agencies. The Government controlled every aspect of the Councils through 
the enactment of laws, the formulation of the policies and guidelines, the selective 
recruitment of the employees, and the approval of the by-laws, practices which were 
viewed by the Councils’ officials as unnecessary interventions. The overall wish of 
the research participants was for the Government to set broader objectives for the 
LGAs, and to restrain from interfering with managerial and administrative decisions 
that  had  been  made  at  the  Council  level.  The  existence  of  the  political  and 
hierarchical interference was also a testimony to the presence of the feeble regulatory 
framework and administrative arrangements.  
 
Because more development funds were allocated to the health sector than to that of 
education, the former was highly subjected to interference. The high involvement of 
donors in the Health Services, and their close supervision of the funds channelled to 
the  Councils,  also  contributed  to  this  phenomenon.  Similarly,  because  the  urban 
Councils were easily accessible to  the politicians and other Government officials, 
they were more highly subjected to political and hierarchical interference than the 
rural ones. This category, represents the macro conditioning context of the central 
phenomenon  which  emerged  in  this  study,  whilst  the  reactions  of  the  Councils’ 
officials to address the interference, represent the strategies for the emergent theory. 
6.2.11  Improving Accountability and Governance 
This main category represented the attempts by the Councils’ officials and that of the 
regulatory authorities to improve the accountability and governance arrangements in 
order  to  build  a  favourable  profile  with  the  external  stakeholders.  This  category 
subsumed  the  two  related  subcategories;  accountability  arrangements  and 
transparency  measures.  In  general,  the  Councils  were  highly  involved  in  the 
accountability and governance arrangements, such as the revenue sharing between the 
HLGs and the LLGs, the supervision of the projects undertaken at the LLGs, the  
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translation of the reports into Swahili, and the posting of remittances’ reports on the 
public notice boards. Despite the fact that these arrangements were carried out to 
meet performance criteria for grants purposes, their undertaking had strengthened the 
Councils’ accountability and governance arrangements. 
 
The  Tanzanian  Councils  also  demonstrated  a  paradox  of  accountability  faced  by 
many public sector entities, where the improved accountability arrangements were 
mainly  directed  towards  satisfying  the  financial  providers,  rather  than  the  other 
stakeholders,  such  as  the  general  public.  The  effective  involvement  of  the  local 
populace in the Councils’ operations was unnoticed. In this regard, the manner in 
which the local citizens made use of the translated financial reports also remained 
unknown.  In  general,  most  of  the  accounting  information  was  directed  towards 
meeting the demands of the Government and donors (and was therefore written in 
English), while little, for grants purposes, was translated into Swahili for the benefit 
of the local inhabitants. 
 
The Parliamentary Committee had also  been highly involved in  following  up the 
audit queries raised by the CAG. Despite the fact that the image of the Committee 
had been recently tarnished by the corruption charges facing one of its members, the 
functions  of  the  Committee,  especially  the  physical  assessment  of  the  Councils’ 
projects, had significantly enhanced the accountability and governance of the LGAs. 
Interestingly, the Parliamentary members used not only the accounting information 
presented in the formal reports, but also information from other sources, such as the 
media and ‘informers’ to hold the Councils’ officials accountable. The implications 
of this practice for the organisational accountability and governance are discussed in 
section 8.2.4 of the Chapter 8. 
6.2.12  Professional Conflict 
‘Professional conflict’ is the core category which depicted the tension which existed 
between the medical practitioners and the accountants, which was fuelled by their 
struggle for the financial control. The conflict emerged following the allocation of the 
accounting staff to the health facilities, in order to undertake the accounting activities 
which had previously been done by the Medicals in Charge. This practice had led to  
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constant clashes between the accountants and the medical practitioners, as evidenced 
in the quote below: 
 
“As a Doctor, my objective is to save the life of my patients. Accountants are very 
slow  in  this  regard.  They  are  rigid  in  following  their  long  and  unnecessary 
accounting procedures…We normally tell them, despite having their own accounting 
ethics, this is the Hospital environment, and the main objective here is to save the 
patient’s life. Therefore, in case of emergency, the funds should be issued and the 
accounting procedures should be followed later. Mind you, this is not like a road 
construction, where it can wait for the accounting procedures to be completed. We 
are  dealing  with  human  life  which  cannot  be  recovered  at  all”  (Meha,  Medical 
Doctor: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
 
The  normative  differences  between  the  accounting  and  the  medical  professionals 
were the causes of the conflict, while the accounting procedures were regarded as the 
subject of the conflict. ‘Blaming’ was used to illustrate the conflict, and this was 
mainly  directed  towards  the  accountants  and  the  accounting  procedures.  Medical 
practitioners claimed that accountants and their corresponding accounting procedures 
were  too  rigid,  bureaucratic,  and  inappropriate  in  the  Health  Services  where  the 
subject  was  ‘human  life’.  However,  these  claims  were  highly  refuted  by  the 
accountants as illustrated below: 
 
“It is very big problem to work in this environment. Doctors are pressing for cash 
expenditure without following the accounting procedures…This has nothing to do 
with Doctor's ethics or emergencies; it is poor plan which is motivated by personal 
incentives.  It  is  very  difficult  to  work  with  Medical  Doctors”  (Heha,  Health 
Accountant: KBDC) (emphasis added). 
 
These two opposing views represented the high level of tension which existed in 
some of the health facilities. An extreme situation was observed in the KAMC, where 
the Municipal Treasurer was once called to the Council Hospital to resolve a conflict 
between an Accountant and the Medicals in Charge. In addition to the self-interested 
behaviour, the observed conflict was also fuelled by the opinions held by the medical 
practitioners that the accountants were ‘foreigners’ in the health environment, and  
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that they had been put there in order to control them. The hostile relationship between 
the accountants and the medical practitioners had a negative impact on the accounting 
practices.  Professional  conflict,  which  was  contributed  to  by  the  presence  of  the 
deficient  regulatory  framework  and  the  self-interested  behaviour,  is  one  of  the 
consequences of the central phenomenon which emerged in this study. 
6.2.13  Lobbying 
Lobbying is the main category which portrayed the inappropriate behaviour which 
existed in the visited Councils. The behaviour was, to a large extent, practiced by the 
Councils’  officials,  and  was  directed  towards  the  regulatory  authorities  and  the 
Councillors. As the Councils experienced operational difficulties, they used lobbying 
to reduce the intensity of the investigation by the regulatory authorities. The Councils 
exhibited two lobbying profile: high and low. At a very high level, lobbying involved 
illegal acts to influence and defend the Councils’ performance, when, for example, 
technocrats bribed their supervisors to cover the organisational weaknesses.  In its 
lowest form, lobbying involved merely persuasive techniques such as complaining 
and  blaming  practices  which  aimed  to  persuade  the  regulatory  bodies  and  the 
Councillors of the appropriateness of the Councils’ performance. 
 
Lobbying  was  also  employed  as  a  mechanism  for  the  restoration  of  Councils’ 
legitimacy, which was threatened by the existing conditions. Opinion shopping, for 
example,  was  used  to  ensure  that  the  problems  which  existed  in  the  Councils’ 
financial statements were not disclosed, so that the Council would gain a favorable 
profile, which would consequently restore the threatened legitimacy (see Chapter 7, 
section  7.5.2.2).  The  lobbying  practices  had  also  been  highly  evidenced  in  the 
Councils’  tendering  procedures,  a  practice  which  took  the  form  of  covering  the 
collusion practices prevalent in the tendering processes. As a result, the Council’s 
tendering  procedures,  which  were  supposed  to  be  used  for  selecting  appropriate 
Councils’ suppliers, were followed only superficially. The high level of lobbying, 
which  contributed  to  the  funding  uncertainties,  highlighted  the  existence  of  the 
Councils’ fragile supervisory bodies. Lobbying is one of the strategies for the central 
phenomenon which emerged in this research.   
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6.3  Summary 
This chapter has discussed the 13 core categories and their corresponding properties, 
and dimensional range which emerged throughout the axial coding process, and has 
demonstrated that the core categories and their subcategories were closely related. 
The manner in which these categories intersect to formulate the substantive grounded 
theory, is elaborated in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Substantive Theory of Manipulating Legitimacy 
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter discusses the substantive theory which emerged from this research, and 
starts  by  providing  brief  explanations  of  the  final  stage  of  the  data  analysis,  the 
selective coding, and the mechanism used to obtain the central phenomenon of the 
study. It also provides an overview of the paradigm model, followed by a detailed 
discussion  of  the  emerged  central  phenomenon.  The  conditions,  strategies,  and 
consequences of the central phenomenon, are then discussed. A presentation of the 
manipulating legitimacy model concludes the chapter. 
7.2  Selective Coding and Identification of Central Phenomenon 
The central phenomenon, or central category, represents the main idea or theme of 
the research, to which all other concepts relate in one way or another (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). This can either emerge from the list of existing categories, or evolve 
as  a  conceptual  idea  that  describes  all  the  existing  categories  (Corbin  &  Strauss, 
2008), the latter being the case in this research. After examining all of the existing 
categories,  none  explained  completely  ‘what  is  going  on’  in  the  Councils.  The 
detailed analysis of the core categories revealed that the Councils were faced with 
three main issues, namely, funding uncertainties, deficient regulatory systems, and 
the performance measurement practices. The data showed that more than 90% of the 
Councils’  operations  were  financed  by  the  Government  and  donors,  and  that 
substantial  funds  from  these  sources  were  conditional  on  the  attainment  of  the 
performance measurement criteria, which was constrained by the deficient regulatory 
systems. Therefore, the manner in  which the Councils managed this paradox and 
accrued resources and support from a variety of stakeholders was the answer to the 
question “what is the main issue or problem with which these people seem to be 
grappling” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 148). This represents the central category of 
this  research,  and  has  been  described  as  manipulating  legitimacy.  Manipulating 
legitimacy is the term that has been given to the strategic measures taken by the 
Councils’ officials to address the operational problems created by the non-conducive 
operating environment in order to accrue resources and support from the Government 
and donors. It was evidenced by the various actions of the Councils’ officials, and it  
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had  been  applied  differently  by  all  the  Councils.  Detailed  explanations  of 
manipulating legitimacy are provided in section 7.4 of this chapter. 
7.3  The Paradigm Model of Grounded Theory 
The  paradigm  model  is  a  mechanism  or  tool  used  to  establish  the  relationship 
between the central phenomenon and other categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The 
model  has  three  basic  components  which  are:  conditions,  strategies,  and  related 
consequences.  The  conditions,  which  facilitate  and  sometimes  constrain  the 
occurrence  of  the  central  phenomenon,  can  either  be  contextual,  intervening,  or 
causal (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The strategies component 
comprises the actions taken by the actors to address the circumstances created by the 
conditions, while the consequences component constitutes the outcome of actions and 
reactions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Therefore, the paradigm model suggests that all 
categories need to be related to the central phenomenon in the form of conditions, 
strategies, or consequences. The paradigm model of manipulating legitimacy which 
emerged from this research is presented in section 7.8 of this chapter. 
7.4  Manipulating Legitimacy- the Central Phenomenon 
The  findings  of  this  research  showed  that  the  operations  of  the  Councils  were 
surrounded by weak administrative and financial regulations. Among other things, 
the regulations limited the fund-raising abilities of the Councils, and had increased 
their financial dependence on the Government and donors. However, a substantial 
amount  of  the  externally  sourced  funds,  which  financed  more  than  90%  of  the 
Councils’  operations,  were  performance  based.  Thus,  the  amount  of  funds  that  a 
Council would receive depended on its attainment of the performance criteria which 
include the Minimum Conditions (MCs) and the Performance Measures (PMs). On 
the other hand, the existence of deficient regulatory systems constrained the effective 
attainment  of  these  performance  criteria.  Therefore,  the  manner  in  which  the 
Councils’ officials managed this puzzle and obtained resources and support from the 
Government, donors, and other stakeholders, has been described in this study as a 
process of ‘manipulating legitimacy’. The phenomenon of manipulating legitimacy 
suggests that, although the Councils were surrounded by unfavourable environments 
which  threatened  the  smooth  undertaking  of  their  operations,  the  technocrats 
managed to use accounting practices, such as budgeting, financial reporting, auditing, 
and performance measurement, to legitimize the operations of the Councils in order  
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to  accrue  resources  from  a  variety  of  stakeholders.  Therefore,  manipulating 
legitimacy involved purposeful and deliberate techniques which were deployed to 
influence and control the reasonableness of the Councils’ operations, a process which 
ensured the availability of resources and the attainment of the individual interests of 
the Councils’ officials. 
 
Manipulating legitimacy comprises two terms, manipulating and legitimacy, which 
were derived by the researcher following the careful examination of ‘what was going 
on’  in  the  Councils  (Strauss  &  Corbin,  1998).  Manipulating  means  control  of 
somebody or something (to control or influence somebody or something in a clever or 
devious way) or to falsify something (to change or present something in a way that is 
false but personally advantageous) (Encarta Dictionary, [n.d]). On the other hand, 
legitimacy means legality (complying with the law, or having official status defined 
by law) or conforming to acknowledged standards (complying with recognized rules, 
standards or traditions) (Encarta Dictionary, [n.d]). The term legitimacy has also been 
discussed in the extant literature. For example, Lindblom (1994) defined legitimacy 
as  a  condition  which  requires  harmonisation  between  wider  societal  values  and 
organisational  modes  of  operations,  and  when  the  two  are  not  compatible,  the 
organisational  legitimacy  is  in  danger.  Suchman  (1995)  regarded  legitimacy  as  a 
“generalized  perception  or  assumption  that  the  actions  of  an  entity  are  desirable, 
proper,  or  appropriate  within  some  socially  constructed  system  of  norms,  values, 
beliefs,  and  definitions”  (p.574).  This  definition  subscribes  to  the  view  that 
legitimacy comes from the reactions and opinions of society as a whole, and not from 
individuals. Moreover, Jost and Major (2001) regarded something as legitimate if it 
complied with the norms, values, beliefs and practices accepted by a certain group or 
individuals. In the socio-political context, legitimacy is regarded as a route which 
enables  different  stakeholders  to  accept  the  appropriateness  of  the  organisational 
operations (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  
 
In general terms, the findings of this study complied with the meanings of the terms 
‘manipulating’ and ‘legitimacy’ discussed above. The data revealed that unfavourable 
operating conditions which existed in the Councils, compelled the Councils’ officials 
to influence, control, and falsify the appropriateness of the Councils’ operations to  
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the  key  stakeholders,  such  as  the  Government  and  donors,  in  order  to  secure 
resources.  Thus,  manipulating  legitimacy  was  a  process  used  deliberately  by  the 
Councils’  officials  to  overcome  the  operational  difficulties  through  a  variety  of 
techniques. It is partly illustrated in the following quote: 
 
“You know, we have a lot of politics here, therefore, it is appropriate to under-budget 
the Council’s own sources and meets the targets easily than to be realistic…If we 
collect below 80% of what we have budgeted for, the Council’s allocation for capital 
and  development  grants  will  be  negatively  affected.  This  will  leads  to  major 
problems  in  the  Council  and  a  number  of  the  development  projects  will  not  be 
implemented. This will also amount to our salary deduction, and the external audit 
query.    Importantly,  under-budgeting  helps  the  Council  to  receive  development 
grants and boost the economic development of our local community” (Rela, Assistant 
Revenue Accountant: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
 
This  indicates  the  manner  in  which  the  Councils’  officials  used  the  accounting 
information,  in  this  case  budgetary  practices,  to  manipulate  the  organisational 
legitimacy in order to obtain funds. A similar pattern was observed in other aspects of 
accounting practices, such as financial reporting, performance measurement, and the 
auditing  processes  (see  section  7.5).  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the  process  of 
manipulating  legitimacy  was  evident  even  at  the  planning  stage,  where  strategies 
such as pre-meeting, under-budgeting of revenue collections, accountability claims, 
and  establishing  rhetoric  rules  and  regulations  were  employed  to  influence  the 
Councils’ legitimacy to fund providers. As a result of these techniques, for example, 
the Councils’ budgets became unreliable, a situation which normally prompted the 
budget  scrutinization  team  from  the  Treasury  to  revise  the  Councils’  budgets. 
Following the Treasury’s amendments, the LGAs entered into the implementation 
phase with a more realistic budget, thus creating a situation which compelled the 
technocrats  to  design  a  number  of  strategies  in  order  to  cope  with  the  changing 
circumstances. These strategies were: managing own sources, the loose coupling of 
performance measurement and the budget, under-banking, managing the procurement 
process,  and  practicing  teeming  and  lading.  The  techniques  employed  attracted 
attention and corresponding pressure from the supervisory bodies, so, as a result, the 
technocrats employed another set of techniques to ‘accommodate’ the supervisory  
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bodies  and  maintain  the  operations  of  the  Councils.  These  defensive  techniques 
included lobbying and the playing of the compliance games. It is worthy of note here 
that  the  process  of  manipulating  legitimacy,  which  was  aimed  mainly  to  address 
operational  uncertainties  existed  in  the  Councils,  was  observed  throughout  the 
Councils’ operating cycle. 
 
It is also interesting to note that the phenomenon of manipulating legitimacy varied 
across levels of Councils and service deliveries. For example, much higher levels of 
manipulation were observed in the rural Councils (KBDC and MCDC) than in the 
urban Councils (KAMC and MDMC). The presence of frequent supervision by the 
Ministries and other Government bodies located in the urban areas, the availability of 
relatively better-educated Councillors, and the presence of the relatively improved 
accounting  establishment,  had  reduced  the  extent  of  manipulation  by  the  urban 
Councils. As one research participant commented: 
 
“You  know,  here,  we  are  extremely  careful.  We  are  in  the  city  centre,  and  all 
Government Units are here watching us very closely. If you do something, even if it 
is  a  small  thing,  it  receives  high  publicity  and  high  intervention  from  various 
Government  Units.  That’s  why  we  are  very  careful  here”  (Muma,  Municipal 
Treasurer: KAMC) 
 
Also, as the following quote illustrates, high involvement of donors in the Health 
Service delivery had reduced the degree of legitimacy manipulation when compared 
to the Primary Education sector. 
 
“You know these health funds [donor-funds] have a lot of conditions. And as you 
know, if you fail to comply with their requirements, you will not get them. In some 
cases, funds are channelled on a quarterly basis, and when they are satisfied with the 
previous quarter’s spending, then, they will disburse funds of the following quarter. 
Therefore, we are very keen on spending and reporting these funds” (Ahm, Health 
Secretary: KBDC). 
 
Furthermore, the extent of manipulation was also observed to be higher in the Lower 
Local Governments (LLGs), such as Wards and Villages, than in the Higher Local  
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Governments (HLGs), such as District and Municipal Councils. This was attributed 
to the absence of any statutory audit and the paucity of competent staff at the LLGs: 
 
“The  main  problem  of  our  Wards  and  Village  is  the  absence  of  statutory  audit. 
Currently, we [the Council] are sending substantial funds to these levels as part of the 
decentralization by devolution policy, but they are not audited. Worse enough, these 
levels are not even required to prepare financial statements because they are not legal 
entities. Also, WEO and VEO do not have enough knowledge to account these funds 
efficiently. Actually, there is a lot of mismanagement there” (Basiv, Internal Auditor, 
KAMC). 
 
Therefore, the phenomenon of manipulating legitimacy, was mediated by both the 
internal and external arrangements. The hypothesis of the emergent theory is that 
when  the  external  and/or  internal  organisational  arrangements  are  effective,  the 
organisational members become less manipulative, and that this would be different 
when  the  external  and/or  internal  arrangements  were  weak.  The  strategies  which 
illustrated  the  process  of  manipulating  legitimacy  are  discussed  in  the  following 
section. 
7.5  Strategies Undertaken to Manipulate Legitimacy 
Strategies  are  the  responses  made  by  organisational  participants  when  addressing 
issues, problems or events that occur under certain conditions  (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998).  Strategies  are  normally  purposeful  actions  taken  by  actors  to  resolve  a 
problem which has, in a way, shaped a phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The 
process of the manipulating legitimacy observed in this research was illustrated by 
two  main  strategies,  building  the  organisational  image  and  managing  the 
organisational performance. These were evidenced by the attempts of the Councils’ 
officials to build an external frame of reference in order to convince the Government 
and  donors  about  the  appropriateness  of  the  Councils,  while  at  the  same  time 
attempting  to  carefully  manage  the  operational  problems  internally.  Therefore, 
‘building the organisational image’ was a major strategy which aimed to convince the 
external stakeholders about the appropriateness of the Councils, while ‘managing the 
organisational performance’ represented the strategies employed to ensure that the 
existing operational problems were carefully managed. The combination of the two 
main  strategies  showed  the  internal  and  external  strategies  used  to  control  and  
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influence the Councils acceptability to the key stakeholders. A detailed discussion of 
both of these strategies and their corresponding sub-strategies is given below. 
7.5.1 Building the Organisational Image 
‘Building the organisational image’ describes the attempts of the research participants 
to portray a favourable image of the Councils to their external stakeholders in order 
to accrue resources. Four sub-strategies were identified within the overall strategy, 
namely maintaining the claims of accountability, managing their own sources, the 
loose  coupling  of  the  performance  measurement  and  budgetary  practices,  and 
establishing rhetorical rules and regulations. Each of these sub-strategies is discussed 
below. 
7.5.1.1  Maintaining the Claims of Accountability 
Because  they  were  local  governments,  the  Councils  consistently  and  deliberately 
claimed  direct  accountability  to  the  general  public,  rather  than  to  any  other 
Government institutions. The transparency and accountability measures instituted by 
the Government, such as sharing revenue with the lower levels, posting remittances 
in public places, and the direct involvement of the Councils in lower level projects, 
were used to foster their claims of accountability. These claims appeared to enhance 
the legitimacy of the Councils, which enabled them to obtain more resources from the 
fund providers. In the words of one respondent: 
 
“Currently,  the  Councils’  operations  are  governed  by  the  decentralization  and 
devolution policy, which emphasise low level participation. We [the Council] are 
very close and accountable to the community, and therefore, facilitate the  policy 
more than any other Government unit. However, in terms of resources, we are not 
capacitated enough” (Napi, District Treasurer: KBDC). 
 
The claims were normally communicated to the fund providers through the Councils’ 
budgets,  including  a number  of activities to  be undertaken  at  the lower levels  of 
Wards and Villages although these were not normally implemented. Having created 
the claims through the budgets, the Councils acquired the legitimacy from the fund 
providers  that  they  were  more  accountable  to,  or  at,  the  lower  levels,  something 
which assured them the availability of resources.   
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7.5.1.2  Managing ‘Own Sources’ 
This was a reactive strategy which addressed the Councils’ funding uncertainties. It 
involved initiatives such as monitoring the self-generated incomes (own revenues), 
under-estimation of the budgeted collections, the allocation of accountants to health 
facilities,  and manipulation  of  performance  reports of the self-generated incomes. 
The  monitoring  of  the  Councils’  self-generated  incomes  was  carried  out  in  the 
CMT’s daily meetings, where the collection of revenue was the main agenda item. 
The  daily  collection  reports,  which  showed  both  the  actual  and  the  budgeted 
collections, were presented and discussed. Behind these initiatives was the fact that 
the proportion of self-generated incomes determined the amount of grants which the 
Councils received from the LGCDG Systems: 
 
“From the Treasurer, obtain and review the Budget for the previous FY, compare the 
budget with actual revenue collected during the period to determine the percentage of 
the budget realised. Take into consideration the effect of the abolishment of revenue 
sources from one year to another. If the average collection is: 80% or more of the 
budget amount score 5; between 50% - 80%; score 2 and below 50 %, score 0” 
(LGCDG Assessment Manual, PMO-RALG, 2006; p. 22) (emphasis in the original). 
 
The above assessment criterion was also a major reason for under-estimation of the 
budgeted collections. Because the Councils’ internal and external factors constrained 
the effective collection of the self-generated incomes, the Councils’ officials under-
estimated the budgeted collections in order to attain the minimum threshold required 
for grants purposes. Similarly, to reflect the high performance of the  own source 
(revenue) collections, officials of some of the Councils included the General Purpose 
Grants (GPG), which came from the Government, as their own revenue. Additionally, 
part of the strategy behind allocating accountants to health facilities was to supervise 
the daily collections from the Cost Sharing Scheme. Together, these strategies aimed 
to inflate the proportion of the self-generated incomes, which consequently, enabled 
the Councils to obtain more funds from the Government and donors.  
7.5.1.3  Decoupling of Performance Measurement and Budgetary Practices 
‘Decoupling’ or ‘loose coupling’, are not an in-vivo code; they are terms borrowed 
from  the  literature  to  describe  the  maintenance  of  the  formal  structures  and 
procedures in the Councils’ performance measurement and budgetary practices. In  
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the extant literature, ‘decoupling’ or ‘loose coupling’ describe a lack of connection 
between the formal structures which institutionalised organisations display to their 
main stakeholders and the actual internal organisational operations (Basu, Dirsmith, 
&  Gupta,  1999;  Fogarty  &  Rogers,  2005;  Rautiainen,  2010).  This  mirrors  the 
situations observed in the Councils visited. Formal performance measurements and 
budgetary practices were maintained in a loosely coupled state, in the sense that there 
was a lack of connection between the formal performance procedures displayed to the 
regulatory bodies and the actual daily operations of the Councils. This was attributed 
to by non-integration of the performance measurement practices into the Councils’ 
regulations. Therefore, the Councils’ officials were unaware of how to integrate the 
formal performance measurement practices into their daily operations. As a result, the 
performance  measurement  criteria  were  only  consulted  at  the  end  of  the  year,  in 
preparation for the performance assessment exercise.  
 
Similarly, the presence of political interference, funding uncertainties, the inadequate 
knowledge of the Councils’ officials, and deficient regulations, constrained adherence 
to  the  formal  budgeting  procedures.  For  example,  the  IFMS/EPICOR  which  was 
introduced to control the Councils’ budgets was not applied effectively, as illustrated 
below: 
 
“Here,  it  is  very  difficult  to  comply  with  budget.  We  have  so  many  political 
directives which we are required to follow, and sometimes contradict with formal 
budgeting arrangements. So, if we have expenditures of that nature, we are forced to 
look  for  formal  items  in  the  system  [IFMS/EPICOR]  which  resemble  with  the 
expenditure  in  question  and  put  there…If  there  is  no  such  similar  item  in  the 
particular Department, then we have to look similar items in another Department. 
Sometimes there is no similar item in all Departments. In this case, we are normally 
create a new expenditure code, reduce funds allocated to other expenditures, and 
charge  the  amount  accordingly.  Later,  we  will  send  to  the  meeting  [Finance 
Committee] as re-allocation” (Gefi, Final Accounts Accountant: KAMC). 
 
As noted in the above comment, budget re-allocations were used to harmonize the 
differences  between  the  formal  budgeting  requirements  and  the  actual  daily 
operations.  In general,  all the Councils visited principally  maintained  two budget  
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documents, formal and informal (daily routine), and the re-allocations were used to 
reconcile  the two.  A detailed discussion of the phenomenon of ‘decoupling/loose 
coupling’ observed in this study is given in section 8.4.2.2 of the following chapter. 
7.5.1.4  Establishing Rhetoric Rules and Regulations 
‘Rhetoric’ is not ‘in-vivo code’, rather, it is a term taken from the extant literature to 
describe the nature of the Councils’ rules and regulations. Rhetoric means persuasive 
speech  or  writing  (speech  or  writing  that  communicates  its  point  persuasively) 
(Encarta Dictionary, [n.d]). It is mainly used to convince external stakeholders on the 
appropriateness  of  the  organisations  (see,  for  example,  Covaleski,  Dirsmith,  & 
Rittenberg, 2003). A similar trend was observed in this study. The Councils were 
engaged  in  establishing  a  variety  of  internal  arrangements  and  by-laws,  although 
these were not adequately and/or effectively applied to the Councils’ operations. The 
arrangements were intended to convince the external stakeholders that the Councils 
were eager to monitor their operations, a practice which ensured the availability of 
resources and support. These arrangements included the CMT’s daily meeting and 
physical  assessment  of  the  Councils’  projects.  The  CMT  daily  meetings  were 
designed to strengthen the internal management, but, as has been noted previously, 
because Council members and even Directors had an inadequate understanding of 
financial  matters,  the  meetings  were  full  of  rhetoric  and  were  used  merely  as 
platforms for endorsing ill-informed decisions: 
 
“To be frank, it is wastage of time and financial resources to have meeting [CMT] 
every day. We don’t have time to execute what we have agreed. Sometimes, we have 
nothing to discuss at all, and things become repetitive. We just attend as a matter of 
requirement” (Hame, Revenue Accountant: KBDC) (emphasis added). 
 
The Councils also established internal arrangements which emphasised the physical 
inspection of developmental and social projects. The rationale behind the exercise 
was to convince fund providers that the Councils’ internal management was effective 
enough  to  supervise  and  monitor  their  projects,  which  was  not  the  case.  The 
involvement of the Councillors thus became a practice which was politicised and 
rhetorical: 
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“Previously, we had no special team for monitoring of the Council’ projects. It was 
regarded as part and parcel of our daily activities. Later, the Councillors claimed to 
be involved in the exercise. But as you know, these are not experts, they are simply 
interested in allowances and overall publicity of the exercise” (Neha, Health and 
Final Accounts Accountant: MCDC). 
 
Furthermore, as the mismanagement of the Councils’ funds continued to develop, 
some of the Councils established special funds to deal with certain activities. The 
practice  aimed  to  convince  potential  contributors  that  the  funds  would  not  be 
subjected  to  the  same  treatment  as  other  Council  funding.  Even  though  it  was 
persuasive by nature, this had attracted a substantial amount of funding from a variety 
of stakeholders. For example, Councils’ officials in the KAMC has established an 
Education  Trust  Fund  (ETF),  as  a  special  fund,  which  had  received  substantial 
contributions  from  the  general  public,  private  entities,  NGOs,  and  other 
organisations.  In  general,  the  Councils  had  established  a  number  of  rules  and 
regulations which were neither functional nor effective, but they had managed to 
persuade external stakeholders of the appropriateness of the Councils’ operations. 
7.5.2 Managing the Organisational Performance 
Managing  the  organisational  performance  was  achieved  by  the  internal  strategies 
used by the Councils’ officials to address the operational problems which endangered 
their performance. It included both offensive and defensive approaches, employed to 
legalize  and  prove  the  Councils’  performances  in  unfavorable  operating 
environments. The techniques used to manage the organisational performance were 
aggressive fund management, lobbying, and the playing of compliance games.  
7.5.2.1  Aggressive Fund Management 
Aggressive fund management was part of the defensive strategies employed by the 
officials as a mechanism to ensure the availability of funds, and was fuelled by the 
late  disbursement  of  funds  from  the  Government  and  donors.  Aggressive  fund 
management involved managing the procurement process, practicing ‘teeming and 
lading’, and an under-banking strategy. A combination of the late disbursement of 
funds  and  lengthy  procurement  procedures,  created  two  possible  options  for  the 
Councils: to remain with unspent funds at the end of the financial year, or to initiate 
the procurement process before the funds became available. Both options raised a  
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statutory audit query to some extent. Having  unspent  funds would mean that the 
Councils’  projects  would  not  be  undertaken,  which  would  not  only  affect  the 
following year’s budget allocations, but would also reduce the social legitimacy of 
the  Councils  in  the  eyes  of  the  general  public,  and  would  also  attract  negative 
publicity. Because of this, the Councils’ officials opted to initiate the procurement 
process  before  funds  became  available.  This  practice,  although  it  was  against 
procurement  regulations,  guaranteed  the  undertaking  of  social  and  development 
projects in the year under consideration, while, at the same time, it did not affect the 
budget allocation to the Councils in the following budgetary year. The Councils’ own 
revenue was used to initiate the procurement process, in anticipation of the late funds 
from the Government and donors. 
 
Also, the existence of multiple and uncoordinated funding sources at the Council 
level facilitated the ‘teeming and lading’ practices, where the late disbursement from 
an external funder motivated the Councils’ officials to take funds from one source to 
finance the activities of another.  The practice worked  on the assumption that the 
taken funds would be returned when the appropriate funds became available. This 
was evident during a conversation with a Municipal Medical Officer of the KAMC: 
 
“The main problem we are facing in our Councils in general is the late disbursement 
of  funds.  Funds  from  donors  and  Government  are  insufficient  and  untimely 
disbursed. Mind you, these funds are very important for smooth running of health 
facilities.  What  we  do,  normally  we  take  funds  from  available  sources  with  the 
anticipation of returning them later when funds from a respective source become 
available. Otherwise, we have to close the health facilities” (Lua, Municipal Medical 
Officer: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
 
The  absence  of  both  the  possibility  of  a  surprise  fund  audit,  and  the  inherent 
weaknesses in the administrative bodies made the practice possible. The ‘teeming and 
lading’ was more practiced in the Health Services than the Primary Education sector. 
This was facilitated by the availability of a variety of health funds which were not 
effectively coordinated. Because funds from the Cost Sharing Scheme were collected 
and spent at the level of the health facility, they were used extensively to finance 
other activities. To rationalise the practice, one Medical in Charge asserted that “the  
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funds from the Cost Sharing Scheme were aimed to help the health facility, and we 
should be allowed to use them in the way we think appropriate”. In addition, some of 
the health practitioners applied an under-banking strategy as a reactive mechanism to 
address the financial domination of the Councils. Because authorization and approval 
of the health funds was done at the Council level, and because some of the Councils’ 
offices were located far away from the health facilities, the health practitioners at 
some  of  the  health  facilities  were  holding  cash  from  collections  in  reserve.  The 
practice was regarded as necessary in order to safeguard a health facility in case of a 
financial emergency. The absence of reconciliation between the patients’ registers, 
the cash collected, and the amount banked, had precipitated the practice. 
7.5.2.2  Lobbying 
Lobbying  involved  strategies  such  as  ‘blaming’,  ‘fear’,  pre-meeting  strategy,  and 
opinion shopping, techniques which were intended to control the performance of the 
Councils.  For  example,  as  for  blaming,  technocrats  blamed  the  Government  and 
donors for issuing inappropriate guidelines and funding conditions, and held these 
responsible for the implementation problems: 
 
“Our situation here is worse. We have a lot of politically and financially motivated 
interference from politicians and higher Government officials from the Ministries 
and  Regional  levels.  We  have  a  lot  of  activities  to  undertake  but  our  internal 
collections  are  very  low  and  the  funds  from  Central  government  are  normally 
disbursed very late. In these circumstances, I think our performance is more than 
appropriate” (Rela, Assistant Revenue Accountant: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
 
‘Fear’  was  also  a  strategy  employed  by  the  Councils’  officials  to  minimise  the 
intensity of investigation and assessment, and was predominantly manifested during 
the statutory audit, the assessment by the Parliamentary Committee, and LGCDG 
Annual assessment. Interestingly, as was observed in one Parliamentary Committee 
session,  the  strategy  protected  the  officials  from  being  exposed  to  extensive 
questioning by the members of the Parliamentary Committee. Furthermore, because 
the Councillors formed the supreme body of the Council, Full Council, it was crucial 
to obtain their support regarding the Councils’ budget. Therefore, to ensure that the 
Councillors endorsed the budget, a pre-meeting strategy was employed, whereby the  
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technocrats arranged a pre-meeting with the Council Chairperson and other eminent 
Councillors prior to the formal Council’s budget session:  
 
“In order to avoid more problems during the session [budget], we normally conduct a 
pre-meeting  with  Council  Mayor  and  other  outspoken  Councillors.  Since  all 
important budget facts are highlighted during the pre-meeting session, this minimises 
questions in the official budget session” (Tihe, Municipal Economist: KAMC). 
 
The  practice,  even  though  it  lowered  the  value  of  the  Councils’  special  budget 
session,  was  effectively  used  to  manage  and  control  political  interference  by  the 
Councillors during the formal budget session, and to reduce negative publicity for the 
Councils. Moreover, because an audit opinion was one of the primary conditions for 
grants purposes
31, it  was an important aspect of  acquiring or losing organisational 
legitimacy. In this regard, an adverse opinion would restrict the Councils’ access to 
discretionary grants under the LGCDG systems, which in turn would attract negative 
publicity and disciplinary punishment for the Councils’ officials. This prompted the 
Councils’ officials to become involved in opinion shopping, a practice employed to 
obtain a favourable audit opinion for grants purposes. The opinion shopping took the 
form  of  financial  bribery  of  the  auditor.  This  was  evidenced  in  the  following 
conversation: 
 
“In reality, the nature of our Councils’ external audit is weak. Some of the auditors 
are not honest and actually take bribes from the Councils’ officials. They are not 
trustful. If you commission a private independent firm to undertake an audit, almost 
all  of  the  Councils  will  receive  an  adverse  opinion”  (Rela,  Assistant  Revenue 
Accountant: KAMC). 
 
The  practice  of  the  Councils’  donors  to  commission  an  independent  auditor  to 
examine  their  projects  verified  the  aforementioned  claim.  Similarly,  the 
Parliamentary  Committee  normally  made  use  of  information  obtained  from  other 
                                                 
31 “From the Treasurer obtain and review the most recent audited accounts. What is the 
auditor’s opinion on the accounts of the previous year? If the audit report is Clean, score 3; 
Adverse or Qualified, score 0” (LGCDG Assessment Manual, PMO-RALG, 2006; p. 21) 
(emphasis in the original).  
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sources to hold the Councils’ officials accountable, a situation which indicated the 
low level of trust attached to the statutory audit. 
7.5.2.3  Playing of the Compliance Games 
The compliance games were played in auditing, budgeting, and financial reporting. In 
auditing,  for  example,  despite  the  fact  that  the  Councils’  internal  auditors  lacked 
sufficient technical competence and appropriate facilities to undertake a performance 
audit,  the  internal  audit  reports  included  a  clause  indicating  that  one  had  been 
undertaken. This was in response to the regulations which required the Councils’ 
internal auditors to undertake a performance audit and indicate this in their quarterly 
internal  audit  reports.  Similarly,  the  effective  implementation  of  the  participatory 
planning  [Mpango  Shirikishi]  was  constrained  by  inadequate  knowledge  of  the 
officials at the lower levels and tight budget timeframes. To counter this, and because 
the participatory budget was one of the funding conditions of both the Government 
and donors, the Councils’ officials involved the lower levels only ceremonially and 
their suggestions were either ignored or subjected to formal and informal revisions at 
the Council level. The excuses for this were the inclusion of the ceilings dictated by 
the Government and the incorporation of cross-cutting issues, which were claimed 
being  not  considered  at  the  lower  levels.  Furthermore,  despite  the  inherent 
weaknesses  facing  the  implementation  of  IPSAS,  all  financial  statements  of  the 
Tanzanian Councils  were stamped  as  ‘fully  IPSAS  compliant’.  These compliance 
games were intended to convince the supervisory bodies and fund providers that the 
Councils complied with the regulations as required, a claim which guaranteed the 
availability of resources.  
 
In general, these strategies were employed by the Councils’ officials as a response to 
the circumstances created by the set of conditions which influenced the process of 
manipulating  legitimacy.  The  discussion  of  the  consequences  of  the  strategies  is 
preceded by a discussion of the four conditions which enabled the manipulation of 
legitimacy observed in this research. 
7.6  Conditions of Manipulating Legitimacy 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) described conditions as sets of circumstances which play 
roles in the occurrence of central phenomena. They classified conditions into three 
main categories: causal, intervening, and contextual. Causal conditions comprise sets  
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of  events  which  influence  the  occurrence  of  the  phenomena,  while  intervening 
conditions  are  those  that  change  or  moderate  the  impact  of  causal  conditions  on 
phenomena.  On  the  other  hand,  contextual  conditions  “are  the  specific  sets  of 
conditions (patterns of conditions) that intersect dimensionally at this time and place 
to create the set of circumstances or problems  to which persons respond through 
actions/interactions” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 132). All the conditions observed in 
this research created circumstances for the occurrence of the central phenomenon. 
Thus, they are contextual in nature. The current research identified four contextual 
conditions of manipulating legitimacy, namely deficient regulatory systems, political 
interference, funding uncertainties, and donors’ influence. 
7.6.1 Deficient Regulatory Systems 
The  deficient  regulatory  systems  represent  a  macro  conditioning  context  which 
created the circumstances which allowed the manipulation of legitimacy. In general, 
the  Councils  were  subjected  to  multiple  and  uncoordinated  regulations,  which 
contained  outdated,  repetitive,  and  sometimes  conflicting,  provisions.  The  few 
amendments to the regulations were claimed to be externally driven and financially 
motivated,  and  failed  to  address  operational  needs  at  the  Council  level.  These 
regulatory  anomalies  had  led  to  the  operational  uncertainties  which  forced  the 
Councils’ officials to manipulate legitimacy in order to ensure smooth undertaking of 
the  Councils’  operations.  For  example,  the  revenue  regulations  had  affected  the 
Councils’ self-generated incomes significantly: 
 
“We have a big problem on revenue collection. The approved collection rates are too 
small and unrealistic. You know, regulations do not allow us to charge any tax or to 
use any collection rate until it is approved by higher organs. The process of approval 
is too bureaucratic. Also, for political reasons, some Councillors are not willing to 
endorse the increase of the collection rates” (Mai, Revenue Accountant: KAMC). 
 
This prompted the Councils’ officials to use a number of techniques, such as under-
estimation of the self-generated incomes and inclusion of the GPG as part of their 
own revenues to manipulate the proportion of their self-generated incomes in order to 
accrue the Government grants. Despite the fact that the Councils’ regulations were 
substantially  amended  in  1999  and  2006,  the  amendments  were  not  effectively  
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integrated into the Councils’ operations, which, in some cases, conflicted with the 
effective implementation of the ‘decentralization by devolution’ policy. For example, 
whilst needs assessment flowed from the general public to the Government via the 
Councils, the planning priorities were dictated centrally by the Government. It was 
this  context  which  prompted  the  Councils’  officials  to  maintain  formal  budget 
procedures  only  superficially,  in  order  to  resolve  the  operational  difficulties. 
Furthermore, the LAFM (1997) and LAAM (1992), the oldest accounting regulations, 
in many respects contradicted the Local Government Finances Act No. 9 of 1982 
(amended  2000),  and  the  Local  Government  Authorities  Tender  Boards 
(Establishment and Proceedings) Regulations of 2007 (see section 5.2.4). There were 
also  mismatches  between  the  Local  Government  Finances  Act  No.  9  of  1982 
(amended 2000) and Public Finances Act (2001). These anomalies meant that the 
Councils’  financial  regulations  were  neither  harmonised  internally,  nor  with  the 
external principal laws. Therefore, in order to ensure the efficient undertaking of the 
Councils’  operations  in  the  deficient  regulatory  regime,  the  Councils’  officials 
applied a number of strategies, including establishing rhetorical rules and regulations 
and the maintenance of formal rules and regulations in a loosely coupled state. 
7.6.2 Political Interference 
Political interference from the Councillors and higher Government officials formed 
another  macro  conditioning  context  for  the  manipulation  of  legitimacy.  Being 
hierarchically superior to the technocrats,  the Councillors and higher Government 
officials imposed a number of directives which sometimes contradicted the efficient 
running  of  the  Councils.  Requests  for  contributions  from  the  Councils  following 
disasters  and  for  entertaining  National  guests  were  some  of  the  non-budgeted 
expenditures  imposed  by  the  higher  Government  officials  on  the  Councils.  Also, 
there  were  incidences  where  the  Councillors  and  officials  from  the  Government 
requested funds for personal use. In order to protect their employment, technocrats 
were forced to comply with both informal and formal directives automatically: 
 
“We have so many directives here from the top…You may receive a call from RC 
[Regional Commissioner] requiring TZS 10,000,000 for the anniversary of the 50
th 
year  of  the  Independence…You  may  also  receive  another  call  requiring  TZS 
50,000,000 for the  Zanzibar’s ship disaster and the Gongolamboto tragedy, and so  
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on.  All of these expenditures were not budgeted for, and they know…If you refuse, 
you will not last in your employment even for three months. You have to accept their 
directives” (Coab, Municipal Treasurer: MDMC). 
 
Because the funds were not budgeted for, at the very least the tendency noted above 
led  to  manoeuvring  during  the  preparation  of  the  financial  statements,  while 
sometimes the financial bribery was extended to supervisory bodies to cover the non-
budgeted  expenditures  incurred  by  the  Councils.  Interestingly,  some  of  the  non-
budgeted expenditures were covered by the general phrase of ‘National Interest’, a 
phrase which denoted that even though the expenditures were not budgeted for, they 
were essential for the smooth running of the country in general. Because this phrase 
was also known to the statutory auditor and other assessment bodies, this practice 
facilitated  the  manipulative  techniques  during  the  preparation  of  the  Councils’ 
financial statements. 
 
Similarly, political interference from the Councillors, which was created by the role 
ambiguity  between  the  Councillors  and  the  technocrats,  constrained  the  efficient 
undertaking of the Councils’ operations. A higher level of interference was noted 
during the budget preparation, when the Councillors were eager to push for higher 
allocations of resources to their respective wards. It was this situation which forced 
the  Councils’  officials  to  develop  the  pre-meeting  strategy  with  the  Council 
Chairperson  and  prominent  Councillors  in  order  to  curtail  much  of  the  political 
interference during a formal budget session.  
7.6.3 Funding Uncertainties 
Funding  uncertainties  were  both  macro  and  micro  contexts  of  the  central 
phenomenon  which  emerged  from  this  research.  The  unreliability  of  the  external 
funds in terms of timing and amount, coupled with the increase of demand of the 
Councils’  services,  forced  the  officials  to  adopt  a  number  of  strategies,  such  as 
management of the procurement process, the practice of teeming and lading, and 
management of the internal funds in order to survive. Arguably, the unreliability of 
the external funds could partially have been addressed by strengthening the internal 
sources. However, as discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6, the internal sources 
were also constrained by political interference, deficient regulatory systems, and the  
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self-interested behaviour of the technocrats and the Councillors. These factors were 
partly  responsible  for  the  reduction  of  the  ability  of  the  Councils’  self-generated 
incomes to finance their recurrent expenditures, as shown in the following figure. 
 
 
Figure 15: The LGAs’ Self-Generated Incomes as % of Recurrent Expenditures 
 
Source: Annual General Report of the CAG, FY 2005/06 to FY 2009/10. 
 
High financial dependence facing the LGAs, had forced the Councils’ officials to be 
manipulative.  This  ensured  the  Councils  with  the  availability  of  resources  and 
support  from  the  Government  and  donors.  Therefore,  high  level  of  financial 
dependence, was one of the ‘enablers’ of the process of manipulating legitimacy. 
Because  the  operating  environment  was  non-conducive,  the  ‘manipulative 
techniques’  were  capable  of  ensuring  the  availability  of  funds  for  the  Councils’ 
operations. 
7.6.4 Donors’ Influence 
“We  have  a  problem  with  donors’  conditions.  They  put  a  lot  of  unnecessary 
conditions on their funds. Sometimes, you are encountered with a situation which 
donor funds could have been better used in addressing that particular situation, but 
you are not allowed to use. This is a big problem in our day to day operations (Mihe, 
Municipal Health Planner: KAMC). 
The  ability  of  the  Councils  to  access  more  funds  from  the  donors  depended  on, 
amongst  other  things,  the  extent  to  which  they  were  able  to  comply  with  the 
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requirements of donors. As was observed in the performance-based conditional grants 
systems, a high level of compliance attracted a bonus, and sanctions were applied to 
cases of low levels of compliance. However, the operating environment constrained 
effective compliance with some of the donors’ funding conditions, a situation which 
had  led  compliance  games  to  be  played  in  areas  such  as  auditing  and  financial 
reporting in order to appear to satisfy the requirements of donors. Related to these 
factors  were  the  opinions  of  the  Councils’  officials  that  some  of  the  conditions 
advanced  by  donors,  such  as  the  maintenance  of  the  Health  Basket  Fund  at  the 
Council level, were inappropriate and  created operational problems  for the health 
facilities. In general, the responses of the Councils’ officials to these situations were 
mainly represented in the form of lobbying and compliance games, practices which 
aimed to solve the perceived operational problem  which had been  created by the 
influence of donors. 
7.7  Consequences of Manipulating Legitimacy 
Strauss  and  Corbin  (1998)  described  consequences  as  “outcomes  of 
actions/interactions and represented by questions as to what happens as a result of 
those actions/interactions or the failure of persons or groups to respond to situations 
by actions/interactions, which constitute an important finding in and of itself” (p. 
128). In the context of this research, the strategies used to manipulate legitimacy 
produced  five  main  consequences,  which  were  the  subordination  of  accounting 
practices,  professional  conflict,  fraud  and  corruption,  the  steering  role  of  the 
accounting  regulatory  board,  and  escalation  of  social  and  political  legitimacy.  A 
detailed discussion of each of these is given below. 
7.7.1 Subordination of Accounting Practices 
Social  and  economic  reforms  introduced  into  the  country  in  the  1990s  under  the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), gave accounting a precedent role in all the 
Councils’  Departments  and  Sections.  The  introduction  of  the  decentralization  by 
devolution policy had fostered the role of accounting at the lower levels even further, 
as demonstrated in the following quote: 
 
“In  the  past,  there  was  no  need  for  accounting  in  health  facilities.  The  Central 
Government supplied everything and there was no need to have accounting records at 
all. After the introduction of the Cost Sharing Scheme, then the need for accounting  
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emerged. This is because the funds are collected and used at the point of service 
delivery,  so  there  is  a  need  to  account  for  the  funds  collected…”  (Ahm,  Health 
Secretary: KBDC). 
 
However, the implanted role of accounting functions failed to be reinforced by a 
supportive environment. As a result, there had been subordination of the accounting 
practices in all accounting practices, namely budgeting, financial reporting, auditing, 
and performance measurement. For example, inadequate knowledge of the Councils’ 
officials, non-maintenance of the vote book systems, poor segregation of duties, and 
the limited use of the IFMS/EPICOR, had reduced the potential contribution of the 
budget to the Councils’ operations. As discussed earlier, political interference also 
downgraded the Councils’ budgetary practices to a large extent: 
 
“It is very difficult to follow the Councils’ budget in our environment. Even the 
implementation of EPICOR in our Councils becomes extremely difficult. How can 
you be able to comply with the budget while you are required to finance the National 
Torch and entertain political leaders, things which were not budgeted for, in the first 
place?”  (Heti, Final Accounts’ Accountant: KBDC). 
 
Political interference was partly attributed to the maintenance of the formal budgeting 
in  a  loosely  coupled  state.  As  a  result,  for  example,  the  Councils’  budgets  were 
merely used as a resource hunting vehicle and had limited value for planning and 
control.  A  similar  trend  was  observed  in  auditing  and  financial  reporting,  where 
compliance  games  were  played.  In  auditing,  for  example,  non-undertaking  of  the 
performance  audit had  weakened the internal  auditing  functions,  and, as  a result, 
there  were  more  external  audit  queries  in  the  Councils’  audited  accounts. 
Furthermore,  the  IPSAS’s  compliance  camouflage  exercised  by  the  Councils’ 
officials had reduced the relevance and reliability of the Councils’ financial reports. 
Therefore, it was apparent that the strategies for manipulating legitimacy had led the 
accounting practices in the Councils to remain as calculative practices, which were 
intended primarily to satisfy the requirements of the Government and donors at face 
value, and which were less relevant for the improvement of internal efficiency of the 
Councils.  
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7.7.2 Professional Conflict 
Professional conflict emerged in the interactions between accountants and medical 
practitioners in the Councils, as well as in the SDUs. The interaction was facilitated 
to  a large extent by  the allocation of accountants  to  the Health Departments  and 
facilities.  The  allocation  of  accountants  to  the  health  facilities,  which  was  the 
mechanism employed to monitor the Councils’ self-generated incomes from the Cost 
Sharing  Scheme,  had  significantly  shifted  financial  power  from  the  medical 
practitioners  to  the  accountants.  The  accountants  super-ceded  the  medical 
practitioners as holders of the budget and they also were directly involved in the 
collection and safe custody of the collected funds. This, arguably, led to the hostile 
relationship between the accountants and the medical practitioners: 
 
“You know, accounting is very important in health facilities. The only problem is the 
rigidity of the accounting rules and regulations. We as medical doctors, we cannot 
allow the accountant to deposit money in the bank while we have an immediate use 
of them…Our aim here is to save the life of our patients and not otherwise” (Reme, 
Health Centre Medical in Charger: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, the allocation of accountants to the health facilities, which was intended to 
strengthen  the  Councils’  legitimacy  regarding  the  efficient  management  of  the 
Councils’ health funds, turned into a source of conflict. As a result, the effective 
supervision  of  the  Councils’  health  funds,  and  more  importantly,  the  overall 
undertaking of accounting practices, was negatively affected. It was also apparent 
that self-interested behaviour on the part of the medical practitioners had fuelled the 
conflict. 
7.7.3 Fraud and Corruption 
Fraud and corruption had emerged as a consequence of the strategies employed to 
manipulate legitimacy. For example, strategies such as under-banking of collected 
funds, teeming and lading, and opinion shopping all provided the potential for the 
occurrence of fraud and corruption. In general, fraud was an outcome of the inherent 
weaknesses  facing  the  Councils,  as  well  as  the  self-interested  behaviour  of  the 
Councils’ officials, while corruption was mainly driven by the officials’ desire to  
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control the operating problems by using bribery
32. Therefore, the emergence of fraud 
and corruption was an  outcome of the dubious mechanisms used by  the Councils’ 
officials to acquire organisational legitimacy. In general, fraud and corruption related 
cases were prominent in the Tanzanian LGAs: 
 
“The  Parliamentary  Committee  for  Local  Authorities  Accounts  (LAAC)  has 
uncovered a syndicate between the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local 
Government  [PMO-RALG]  and  various  Local  Government  Authorities  (LGAs) 
which is involved in massive embezzling of billions of shillings of state funds... The 
committee discovered misappropriation of TZS 5.8bn/- allocated for various projects 
in TNDC [pseudonym] in which a greater portion of the money was misappropriated. 
The  committee  was  equally  dissatisfied  with  the  accounting  of  TZS  7.7  billion 
allocated to the council for the 2008/09 fiscal year for recurrent and development 
expenditures and has ordered for the same to put records clear and submit them… 
The Government has admitted that funds totalling more than 70 per cent of its annual 
budget  allocated  in  the  LGAs  have  been  mismanaged;  hence  affecting 
implementation of development programmes” (Reporter-Daily News, 1
st April, 2011) 
(emphasis added). 
 
7.7.4 Steering Role of Accounting Regulatory Board 
What emerged from the process of manipulating legitimacy  was the need for the 
active involvement of accounting board in the regulation of accounting practices in 
the Councils. At the time of the research, accounting in the Tanzanian public sector in 
general, and the LGAs in particular, was highly regulated by the Government and 
donors. With the focus of these bodies being on the reporting of funds disbursed to 
the LGAs, the opportunity to improve accounting practices overall had been missed. 
The  country’s  accounting  regulatory  board,  the  NBAA,  had  not  yet  effectively 
extended its regulatory functions to the public sector entities, despite the belief of the 
Councils’  officials  and  other  stakeholders  that  the  effective  involvement  of  the 
NBAA  could  substantially  reduce  the  extent  of  manipulation,  and  strengthen  the 
accounting practices, in the Councils: 
                                                 
32 On 3
rd June, 2012, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) caught 
one member of the Parliamentary Committee (LAAC) receiving a financial bribe from the 
Councils’ officials which planned to be visited by the Committee (Daily News, 4
th June, 
2012).  
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“We have been told to adopt IPSAS as our financial reporting framework. However, 
IPSAS require a lot of information. As you know, IPSAS represent International 
framework,  and  some  of  the  information/items  are  not  applicable  at  all  in  our 
environment. I think there is a need for the NBAA to be involved in ‘contextualizing’ 
some  of  the  disclosure  and  recognition  principles”  (Hame,  Revenue  Accountant: 
KBDC) (emphasis added). 
 
7.7.5 Augmenting Social and Political Legitimacy 
Social  legitimacy  denotes  the  extent  to  which  key  stakeholders  accept  the 
organisation as dependable (Curtin & Meijer, 2006), a phenomenon which was noted 
in the studied organisations. The increasing involvement of the Tanzanian LGAs in 
provision of the public services enhanced their social legitimacy. As a result, despite 
the  existence  of  inherent  operational  problems  in  the  Councils,  the  Government 
officials, Members of Parliament, Councillors, and the general public, still regarded 
the Councils as important and appropriate bodies for the development of the country. 
The  transparency  and  accountability  claims  had  fostered  the  Councils’  social 
legitimacy  even  further.  The  Councils’  operations  also  enhanced  the  political 
legitimacy  of  the  elected  officials,  such  as  Councillors,  Members  of  Parliament, 
Higher Government officials, Chairpersons of the Village and Suburbs, and the ruling 
party.  It was  at  the Council level  that  political  promises included in the political 
parties’ election manifestos were implemented. Therefore, it was apparent that the 
process of manipulating legitimacy had boosted not only the appropriateness of the 
Councils  to  the  stakeholders,  but  also  the  legitimacy  of  the  politicians  and  the 
Government in the eyes of the general public. These observations can partly explain 
why  the  Councils  obtained  high  levels  of  support  from  the  politicians  and  other 
stakeholders, despite the fact that they demonstrated extremely weak administrative 
arrangements. 
7.8  The Paradigm Model of Manipulating Legitimacy 
This section presents the paradigm model of the manipulating legitimacy. It contains 
four  main  conditions  which  are:  the  deficient  regulatory  systems,  political 
interference,  funding  uncertainties,  and  the  influence  of  donors.  These  conditions 
constrained the effective undertaking of the Councils’ operations. The responses of  
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the Councils’ officials to these conditions were reflected through two main strategies, 
namely,  building  the  organisational  image  and  managing  the  organisational 
performance.  Building  the  organisational  image  represents  the  attempts  of  the 
Councils’ officials to create a favourable image of the Councils through accounting 
practices.  It  involved  four  sub-strategies  which  were  accountability  claims,  the 
management of self-generated incomes (own sources), loose coupling of performance 
measurement and budgetary practices, and the establishment of rhetorical rules and 
regulations.  The  other  main  strategy,  managing  the  organisational  performance, 
denotes  the  techniques  employed  by  the  technocrats  to  control  the  Councils’ 
performance through mechanisms such as aggressive fund management, lobbying, 
and  compliance  games.  The  consequences  of  manipulating  legitimacy  were 
evidenced  through  subordination  of  the  accounting  practices,  in  the  sense  that 
accounting  had  less  value  for  internal  decision  making.  Also,  the  legitimacy 
manipulation  process  led  to  fraud  and  corruption,  professional  conflict  between 
accountants and medical practitioners, and a need for the active involvement of the 
accounting regulatory board. Finally, despite the fact that the financial resources were 
acquired  through  manipulation  techniques,  they  enhanced  social  and  political 
legitimacy of the Councils, politicians, the ruling party, and the entire Government. 
The paradigm model of the manipulating legitimacy is shown in the following figure. 
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Figure 16: Substantive Theory of Manipulating Legitimacy 
 
7.9  Summary 
This chapter is the concluding part of the grounded theory analysis method which 
was  adopted  in  this  study.  The  core  categories  which  were  obtained  in  the  axial 
coding process were integrated into the emerged central phenomenon in the form of 
conditions, strategies, or consequences. This was done through the application of the 
paradigm model (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The four conditions which created the 
situations  and  circumstances  for  the  occurrence  of  the  central  phenomenon, 
manipulating legitimacy, have been identified as the deficient regulatory systems, 
political interference, funding uncertainties, and donors’ influence. The responses of 
the Councils’ officials to the circumstances created by these conditions were two-
folds:  to  build  the  organisational  image,  and  to  manage  the  organisational 
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performance.  Building  the  organisational  image  was  achieved  by  using  four  sub-
strategies,  which  were:  accountability  claims,  the  management  of  self-generated 
incomes  (own  sources),  establishing  rhetorical  rules  and  regulations,  and  loose 
coupling  of  the  performance  measurement  and  budgetary  practices.  On  the  other 
hand,  managing  the  organisational  performance  subsumed  three  sub-strategies: 
aggressive  fund  management,  lobbying,  and  compliance  games.  The  strategies 
employed  produced  five  related  consequences,  which  were:  the  subordination  of 
accounting practices, professional conflict, fraud and corruption, a steering role for 
accounting regulatory board, and escalation of social and political legitimacy. The 
chapter  concluded  with  the  presentation  of  the  substantive  grounded  theory  of 
manipulating  legitimacy.  An  integration  of  the  emergent  theory  within  the  extant 
literature is contained in the following chapter.    
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Chapter Eight 
The Emergent Theory within the Extant Literature 
8.1  Introduction 
This chapter integrates the emergent theory and its related concepts within the extant 
literature.  The  process  ensures  the  general  implications  of  the  emergent  theory 
beyond the Tanzanian Councils where the current research was carried out (Glaser, 
2010). The chapter is divided into four main parts. The first part discusses the central 
phenomenon  and  other  phenomena  within  the  extant  literature.  The  second  part 
provides a general discussion of institutional theory applied within the accounting 
literature.  It  briefly  discusses  the  main  strands  of  institutional  theory  adopted  in 
accounting  research  and  their  potential  contributions  to  the  understanding  of 
accounting as practiced in organisational settings. This part concludes by offering a 
rationale  for  using  New  Institutional  Sociology  (NIS)  to  interpret  the  findings 
emerged  from  the  current  research.  The  third  part  integrates  the  emergent  theory 
within  the  NIS  framework.  The  section  provides  detailed  discussion  of  the 
institutional  pressures  imposed  on  the  Councils,  the  reactions  of  the  Councils’ 
officials,  and  their  related  consequences.  The  integration  of  the  emergent  theory 
within  NIS  framework  suggests  a  more  abstract  formal  grounded  theory  of 
manipulating legitimacy, which is discussed in the last part of the chapter. 
8.2  Manipulating Legitimacy 
This  section  discusses  the  concept  of  manipulating  legitimacy  within  the  extant 
literature. It specifically provides an overview of the concept and the rationale behind 
its  application.  The  section  also  discusses  the  main  strategies  undertaken  for 
manipulating  legitimacy  and  other  phenomena  which  emerged  from  the  current 
research within the extant literature. 
8.2.1 An Overview of Manipulating Legitimacy 
The  concept  of  manipulating  legitimacy,  which  was  the  core  phenomenon  which 
emerged  from  this  study,  has  been  implicitly  discussed  in  the  extant  literature 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Deegan, 2006; Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2002; Oliver, 
1991;  Suchman,  1995).  Suchman  (1995)  raised  the  possibility  for  organisational 
legitimacy  to  be  gained  through  manipulation  techniques.  This  occurs  when 
organisations  manipulate  the  existing  external  structures  by  creating  new 
organisational legitimating beliefs which aim to persuade the external stakeholders on  
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its  appropriateness.  Oliver  (1991)  also  acknowledged  the  possibility  of 
institutionalized organisations using manipulation techniques to address institutional 
pressures, which, in turn, enhanced organisational legitimacy. Oliver (1991) further 
argued that  manipulation is  the most  active response to  institutional pressures, in 
comparison  to  other  responses  (i.e.  acquiescence,  compromise,  avoidance,  and 
defiance), and  is more likely to  happen when it  is  anticipated that organisational 
legitimacy  will  be  low.  These  explanations  closely  resembled  the  findings  of  the 
emergent  theory.  The  Councils’  officials  were  actively  involved  in  manipulation 
techniques, such as lobbying, aggressive fund management, and compliance games, 
in  order  to  gain  legitimacy  from  the  Government  and  donors.  Even  though  the 
techniques  were  ‘harsh’,  they  were  intended  to  persuade  fund  providers  on  the 
appropriateness  of  the  Councils’  operations.  This  was  due  to  the  low  levels  of 
credibility  attached  by  the  various  stakeholders,  as  a  result  of  the  operational 
problems prominent in the Councils. 
 
Deegan  (2006)  also  raised  the  possibility  that  organisations  might  manipulate 
disclosure  information  in  order  to  gain  legitimacy.  This  correlates  with  the  main 
findings of the current research. The only difference is the fact that the manipulation 
of legitimacy which was observed in this study included both accounting functions 
and  output.  In  the  same  context,  Zimmerman  and  Zeitz  (2002)  referred  to 
manipulation as the process of  changing the external environment in order to be 
consistent  with  organisational  operations,  whereby  manipulation  techniques  are 
applied in order to influence the external environment to be in line with the actual 
organisational operations. In general, these explanations show that organisations may 
manipulate their operating environment in order to gain legitimacy and ensure the 
availability  of  resources  and  support  from  the  wider  constituents  (DiMaggio  & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This was observed in the visited Councils, 
where the manipulation techniques enabled them to obtain financial resources from 
the Government and donors. The following section discusses the strategies employed 
in the process of manipulating legitimacy in light of the extant literature. 
8.2.2 Strategies for Manipulating Legitimacy 
The issue of how the manipulation of legitimacy is normally exercised is addressed in 
the  extant  literature,  the  findings  of  some  of  which  were  parallel  to  the  tactics  
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observed in the emergent theory. For example, building the organisational image, 
which was one of the major strategies for manipulating legitimacy, involved mere 
legitimization techniques which were employed by the Councils’ officials to portray a 
favourable  image  to  the  external  stakeholders.  It  included  techniques  such  as  the 
management of self-generated incomes (own sources), accountability claims, loose 
coupling, and the establishment of rhetorical rules and regulations. Richardson and 
Eberlein  (2011)  similarly  showed  the  legitimization  techniques  used  by  the 
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) in order to maintain its legitimacy 
for setting the transnational accounting standards. The board used the ‘due process’ 
mechanism, which involved an effective dialog between the board and a variety of 
stakeholders, a process which ensured the legitimacy of the standards. Also, Panozzo 
(2000) and Black (2008) argued that ‘accountability claims’ are key to organisational 
legitimacy, an observation which closely resembles what was noted in the emergent 
theory,  whereby  the  Councils’  officials  used  budgeted  information  to  claim  high 
levels  of  accountability  to  the  Wards  and  Villages  in  order  to  obtain  increased 
funding  allocations.  Furthermore,  Pettersen  (2001)  revealed  the  manner  in  which 
officials  in  the  Norwegian  Hospital  sector  systematically  utilized  ambiguity 
embedded in the budgeting systems to create a budget deficit in order to obtain more 
resources.  This  mirrors  closely  the  under-estimation  of  the  budgeted  revenues 
exercised by the Councils’ officials. As was explained in the previous chapter, under-
estimation was intended to increase the proportion of actual collection to above 80% 
in order to increase funding allocation. 
 
Similarly, the use of ‘rhetorical’ techniques to manipulate organisational legitimacy 
has  been  recorded  in  the  extant  literature  (Covaleski  et  al.,  2003;  Suddaby  & 
Greenwood,  2005).  For  example,  in  the  case  study  by  Covaleski  et  al.  (2003), 
rhetorical  terms,  “rhetorical  velvet  glove”  (p.  349),  were  used  by  the  Big  Five 
accounting firms to minimize the financial and political pressure. Persuasive terms 
such  as  ‘world  class  services’,  and  ‘higher  order  platform  of  services’  were 
successfully  used  to  bargain  for  the  right  to  perform  the  internal  audit  services. 
Despite the fact that this was a different situation to the ones presented in the study 
under consideration, it pinpoints the use of rhetorical strategies when building the 
organisational  image  in  another  context.  The  rationale  behind  ‘building  the  
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organisational image’ originated from the fact that “for [an] organisation seeking to 
be legitimate it is not the actual conduct of the organisation which is important, it is 
what society collectively knows or perceives about the organisation’s conduct that 
shapes legitimacy” (Deegan, 2006, p. 165). It was in this context that the Councils 
employed persuasive techniques to influence their appropriateness to the Government 
and donors regardless of their actual operations.  
 
‘Managing  the  organisational  performance’  was  a  second  main  strategy  of  the 
manipulating legitimacy, and describes ‘harsh’ techniques employed by the Councils’ 
officials to address the internal performance of the Councils. In contrast to the extant 
literature,  where  performance  management  practices  take  the  form  of  integrated 
approaches  (Brignall  &  Modell,  2000;  Modell,  2009;  Modell  &  Wiesel,  2008; 
Yetano,  2009),  the  practices  observed  by  this  study  were  intended  to  defend  the 
performance  of  the  Councils  in  order  to  obtain  funds  from  the  Government  and 
donors. This was especially the case following the Government decision to introduce 
performance  based  discretionary  grants  to  the  LGAs  with  effect  from  the  FY 
2004/05. As a result, sub-strategies such as aggressive fund management, compliance 
games,  and  lobbying,  were  employed  to  ensure  the  attainment  of  grants.  These 
techniques have also been discussed in the extant literature. For example, in UK and 
Australia, gatekeepers played research games as well as teaching, professional, and 
community service games in order to strengthen their departments (Parker, Guthrie, 
& Gray, 1998). Also, in Uddin and Hopper’s (2001) case study, the game played  by 
workers,  ‘informal  rest  arrangements’  (p.  665),  promoted  the  achievement  of  the 
budget. The  workers, in union, were eager to attain the budgeted output quickly by 
using  ‘tricks’  in  order  to  enjoy  informal  rests,  and  this  was  tolerated  by  the 
management. Similarly, Lapsley (2008) raised the possibility of managers in public 
sector  organisations  adopting  a  ‘tick  box’  approach  which  had  the  potential  to 
increase  compliance  games  in  the  audit  process.  These  observations  closely 
resembled the compliance games which were evidenced in this research (see Chapter 
7,  section  7.5.2.3).  However,  unlike  the  observations  of  the  extant  literature,  the 
games played by the Councils’ officials were grants-driven. 
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Similarly, lobbying, which was observed in this research, has also been explicitly and 
implicitly discussed in  the extant literature  (Deakin,  1989; Georgiou, 2005; Jupe, 
2000; Tutticci, Dunstan, & Holmes, 1994; Weetman, Davie, & Collins, 1996). Taken 
together, these studies show the existence of lobbying in the standard setting process, 
and they also revealed the political and social context which justified the lobbying 
practices,  instances  which  resembled  the  ones  observed  in  the  current  study.  In 
general, as Rahaman and Lawrence (2001) noted, the rules and procedures in the 
public sector organisations  are the product of negotiations, a phenomenon which 
increases lobbying practices. Overall, the discussion provided in this section positions 
the strategies employed in the process of manipulating legitimacy within the extant 
literature, and, therefore, enriches both the emergent theory and the extant literature. 
Other  important  phenomena  which  emerged  from  the  process  of  manipulating 
legitimacy are discussed in the following section. 
8.2.3 Peripheral Phenomena of Manipulating Legitimacy 
This  section  discusses  five  other  phenomena  which  emerged  from  the  research 
process,  namely,  the  role  of  accounting  in  the  organisations,  accounting, 
accountability, and governance, accounting and the reporting language, professional 
conflict, and corruption. The extant literature is used to compare and contrast issues 
under each phenomenon with the overall objective of cross-referencing between the 
observations of this research and that of the established literature. 
8.2.3.1  The Role of Accounting in the Organisations 
The role of accounting in the Tanzanian Councils was to satisfy the requirements of 
the fund providers. For example, budgeting was simply used as a mechanism for 
‘hunting’  financial  resources  with  a  limited  role  in  both  planning  and  control. 
Financial reporting, on the other hand, was mainly used to justify the utilisation of the 
entrusted  resources,  while  auditing  processes  were  used  primarily  to  satisfy  the 
external  stakeholders,  with  little  relevance  to  improving  the  operations  of  the 
Councils. In general, the actual undertaking of the accounting practices was directed 
towards  fulfilling  the  funding  requirements  of  the  Government  and  donors.  As  a 
result,  these  major    financial  providers  received  most  of  the  accounting  attention 
(Goddard & Assad, 2006), followed by other stakeholders such as the Parliamentary 
Committee, the statutory auditor, the Councillors, and the general public.  
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Also, this research evidenced that the operational changes introduced in the Councils 
as a result of the SAP and the decentralisation by devolution policy had not positively 
and progressively changed the role of accounting in the Councils (cf. Alawattage & 
Wickramasinghe,  2008).  Accounting  remained  disorganised,  procedural,  reactive, 
and calculative practices, performed and supervised by self-interested individuals. As 
a  result,  accounting  practices  had  not  been  able  to  address  effectively  the  main 
concerns of the Tanzanian citizens, such as poverty, let alone the Councils’ internal 
efficiency (see Abernethy & Brownell, 1999). The major weakness of the accounting 
practices  in  the  LGAs  was  caused  by  the  absence  of  an  effective  accounting 
regulatory board. Unlike other countries where professional bodies play a significant 
role in the public sector accounting (Day, 2000; Hoque & Moll, 2001; Kent, 2003), 
the  regulatory  link  between  the  country’s  accounting  board,  the  NBAA,  and 
accounting  practices  in  the  Tanzanian  LGAs,  was  unnoticed.  This  had  led  to  a 
regulatory ‘vacuum’ which had facilitated the accounting manipulations.  
8.2.3.2  Accounting, Accountability, and Governance 
An interesting observation from the emergent theory was the relationship between 
accounting,  accountability,  and  governance.  It  was  marginally  observed  that 
accounting  practices  not  only  enhanced  accountability  and  governance,  but  also 
influenced the officials’ views of their roles regarding accountability and governance. 
For  example,  in  one  session  of  the  Parliamentary  Committee,  members  of  the 
committee refused to accept the accounts of four Councils due to the differences in 
the development  funds’  balances  between  the Councils’ audited accounts  and the 
LAAC book. The members of the committee were of the view that the differences 
needed to be investigated and audited accordingly before they would discharge their 
governance roles regarding the Councils’ accounts. Similarly, the financial reporting 
practices  influenced  the  way  the  technocrats  viewed  their  accountability  roles. 
Because the development funds of the lower levels of the Wards and Villages were 
fully expensed at the point of transfer at Council level, the Councils’ technocrats felt 
that they were not accountable for ensuring the efficient utilisation of the funds at the 
lower levels. 
 
The relationship between accounting, accountability, and governance as observed in 
this study finds support in the extant literature (Ahrens & Chapman, 2002; Collier,  
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2005; Cooper & Pearce, 2011; Goddard, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Goddard & Powell, 
1994; Roberts & Scapens, 1985). However, peculiar to the current study was the level 
of  distrust  found  amongst  the  participants,  which  had  increased  the  officials’ 
accountability and the governance roles. For example, the increased public outcry 
about the mismanagement of the public funds allocated to the LGAs, and the low 
level  of  trust  attached  to  the  technocrats,  forced  the  Parliamentary  Committee  to 
initiate physical assessment of the development projects, with effect from the FY 
2006/07.  Previously,  the  Committee  had  only  been  involved  in  examining  the 
Councils’  accounts.  Similarly,  realizing  the  possibility  of  collusion  between  the 
Councils’  officials  and  external  auditors,  the  members  of  the  Parliamentary 
Committee used as a norm accounting information from other sources, such as the 
media  and  ‘whistle-blowers’  to  hold  the  Councils’  officials  accountable.  These 
informal arrangements, which were based on ‘sense-making’ (Collier, 2005; Roberts, 
1991), enhanced the Councils’ accountability to a large extent. 
 
It  is  also  important  to  note  that  the  question  frequently  raised  about  where  the 
accountability  of  the  public  sector  lies,  is  still  relevant  (Pollitt,  1993).  Whilst 
theoretically local governments need to be more accountable to the local citizens 
(Devas  &  Grant,  2003),  the  studied  Councils  showed  that  they  were  more 
accountable  to  the  Government  and  their  donors.  This  supports  Kloot’s  (1999) 
observation that local  governments,  as  with  other public sector  entities,  are more 
accountable to their financial providers than other stakeholders. This is especially the 
case when organisations depend heavily upon external sources of finance. As it was 
observed in this research, even when the accountability to the general public appeared 
to  be  enhanced,  the  rationale  behind  it  was  to  convince  fund  providers  that  the 
Councils were more accountable and hence accrue additional resources.  
8.2.3.3  Accounting and the Reporting Language 
This  research evidenced  the language problem  which faced  some majority of the 
Councillors  and  the  general  public,  which  somewhat  constrained  effective 
communication of the accounting information.  In contrast to developed countries, 
such  as  Sweden,  which  require  all  official  documents  to  be  written  in  the  local 
language (Czarniawska, 2010), the situation is different in emerging economies. The 
local  language  is  usually  different  from  the  official  language,  which  necessitates  
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translation. As was observed in the Councils, English was a transaction and reporting 
language and was not clearly understood by the majority of the Councillors and the 
general public. This necessitated the translation of accounting information into the 
local language, Swahili. It was noted that the accounting information lost much of its 
content value in translation, which cast doubt on the appropriateness of decisions 
made based on the translated accounting information. The issue of translation and its 
impacts have also been discussed in the extant literature (Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 
2003;  Czarniawska,  2010;  Evans,  2004;  Gray,  1988).  For  example,  examining 
disclosures of the International Accounting Standards (IASs) when they were firstly 
introduced in the Egypt, Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003) found that the level of 
compliance was low when the regulations were not available in the local language, 
Arabic. Thus, their study suggested that appropriate translation increases the level of 
compliance. However, the literature generally recognises the incomplete nature of 
translation especially when technical terms are used. As Evans (2004) commented: 
 
“The discipline of translation studies suggests that full equivalence in translation 
between  languages  is  rare.  This  suggests  that  the  risk  of  misunderstanding  is 
exacerbated when technical terms are translated into another language” (p.210). 
 
Although Evans (2004) referred to the implications of mistranslations of technical 
terms in the context of linguistic theories, her observation relates to what was noted 
in this research. The Councils’ officials struggled with the translation of some of the 
technical accounting terms such as ‘balance sheet’, ‘statement of owners’ equity’, and 
‘amortization’. And, as a result, inappropriate terms were used purposely to ‘get rid’ 
of translation: 
 
“The Council’s annual budget, final accounts, statutory audit report, monthly, and 
quarterly  financial  reports  are  all  required  to  be  translated  into  Swahili  for  the 
Councillors  to  understand.  As  you  know,  some  of  the  accounting  terms  are  so 
technical  and  very  difficult  to  be  translated  in  Swahili.  As  a  result, 
tunawachomekea
33” (Muma, Municipal Treasurer: KAMC) (emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
33Tunawachomekea is the Swahili proverb which means camouflaging or putting something 
without the knowledge of other party.  
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Thus, this study supports the assertion of Gray (1988) that the effective development 
of accounting system of any country needs to take into account cultural factors, in 
this case, the language. 
8.2.3.4  Professional Conflict 
Professional  conflict  emerged  as  a  consequence  of  manipulating  legitimacy 
phenomenon. The issue of professional  conflict between accountants  and  medical 
practitioners, and its potential impact on the accounting practices, has been widely 
discussed in the extant accounting literature
34. The antagonistic relationship between 
accountants  and  medical  practitioners  rep orted  in  the  extant  literature  mainly 
originated from two factors: health care reforms which put more emphasis on cost at 
the expense of the quality of health services, and the differences in the cultural norms 
and ethical values between accountants and  medical practitioners (Chua & Preston, 
1994; Jones, 2002; Jones & Dewing, 1997; Lawrence et al., 1994; Lawrence, Alam, 
Northcott, & Lowe, 1997; Scarparo, 2006). Further to these, the current study found 
that the self-interested behaviour of some of the Councils’ officials also accelerated 
the conflict. The implementation of the health sector reforms introduced in Tanzania 
in  the  1990s,  as  part  of  the  SAP,  necessitated  constant  interactions  between 
accountants and medical practitioners at both the health facilities and the Council 
level. The allocation of accountants in both places was seen to have replaced medical 
practitioners’ role in the financial administration of the health funds. In the health 
facilities, financial administration shifted from Medicals in Charge to accountants, 
and Health Accountants at the Council level had replaced the financial administration 
role  of  Councils’  Medical  Officers.  These  changes  were  not  only  “potentially 
conflicted  with  the  dual  hierarchies  which  characterized  hospitals  and  created 
pronounced demarcation between medical and administrative functions” as suggested 
by  Jones  and  Dewing  (1997,  p.  262),  but  had  also  significantly  minimised  the 
financial power of medical practitioners. 
 
                                                 
34 The issue of involvement of accountants in health facilities attracted a debate long time 
ago. This was acknowledged in the Lawrence, Alam, and Lowe (1994)’s paper which first 
paged  the  cartoon  originated  from  the  Tom  Scott  of  Waikato  Times  which  reads: 
“WELCOME TO YOUR REGIONAL HEALTH AUTHORITY. POP UP ON THE BED, 
POP OFF YOUR CLOTHES, AND ONE OF OUR ACCOUNTANTS WILL ATTEND TO 
YOU SHORTLY” (p.68). This shows that a position of accountants in health facilities is the 
contentious issue.   
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As  a  result,  the  medical  practitioners,  who  were  hierarchically  superior  to  the 
accountants,  resisted  the  changes  informally  by  restricting  the  participation  of 
accountants  in  the  health  budgets,  and  compelling  the  accountants  to  bend  the 
accounting procedures. For example, there were cases where the accountants were 
forced to give out cash without the appropriate authorization. In contrast to the extant 
literature,  rather  than  resistance  being  a  mechanism  for  protecting  professional 
normative values (Broadbent et al., 2001), or an attempt to maintain the threatened 
autonomy of the medical practitioners (Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1995), was used as 
a  mechanism  to  regain  lost  financial  power  and  control.  Unlike  what  had  been 
observed by Kurunmaki et al. (2003) in Finland and Scarparo (2006) in the Swedish 
hospitals,  where  the  management  accounting  was  absorbed  by  health  care 
professionals,  accounting  practices  in  the  Tanzanian  health  facilities  were  neither 
absorbed, nor effectively accepted by the medical practitioners, a situation which had 
affected the efficient undertaking of the accounting practices as well as the delivery 
of health services. In general, the findings of this study demonstrated the assertion by 
Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1995) that when controls are imposed on individuals 
with  high  professional  orientations,  it  is  likely  to  have  adverse  effects  to  both 
individuals and organisations. 
8.2.3.5  Corruption 
The  current  study  observed  incidences  of  corruption  as  the  consequences  of  the 
process of manipulating legitimacy. The manipulation strategies created a loophole 
which enabled the occurrence of corruption, and given its magnitude, it seems to have 
been “institutionalized” (Okike, 2004, p. 708). The observed corruption was in a form 
of collusion between the Councils’ officials and the Councils’ suppliers, and bribery 
was also applied to members of the supervisory bodies
35. Because public officials had 
free will, accountability was narrow, and transparency was inadequate, to observe 
corruption was unsurprising (Riley, 1998). Parallel to the observation by Iyoha and 
Oyerinde (2010) in Nigeria, the corruption related issues eminent in the Tanzanian 
Councils had failed to be effectively addressed by the anti-corruption agencies, such 
as the PCCB and the Fraud Investigation Unit (FIU). In fact, current study found no 
                                                 
35 Sometime after the fieldwork (i.e. 3
rd June, 2012), PCCB arrested one member of the 
Parliamentary  Committee  for  taking  a  bribe  of  TZS  1,000,000  from  the  officials  of  the 
Council which planned to be visited by the Committee (Daily News, 4
th June 2012).  
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evidence  to  suggest  that  there  was  cooperation  between  these  anti-corruption 
agencies and the Councils’ accountants and auditors. The few reported corruption 
cases  originated  from  whistle-blowing  by  the  media,  or  by  ordinary  citizens.  In 
contrast to the extant literature, the findings of the current study demonstrated that the 
role of financial reporting in signposting fraud and corruption was blurred. Therefore, 
the  current  research  supports  Okike  (2004)’s  argument  that  the  “success  of  the 
government’s anti-corruption campaign hinges on effective cooperation with various 
corporate governance mechanisms, prime amongst which is the role of accountants 
and auditors in financial reporting” (p.707). Similarly, as Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010) 
asserted,  a  “robust  accounting  infrastructure”  (p.368)  has  the  potential  to  curtail 
corruption related cases in the emerging economies. 
 
It is also worth noting that corruption is a contentious issue in the Tanzanian public 
sector  in  general.  Recognizing  this  fact,  the  third  phase  Government  formed  the 
Presidential corruption inquiry in January 1996 and the inquiry reported its findings 
in December 1996. It unveiled ‘petty’ corruption in the police force and the judicial 
systems,  while  ‘grand’  corruption  was  noted  in  major  public  contracts,  such  as 
mining and the construction of the public infrastructures, such as roads and buildings 
(Warioba, 1997). However, its conclusions have not been effectively acted upon. In 
general, the corruption incidences noted in this study are representative of a wider 
problem  in  the  public  sector  entities  of  emerging  economies  (Abdulai,  2009; 
Ampratwum,  2008;  Berkman  et  al.,  2008;  Brown  &  Cloke,  2006;  Malagueño, 
Albrecht, Ainge, & Stephens, 2010; Muganda, 1997; Olowu, 1999). The following 
section discusses institutional theory within the context of accounting research. 
8.3  Institutional Theory and Accounting Research 
Institutional theory is concerned with the way in which structures, procedures, rules, 
and norms, become part of the organisational behaviour (Scott, 2005). It primarily 
deals  with  how  these  elements  are  constructed,  adopted,  and  diffused  by  the 
institutionalized  organisations  (Scott,  2005).  Based  on  discipline,  Scott  (2001) 
identified three components  of institutional  theory, namely, institutional  theory in 
economics,  institutional  theory  in  political  science,  and  institutional  theory  in 
sociology.  In  sociology,  which  is  the  subject  most  related  to  this  research,  Scott 
(1987)  identified  four  sociological  formulations  for  institutional  theory,  namely,  
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institutionalization as a process of instilling value, institutionalization as a process of 
creating  reality,  institutional  systems  as  a  class  of  elements,  and  institutions  as 
distinct societal spheres. In principle, these formulations depict the development of 
the  institutionalization  process  which  takes  place  in  the  organisations.  The 
institutional theory, with its focus on institutions, has attracted enormous interest in 
social science research, including accounting (Miller, 1994). The use of institutional 
theories  to  study  accounting  practices  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  accounting  is 
influencing, and being influenced by, the social, political, and economic contexts in 
which it operates, and these elements are central to institutional theory (Burns & 
Scapens, 2000; Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006; Scapens, 2006). Therefore, institutional 
theory, with its focus on institutional settings, is claimed to be in a better position to 
dissect institutional interrelationships and increase the understanding of accounting 
practices (Burns & Scapens, 2000; Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004). This was the 
primary reason for the use of institutional theory to interpret the research findings of 
this study. 
 
Accounting research from the institutional theory perspective is normally informed 
by three theoretical frameworks, namely, Old Institutional Economics (OIE), New 
Institutional  Economics  (NIE),  and  New  Institutional  Sociology  (NIS)  theories 
(Ahmed  &  Scapens,  2000;  Burns  &  Scapens,  2000;  Ribeiro  &  Scapens,  2006; 
Scapens, 2006). As evidenced in the following discussion, all of these three strands of 
institutional theory share common characteristics, although they differ in specifics 
(Burns & Scapens, 2000; Moll et al., 2006; Ribeiro & Scapens, 2006). 
 
New  institutional  economics  (NIE)  applies  economic  reasoning  to  explain 
institutional settings and organisational structures (Burns, 2000; Moll et al., 2006; 
Scapens, 2006). The theory describes organisational existence based on cost-benefit 
analysis  (Moll  et  al.,  2006).  It  argues  that  organisations  normally  exist  when  its 
benefits outweigh its costs. In the accounting discipline, NIE has been mainly used to 
explain and develop various types of management controls and accounting systems 
(see  for  example,  Speklé,  2001;  Van  der  Meer-Kooistra  &  Vosselman,  2000; 
Vosselman, 2002). Despite its contributions, there are concerns that the rationality 
assumptions emphasised by NIE are inappropriate. Major business collapses were  
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claimed to be associated with the managers’ rationality and opportunism behaviours, 
concepts  which  are  imbedded  in  NIE’s  framework  (Scapens,  2006).  This  partly 
explains the paucity of NIE informed studies in the accounting literature.  
 
Opposition to the economic assumptions such as market equilibrium, rationality, and 
opportunism embedded in NIE has contributed to the emergence of old institutional 
economics (OIE) theory (Moll et al., 2006; Scapens, 2006). Instead of regarding the 
economic  assumptions  as  taken  for  granted,  OIE  explains  the  rationale  behind 
people’s behaviour surrounding the assumptions (Scapens, 2006). It focuses on an 
intra-organisational stance that explains the processes of change and resistance, as 
well  as  the  decoupling  of  the  formal  arrangements  and  the  actual  organisational 
practices (Moll et al., 2006; Ribeiro & Scapens, 2006). As noted by Scapens (2006), 
OIE is providing more of an intra-organisational aspect of institutions. Therefore, 
“OIE theory would generally consider why/how particular behaviours or structures 
emerge, sustain and/or change over time than merely what structures exists at any 
given point in time” (Moll et al., 2006, p. 184). A number of accounting studies have 
used  this  theoretical  framework  to  investigate  accounting  changes  in  actual 
organisational  settings  (Burns,  2000;  Burns  &  Baldvinsdottir,  2005;  Burns  & 
Scapens, 2000; Collier, 2001; Guerreiro, Pereira, & Frezatti, 2006; Perren & Grant, 
2000; Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005). 
 
Notwithstanding its usefulness, OIE has been criticised for being unable to provide a 
thorough account of the reasons for change which normally occur in an organisation 
(Ribeiro  &  Scapens,  2006).  This  is  associated  with  its  intra-organisational  focus, 
which sometimes fails to provide thorough insights into the macro factors associated 
with the changes. Realizing this limitation, some accounting studies, such as Siti-
Nabiha and Scapens (2005) and Ribeiro and Scapens (2006), combined OIE and NIS 
in order to provide a complete explanation of the accounting changes. This approach 
acknowledges,  among  other  things,  that  accounting  is  influencing,  and  being 
influenced  by,  both  internal  and  external  factors  surrounding  the  organisational 
operations (Moll et al., 2006; Scapens, 2006). This fact permeates the use of the New 
Institutional Sociology (NIS) and its extension. 
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New Institutional Sociology (NIS) provides explanations pertaining to the adoption 
of  specific  structures  and  procedures  in  organisations  that  operate  within 
institutionalized environments (Ribeiro & Scapens, 2006). The theory suggests that 
institutionalized  organisations  adopt  external  structures  and  procedures  to  appear 
legitimate  to  their  broader  constituencies  in  order  to  ensure  the  attainment  of 
resources  for  survival  (DiMaggio  &  Powell,  1983;  Meyer  &  Rowan,  1977). 
Generally, NIS is concerned with the interactions between organisational operations 
and wider social environments (Ribeiro & Scapens, 2006). The NIS framework has 
been  implicitly  and  explicitly  adopted  to  study  the  practice  of  accounting  in 
organisational  settings  (Abernethy  &  Chua,  1996;  Alam,  1997;  Ansari  &  Euske, 
1987; Carpenter & Feroz, 1992, 2001; Collier, 2001; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988a; 
Covaleski,  Dirsmith,  &  Michelman,  1993;  Hopper  &  Major,  2007;  Laine,  2009; 
Modell, 2001, 2003; Moll & Hoque, 2011; Rautiainen, 2010). In line with this body 
of  literature,  the  following  section  integrates  the  emergent  theory  into  the  NIS 
theoretical framework.  
8.4  NIS and the Emergent Theoretical Framework 
This research revealed high influence of the institutional pressure on the operations of 
the Councils. As public organisations, the Councils were subjected to formal and 
informal directives from a variety of stakeholders, and the main accounting functions 
such as budgeting, auditing, financial reporting, and performance measurement, were 
used to respond to these pressures. Therefore, it became evident that NIS, with its 
emphasis  on  analysing  the  institutional  environment  in  which  an  organisation 
operates (Rahaman et al., 2004), could explain how the accounting practices were 
used  to  legitimize  the  Councils’  operations  to  the  key  stakeholders  such  as  the 
Government  and  donors.  NIS  is  also  able  to  explain  how  institutionalized 
organisations tend to conform to the institutional pressures ceremonially in order to 
accrue  resources  (DiMaggio  & Powell, 1983;  Meyer  &  Rowan, 1977; Ribeiro  & 
Scapens, 2006). It is also more appropriate when analysing organisations that require 
both  political  and  institutional  legitimacy  (Tsamenyi  et  al.,  2006),  as  well  as 
analysing organisations which are subject to the interactions between organisational 
operations  and  the  wider  social  environment  (Hussain  &  Hoque,  2002).  These 
instances  equally  existed  in  the  Councils,  and  therefore,  NIS  was  considered  an 
appropriate theoretical framework for interpretation of the research findings. It is also  
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worth noting that this research was not intended to test NIS but, rather, to adopt it as a 
theoretical lens that would assist the interpretation of the research findings. Drawing 
upon  the  NIS  perspective,  this  research  suggests  that  the  phenomenon  of 
manipulating  legitimacy  originated  from  the  interplay  between  the  institutional 
pressures  from  the  Government  and  donors  and  the  responses  of  the  Councils’ 
officials. The discussion of the responses of the Councils’ officials is preceded by an 
analysis of the institutional pressures imposed on the Councils. 
8.4.1 Institutional Influences on the LGAs’ Accounting Practices 
DiMaggio  and  Powell  (1983)  identified  three  forces  which  normally  face 
institutionalized organisations. These are coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive 
pressure represents formal and informal pressure which an organisation faces from 
society in general or other institutions. Mimetic pressure signifies an attempt by an 
organisation to copy, or assimilates its activities, with other organisations which are 
considered to be a role model. On the other hand, normative pressure denotes the 
influence  of  trade  associations  and  professional  bodies  on  the  organisational 
operations.  The  Councils  demonstrated  high  levels  of  coercive  pressure  from  the 
Government  and  donors.  Because  the  Councils  lacked  autonomy,  there  was  no 
evidence to suggest that they themselves imitated the best practices and incorporated 
the same into their operations. Also, the influence of the professional bodies and trade 
unions on the operations of the Councils was insignificant. Therefore, the following 
three subsections examine the influence of the coercive pressures imposed on the 
financial  reporting,  budgeting,  and  the  performance  measurement  practices  of  the 
Councils. 
8.4.1.1 Coercive Pressures on the Financial Reporting Practices 
The influence of the Government and donors on the Councils’ financial reporting 
practices  was  primarily  manifested  in  two  aspects:  the  introduction  of  the 
IFMS/EPICOR and the adoption of the financial reporting frameworks. In the case of 
IFMS/EPICOR,  the  Government,  in  collaboration  with  donors,  pioneered  its 
introduction to the LGAs as a mechanism to address financial mismanagement and to 
enhance the comparability of the reporting mechanisms across the LGAs. The latter 
reason,  as  Meyer  and  Rowan  (1977)  argued,  was  an  attempt  to  make  the 
organisations homogeneous. The use of NIS to explain the adoption of the accounting 
system in this study is congruent with other accounting studies (see Collier, 2001;  
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Hussain  &  Hoque,  2002;  Kholeif,  Abdel-Kader,  &  Sherer,  2007;  Quattrone  & 
Hopper, 2005; Tsamenyi et al., 2006). For example, Tsamenyi et al. (2006) adopted 
NIS framework to analyze how the institutional environment interacted with market 
forces and intra-organisational power relations to influence changes in the accounting 
and financial information system in a Spanish electricity company. Also, Hussain and 
Hoque  (2002)  adopted  NIS  to  show  the  impact  of  institutional  forces  (economic 
factors,  competition,  regulations,  management  commitment,  organisational  profile, 
etc) on management accounting systems.  
 
In a similar vein, this research shows the influence of the Government and donors on 
the  adoption  and  implementation  of  the  LGAs’  accounting  systems  (i.e. 
IFMS/EPICOR). The system was coercively imposed on the LGAs, and in order to 
ensure its implementation, it was included as one of the performance indicators for 
grants  purposes. The  actual operation of the system  by  the  LGAs was phased in 
between  1999  and  2002  in  a  few  LGAs  under  IFMS-Platinum,  and  later,  was 
renamed the EPICOR system. In the studied Councils, the system had been adopted 
by the KAMC and the MDMC in 2003 and 2007 respectively, while the KBDC and 
the  MCDC  had  not  yet  adopted  it.  DiMaggio  and  Powell  (1983)  observed  that 
subsidiaries normally adopt accounting systems that are compatible with the parent 
company.  This  was  the  case  in  the  LGAs  in  that  they  adopted  the  same 
IFMS/EPICOR  implemented  by  the  Central  Government.  However,  the  effective 
implementation  of  the  system  in  the  Councils  was  surrounded  by  a  number  of 
problems, namely, the unreliability of power supply and poor coordination between 
the Government, the Councils, and the vendor. Also, the vendor restricted some of 
the functions and needed to be contacted in the case of system faults. There were also 
claims that some LGAs’ officials resisted the effective implementation of the system 
because it limited the personal allowances. Notwithstanding the fact that the system 
had limited application, these problems, together with the self-interested behaviour of 
some of the Councils’ officials, had also contributed to the under-utilisation of the 
systems. As a result, by June 2008, there were only 82 LGAs out of 133
36 which were 
using the system at various levels (PMO-RALG, 2008). This trend was not associated 
                                                 
36 On 1
st July 2010, the Government established Masasi Town Council (Government Notice 
No. 393 of 15
th October, 2010). This makes the total number of LGAs to be 134.  
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with  the  inability  of  the  accounting  systems  to  conform  with  institutional 
requirements  (see  Kholeif  et  al.,  2007),  but,  rather,  was  mainly  due  to  the 
unsupportive  environment  for  the  operation  of  the  systems  which  existed  in  the 
Councils. 
 
The financial reporting framework of the Councils had also been subjected to the 
external influences of the Government and donors. The Councils’ financial reporting 
framework started as the cash basis under TSSAPs, and then changed to the accrual 
basis on 1
st July, 2004, following the country’s wholesale adoption of the IFRSs. 
With effect from the FY 2008/09, the framework was again changed to IPSAS. The 
influence  of  the  regulatory  bodies  and  funding  agencies  on  the  adoption  of  the 
financial  reporting  frameworks  has  also  been  discussed  in  the  extant  literature 
(Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2009; Pilcher, 2011; Pilcher & Dean, 2009a). For example, 
drawing upon institutional theory, Pilcher (2011) observed that the adoption of IFRSs 
by  the  Australian  local  governments  was  primarily  conformance  to  the  coercive 
pressure  from  the  legislative  bodies.  He  further  argued  that  the  adoption  of  the 
framework was  costly, time consuming, and had little  value internally. Similarly, 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001) observed that the institutional pressures exerted on the 
four American states (New York, Michigan, Ohio, and Delaware) influenced their 
decisions to adopt GAAP. They concluded that organisational resistance is highly 
unsuccessful when strong coercive and normative pressures exist. These observations 
closely resembled the findings of the emergent theory, whereby the adoption of the 
IFRSs and IPSAS was, in the main, a response to the coercive pressure from the 
Government  and  donors.  Because  the  Councils  were  financially-dependent  public 
organisations, they were unable to resist their implementation completely. As a result, 
compliance  games  were  played  to  ensure  a  superficial  compliance  with  the 
frameworks,  for  grants  purposes.  It  is  also  important  to  note  that  although  the 
adoption  of  the  IFRS  and  the  IPSAS  represented  an  imitation  of  best  practices 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), it was entirely driven by coercive pressures from the 
Government  and  donors,  as  opposed  to  resulting  from  attempts  by  the  Councils 
themselves to imitate the financial frameworks.  
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8.4.1.2  Coercive Pressures on the Budgetary Practices 
The  budgetary  practices  has  been  extensively  discussed  in  the  extant  literature 
(Ahmed & Scapens, 2000; Alam, 1997; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988a; Malmi, 1999; 
Moll & Hoque, 2011; Parker, 2001; Pettersen, 1995; Soin, Seal, & Cullen, 2002). 
What emerged from the extant literature was the influence of the external pressures 
on the budgetary practices of public sector organisations. For example,  Moll and 
Hoque (2011) showed that the external pressure imposed on an Australian University 
led to  the introduction  of  a new budget  system  which  created uncertainties, as  a 
result, it was undermined by the staff through ‘under-and over-spending’ practices. A 
related  trend  was  observed  in  the  studied  Councils.  The  Councils’  budgets  were 
subjected to formal and informal pressures from the Government, donors, and the 
politicians. The formal pressures from the Government and donors were imbedded in 
the  budget  guidelines,  which  contained  conditions  such  as  participatory  planning 
which  was  difficult  to  implement.  In  order  to  ensure  compliance,  the  Councils’ 
officials applied a superficial involvement of the Wards and Villages into the budget 
process. Also, as observed by Rahaman et al. (2004) in Ghana, some of the Councils’ 
donors required additional budgeting arrangements which perceived by the Councils’ 
officials as costly and time consuming. There were also informal directives from the 
Councillors and the Members of Parliament to divert the financial resources to their 
respective constituencies. Furthermore, the budget scrutinization team at the Treasury 
imposed pressure on the LGAs to adhere to the budget timeframe (see Appendix 2), 
something which forced the Councils’ officials to be more concerned with deadlines 
than  the  reliability  of  the  budgeted  information  (see  Alam,  1997;  Covaleski  & 
Dirsmith, 1988a). A combination of these influences and self-interested behaviour of 
the  Councils’  officials  suggests  that  the  Councils’  budget  was  surrounded  by  the 
external and internal uncertainties, which threatened its credibility (Moll & Hoque, 
2011). Because Councils’ officials, like other organisational actors, are not ‘passive 
adopters’  of  the  institutional  pressures  (Modell,  2001;  Oliver,  1991),  different 
strategies were employed to counteract the operational difficulties. These included 
the maintenance of two budget documents, conducting a pre-budget meeting with the 
prominent Councillors, and informal exchanges with the politicians, RAS, and the 
members of the budget scrutinization team at the Treasury. Because the actual time 
between  the  Full  Council  and  the  Treasury’s  budget  scrutiny  was  short,  the  two  
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budget  documents  ensured  that  the  changes  proposed  by  the  Councillors  did  not 
affect the budget that was to be submitted to the Treasury. The pre-budget meetings 
and informal exchanges were used to minimize the impact of the supervisory bodies 
on the budgets. 
8.4.1.3  Coercive Pressures on the Performance Measurement Practices 
External  pressures  have  exerted  great  influence  on  the  performance  measurement 
practices  of  public  sector  organisations  (Ballantine,  Brignall,  &  Modell,  1998; 
Brignall  &  Modell,  2000;  Hoque,  2008;  Modell,  2001,  2003,  2009;  Rautiainen, 
2010). The pressures have normally been exerted throughout the design, adoption, 
use,  and  evaluation  of  the  performance  systems  (Heinrich  &  Marschke,  2008; 
Hernandez, 2002; Hoque, 2008; Johnsen, 1999; Midwinter, 1994). In general, the 
previous research has shown the influence of regulatory bodies and funding agencies 
on performance measurement of the public sector organisations. A similar trend was 
observed in  this  research  whereby the Government,  in  collaboration  with  donors, 
introduced performance measurement systems to the Councils with effect from the 
FY  2004/05.  The  system  was  imposed  as  a  mechanism  for  allocating  the 
discretionary grants. Although it was one of the initiatives to imitate the performance 
measurement  practices  applied  in  other  public  sector  entities  in  the  developed 
countries  (see  Ball  et  al.,  2000;  Ballantine  et  al.,  1998;  Bowerman  et  al.,  2001; 
Modell,  2001,  2009),  its  application  in  the  Councils  was  entirely  driven  by  the 
coercive pressure from the Government and donors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
 
As with other initiatives, the system was imposed on the Councils without sufficient 
coordination with other structures, thus creating operational uncertainties. This forced 
the Councils’ officials to maintain the system in a loosely coupled state in order not 
to disturb the normal operations, while at the same time falsifying its appropriateness 
to the stakeholders. This mirrored closely with the observation by Robinson (2003) 
that performance measurement in public sector is  primarily for external legitimacy. 
Also, because funds attached to the system were substantial, the Councils’ officials 
were involved in practices such as opinion shopping and under-estimation of their 
own sources in order to ensure the attainment of the performance assessment criteria. 
This provides proof of the assertion made by Heinrich and Marschke (2008) that 
performance games could be played by the public sector entities which made the  
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performance measurement exercise worthless. However, despite the exercise being 
surrounded  by  a  number  of  problems  which  questioned  its  credibility,  the 
Councillors, the members of the Parliamentary Committee, and the officials from the 
PMO-RALG,  believed  that  the  exercise  was  necessary  in  order  to  improve  the 
Councils’  operations,  a  claim  which  was  not  found  to  be  the  case  in  reality  (cf. 
Hernandez,  2002).  This  supports  Meyer  and  Rowan’s  (1977)  notion  of  the 
organisational  ‘myth’.  Meyer  and  Rowan  (1977)  argued  that  institutionalized 
organisations  normally  adopt  products,  policies,  techniques,  and  programs 
ceremonially. Rather than being driven by the technical demands, these elements are 
adopted to persuade external stakeholders of the organisational appropriateness. As 
illustrated  by  the  visited  Councils,  the  performance  measurement  practices  were 
adopted primarily to  enhance the legitimacy of the Councils  for the donors,  and, 
therefore, it was indeed a ‘powerful myth’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 340).  
8.4.2 Actors’ Responses on the Institutional Pressures 
In contrast to the early NIS orientation, which suggested that the organisational actors 
are unreceptive (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), the emergent 
theory found that the technocrats responded to the institutional pressures strategically 
by creating a web of actions and reactions which influenced the Councils’ operations 
(Oliver, 1991). Therefore, this research acknowledges the influences of the actors’ 
responses  (micro  explanations)  on  shaping  the  institutional  processes  which  took 
place  within  the  organisations  (Modell,  2003;  Oliver,  1991;  Scott,  1995).  The 
responses of the Councils’ officials, which broadly were manipulation techniques, 
were  attempts  to  influence  the  external  criteria  of  evaluations  subjected  on  the 
Councils (Oliver, 1991). The responses of the Councils’ officials on the institutional 
pressures  are  classified  under  three  sub-headings,  namely,  legitimization  games, 
decoupling of formal structures and actual practices, and managing the organisational 
performance. Each of these is discussed below. 
8.4.2.1  Legitimization Games 
Legitimization  games  or  techniques  involve  the  practices  which  aim  to  persuade 
institutions to accept an organisation as it is, or to change the values and norms of the 
society  to  be  in  line  with  the  existing  organisational  values  (Preston,  Cooper, 
Scarbrough, & Chilton, 1995). Viewed from the institutional theory perspective, the 
overall purpose of legitimization techniques is to enhance legitimacy and maintain  
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organisational stability (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Granlund, 2001; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Pettersen, 2001; Preston et al., 1995; Suchman, 1995). Legitimization games or 
techniques  have  been  briefly  discussed  in  the  extant  literature  (Granlund,  2001; 
Kornberger, Justesen, & Mouritsen, 2011; Lukka, 2007). For example, Kornberger et 
al.  (2011)  observed  that  the  managers  of  a  Big  4  Accounting  Firm  used  gaming 
tactics such as ‘visibility’, ‘networking’, ‘exposure’, and ‘selling oneself’ to become 
partners. As a result, the promotion criteria were based on the ‘PR game’ (p. 528), 
and those who were not successful in those games were overlooked. Also, in the case 
study by Granlund (2001), delaying games were played by one influential person to 
block the implementation of a project. He purposely and intentionally delayed the 
implementation of the project until the deadline passed, which led to the project being 
terminated by the top management.  
 
In a somewhat different context, the legitimization games/techniques practiced by the 
Councils’  officials  aimed  to  maintain  the  operations  of  the  Councils  given  the 
uncertainties of the funding sources. For example, the ceremonial participation of the 
lower levels in the budgeting process was intended to convince the Government and 
donors that the Councils’ budget was participatory in nature, a practice which ensured 
Councils with availability of financial resources. This practice is closely resembled 
the nature of the participatory budget observed in Uganda where the main actors 
merely created an impression of participation by the lower levels (Uddin et al., 2011). 
Also, regarding auditing, the current study observed that the quarterly internal audit 
reports contained a declaration of having undertaken the performance audit, although 
it had not actually been undertaken. Similarly, despite having compliance challenges, 
the financial statements of all Councils were claimed to be fully IPSAS compliant. In 
general, these legitimization techniques find support in the Oliver (1991) argument 
that, in an attempt to respond to institutional pressures, organisations may become 
involved  in  a  number  of  manipulation  techniques  to  influence  their  approval  by 
society.  The  following  section  discusses  the  decoupling  of  formal  structures  and 
informal routines. 
8.4.2.2  Decoupling of Formal Structures and Actual Practices 
Meyer  and  Rowan  (1977)  maintained  that  for  survival  purposes,  institutionalized 
organisations tend to adopt structures and procedures from the external environment  
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in  order  to  confer  legitimacy  and  obtain  resources.  They  further  argued  that  the 
adopted  structures  normally  create  operational  uncertainties  which  may  threaten 
organisational  legitimacy.  Therefore,  in  order  to  portray  a  favourable  image, 
organisations  tend  to  cushion  their  formal  structures  from  the  operational 
uncertainties by ‘loosely coupling’
37 them with the actual day to day activities. This, 
among other things, demonstrates ‘loose coupling’ as a ‘taken for granted’ feature of 
institutionalized organisations, a position which has been refuted empirically by a 
number  of  researchers  (Brignall  &  Modell,  2000;  Modell,  2003;  Moll  &  Hoque, 
2011; Nor-Aziah & Scapens, 2007). For example, Brignall and Modell (2000) and 
Oliver (1991) treated loose coupling as an intra-organisational form of resistance. 
Also, Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) regarded ‘loose coupling’ as both, a process and 
an outcome.  As a process,  ‘loose coupling’ demonstrates the manner in which it 
interacts  with  organisational  resistance,  power,  and  trust  to  shape  accounting 
practices, and, as an outcome, ‘loose coupling’ explains the extent of the conflicting 
nature of the institutional pressures imposed on an organisation. Also Modell (2003) 
demonstrated  the  two  edges  of  ‘loose  coupling’-  resistance  and  passivity  of  the 
regulatory bodies. 
 
This  study  contributes  and  extends  the  contemporary  understanding  of  the  ‘loose 
coupling’ phenomenon. The ‘loose coupling’ found in this study originated from four 
main sources, namely, informal resistance of the Councils’ officials, the laxity of the 
regulatory  bodies,  existence  of  the  conflicting  pressures,  and  the  absence  of  a 
supporting environment  for the adopted structures. The informal resistance of the 
Councils’ officials was observed in the KAMC and MDMC where IFMS/EPICOR 
was in operation but the Councils’ officials were intentionally shielding its day to day 
usage, and the manual system was used in parallel with the IFMS/EPICOR. A few 
‘sensitive’  transactions  were  posted  on  the  IFMS/EPICOR  systems  to  minimize 
pressure  from  the  CAG  and  the  Regional  Financial  Management  Specialists 
                                                 
37The  literature  offers  different  but  closely  related  interpretation  of  the  words  ‘loose 
coupling’  and  ‘decoupling’.  Loose  coupling  is  when  the  external    and  internal 
structures/procedures are different but are closely interdependent while decoupling is when 
the internal and external structures/procedures are distinct and separate (Basu et al., 1999; 
Fogarty & Rogers, 2005). In this study, the two words are used interchangeably to indicate 
the differences between the adopted formal structures /procedures and day to day activities of 
the organisations.  
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(RFMSs). Apart from the informal resistance of the Councils’ officials, maintenance 
of the IFMS/EPICOR in a loosely coupled state was also marginally contributed to by 
the laxity of the regulatory bodies. This was attributed to the fact that there was no 
effective monitoring of the system from the regulatory bodies. The only time when 
the system came under scrutiny was at the financial year end, and this was carried out 
by the CAG and the RFMSs. Also, there was neither a system audit nor a surprise 
check.   
 
Furthermore, the conflicting and political instructions from the Councillors, Members 
of the Parliament, and the Higher Government  officials on the Councils’ budgets 
necessitated the decoupling practice. As discussed somewhere in this thesis, these 
politicians  imposed  a  number  of  political  directives  to  the  Councils  which  had 
affected  formal  budgetary  arrangements  and  had  forced  the  use  of  informal 
arrangements. This supports the findings of Rautiainen (2010) which showed that the 
decoupling of formal rules is likely to occur if there are conflicting pressures. Also, 
as How and Alawattage (2012) established, when accounting is involved in political 
‘imperfections’,  decoupling  is  to  be  expected.  As  they  demonstrated,  this  can  be 
attributed to the fact that formal accounting arrangements find it harder to cope with 
political ‘imperfections’. This mirrored the emergent theory, where the decoupling of 
the formal budgeting arrangements helped the Councils to deal with the non-budgeted 
expenditures,  which  were  requested  by  the  politicians  and  Higher  Government 
officials as a norm. 
 
Similarly,  formal  structures  of  the  performance  measurement  practices  were  not 
effectively  integrated  into  the  daily  operations  of  the  Councils.  The  performance 
assessment was merely checklists of the Minimum Conditions and the Performance 
Measures which evaluated the operations of the Councils on an annual basis without 
detailed  descriptions  of  how  to  integrate  the  performance  criteria  into  the  daily 
operations.  As  a  result,  as  Rautiainen  (2010)  noted,    when  there  are  conflicting 
interests,  performance  measurement  “becomes  more  complicated  and  decoupled, 
because it is not clear what is wanted, and consequently, what should be done or 
measured” (p. 386). This, as noted in the visited Councils, forced the technocrats to 
ignore the performance criteria in the daily operations, and only referred to them at  
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financial  year  end,  when  mock  assessments  would  be  carried  out  to  ensure  the 
appropriate scores for grants purposes. Thus, the maintenance of the performance 
measurement practices in a loosely coupled state observed in this research closely 
resembles the observation of Modell (2003) in which the passivity of the centrally 
located actors contributed to the ‘loose coupling’ of performance measurement in the 
Swedish University Sector. In the case of the Tanzanian Councils, for example, since 
its inception in the FY 2004/05, the performance measurement systems were neither 
sufficiently incorporated into the Councils’ laws and regulations, nor fully integrated 
into their governance structures. The performance assessment was carried out by an 
independent  external  consultant  without  any  clear  coordination  with  the  other 
regulatory bodies. As one respondent commented, “the Government would be happy 
if  more  Council  would  access  these  donor-funded  projects  attached  to  the 
performance  measurement  system”.  This  possibly  explains  the  passivity  of  the 
regulatory bodies. 
 
Therefore, the findings of this research support the general descriptions offered in the 
institutional theory regarding the nature of ‘loose coupling’ as a form of resistance 
(Brignall & Modell, 2000; Nor-Aziah & Scapens, 2007; Oliver, 1991), a product of 
regulatory passivity (Modell, 2003), and a consequence of the conflicting interests 
(How & Alawattage, 2012; Rautiainen, 2010). In addition, this study suggests that the 
supporting environment constituted a potential source for ‘loose coupling’. As was 
observed in the IFMS/EPICOR, the absence of a supporting environment necessitated 
the decoupling of the formal procedures from the daily routines. Problems such as 
unreliability of power supply, lack of the maintenance expertise, vendor’s autonomy, 
and limited functions embedded in the system, created operational difficulties, which 
forced  the  Councils’  officials  to  use  the  parallel  systems  (manual  and 
IFMS/EPICOR). Therefore, as Moll and Hoque (2011) argued, the ‘loose coupling’ 
observed in this study was not only caused by the responses of the Councils’ officials 
to  the  pressures  from  the  Government  and  donors,  but  also  by  the  interactions 
between the internal and external factors. Also, the emergent theory evidenced the 
peculiar role of the self-interested behaviour in facilitating the decoupling process. 
The  deficient  regulatory  systems  existed  in  the  Councils  allowed  technocrats  to 
benefit  illegally  by  purposively  and  pro-actively  decoupling  the  formal  structures  
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from the actual day to day operations. Managing the organisational performance as 
the third form of reaction is discussed in the following section. 
8.4.2.3  Managing the Organisational Performance 
The extant literature has  extensively discussed  the performance measurement and 
management (PMM) practices in public sector organisations (see Modell, 2009). This 
is  partly  attributed  to  their  unique  role  in  the  implementation  and  subsequent 
evaluation of the various initiatives which have been carried out in the public sector 
(Ball  et  al.,  2000;  Bowerman  et  al.,  2001;  Modell,  2009).  Despite  the  fact  that 
research  into  performance  measurement  and  management  has  been  informed  by 
different theoretical orientations, NIS has received relatively higher representation 
than  the  others  (Brignall  &  Modell,  2000;  Lawton,  McKevitt,  &  Millar,  2000; 
Modell, 2001; Modell & Wiesel, 2008). As Modell (2009) argued, “the institutional 
significance of PMM comes to the fore as public sector organisations often depend on 
the  provision  of  performance  information  to  a  broad  range  of  constituencies  to 
maintain their legitimacy, whilst being subject to regulatory and other institutional 
pressures to adopt various PMM practices” (pp. 277-278). In line with this argument, 
this  research  discusses  the  performance  management  techniques  within  the  NIS 
theoretical framework. 
 
The studies of performance management in the public sector have revealed a number 
of  strategies  used  by  officials  to  manage  their  organisational  performance.  These 
have  included  initiatives  such  as  relative  performance,  performance  auditing, 
balanced  score  cards,  management  by  objective,  benchmarking,  Total  Quality 
Management (TQM), and managing for results (Bowerman et al., 2001; Johnsen et 
al.,  2001;  Modell,  2009;  Siverbo  &  Johansson,  2006).  In  addition  to  these,  the 
literature also records the attempts of the actors to utilize the complexities involved in 
the performance management for their own organisational interests (Modell, 2004, 
2005). For example, in the case study by Modell (2005), the actors opposed change in 
the audit practice by constructing PMM ambiguities in order to block the quality 
audit practices. In a somewhat different context, the current study noted the attempts 
of  the  Councils’  officials  to  manage  the  organisational  performance  through 
strategies  such  as  aggressive  fund  management  and  lobbying.  Aggressive  fund 
management  comprised  techniques  such  as  managing  the  procurement  process,  
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practicing  teeming  and  lading,  and  an  under-banking  strategy.  The  first  two 
techniques  were  used  to  counteract  the  late  disbursement  of  funds  from  the 
Government and donors, whilst the under-banking strategy, which closely resembled 
‘shielding’ behaviour (Lightbody, 2000), was employed to counteract the Councils’ 
financial bureaucratic system. Lobbying, which involved techniques such as blaming 
was also employed to rationalize and defend the performance of the Councils to the 
regulatory  bodies.  The  application  of  these  ‘harsh’  performance  management 
techniques supports the claims that the actors in public sector organisations “may 
pro-actively  and  skilfully  utilize  the  ambiguity  associated  with  PMM  to  advance 
various  interests  in  reciprocal  interplay  with  institutionalized  structures”  (Modell, 
2009, p. 285). Thus, as opposed to demonstrating formal performance management 
practices, the case organisations used simple manipulation techniques to defend the 
Councils’  performance.  The  presence  of  regulatory  laxity  regarding  performance 
management and self-interested behaviour of the Councils’ officials  enhanced the 
application of these strategies.  The implications  of the reactions  of the Councils’ 
officials are discussed in the following section. 
8.4.3 Implications of the Actors’ Responses-Resistances and Laxity 
The  responses  of  the  Councils’  officials  as  revealed  in  this  research  refute  the 
position of the early NIS theorists who assumed that the organisational actors are 
passive adopters of the institutional pressures. Thus, this research recognizes the role 
of  the  Councils’  officials  in  the  institutionalization  process,  which  consequently 
shaped  the  operations  of  the  Councils  in  general,  and  accounting  practices  in 
particular.  In  a  broader  sense,  the  reactions  of  the  Councils’  officials  to  the 
institutional pressures had two implications: informal resistance and regulatory laxity. 
The Councils’ officials adopted informal resistance against the accounting changes in 
all  the  main  functions,  namely,  budgeting,  financial  reporting,  auditing,  and 
performance measurement. This was illustrated by the compliance games played in 
these areas. Also, as argued previously, the maintenance of the IFMS/EPICOR in a 
loosely coupled state was partly attributed to the informal resistance of the Councils’ 
officials.  The  issue  of  resistance  to  accounting  changes  has  been  extensively 
discussed in the literature (Broadbent  et al., 2001; Granlund, 2001;  Lukka, 2007; 
Malmi, 1997). For example, Broadbent et al. (2001) revealed the techniques used by 
the  GPs  to  resist  the  accounting  changes  and  fundholding,  introduced  into  their  
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practices.  Some  GPs  created  separate  organisations  to  deal  with  the  fundholding 
mechanisms  and,  when  the  changes  were  institutionalized,  more  aggressive  and 
external commissioning groups were formed to counteract the changes. Also, Malmi 
(1997)  reported  the  way  in  which  a  powerful  factory  managed  to  resist  the 
implementation of the ABC technique. Similarly, the management accountants in the 
case study of Lukka (2007), were able to use informal routines to legitimize their 
organisational performance and prevent changes in the formal rules. 
 
Therefore, the  common  theme from the extant literature is  that  organisations  can 
deter the influence of the institutional pressures imposed upon them. However, the 
successfulness of this  depends  on the amount  of power  which organisations  as  a 
whole possess (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988a, 1988b; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996), 
or  organisational  members  individually  or  collectively  possess  (Broadbent  et  al., 
2001). As hierarchically financially controlled public entities, the Councils lacked 
sufficient power, and, therefore, demonstrated internal and private forms of resistance 
(Broadbent et al., 2001), whereby the accounting changes were accepted at face value 
but  they  were  ‘sabotaged’  in  their  effective  application  through  the  decoupling 
process, legitimization games, and by exercising ‘harsh’ performance management 
techniques.  The  informal  resistance  was  mainly  driven  by  the  operational 
uncertainties created by the adopted structures and the self-interested behaviour of the 
Councils’ officials. 
 
It is worth noting that the responses of the Councils’ officials were also facilitated by 
the laxity of the regulatory bodies. As discussed in detail in Chapters 5 to 7, the 
Councils  operated  under  deficient  regulatory  systems.  Therefore,  the  adopted 
structures and procedures, which were claimed to be donor driven, were acquired 
merely  for  grants  purposes.  For  example,  higher  regulatory  organs  failed  to 
effectively integrate the performance measurement practices into the Councils’ laws 
and regulations, and, as a result, they were decoupled from the daily operations. In 
this situation, the responses of the technocrats were regarded as being necessary to 
maintain the Councils’ operations, rather than the form of resistance. Related to this 
was the assertion that higher regulatory bodies were ‘sympathetic’ to the Councils in 
order to allow them to access funds attached to donor-funded projects which were  
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performance  based.  The  following  section  discusses  the  concept  of  legitimacy-
seeking and efficiency-enhancing within the NIS theoretical framework. 
8.4.4 Organisational Legitimacy and Efficiency 
The issue of whether legitimacy and efficiency can be achieved simultaneously has 
been widely debated in the extant literature (Modell, 2001; Ribeiro & Scapens, 2006; 
Scapens, 2006). Early NIS theorists maintained that institutionalized organisations 
normally adopt structures and procedures to enhance their legitimacy without taking 
into consideration the technical environment. As a result, the adopted structures and 
procedures are ‘myth’ and may sometimes contradict the organisational efficiency 
criteria (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983a, 
1983b; Scott, 1987). A number of researchers have implicitly and explicitly drawn 
upon  this  insight  to  study  accounting  practices  in  institutionalized  organisations 
(Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Ansari & Euske, 1987; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988a; 
Covaleski et al., 1993; Hoque & Hopper, 1994; Laine, 2009; Touron, 2005; Tuttle & 
Dillard, 2007). For  example, Tuttle and Dillard (2007) noted that the exclusion of 
non-financial accounting topics in accounting research was a response to institutional 
pressure, rather than the outcome of competitive forces. Also, Laine (2009) observed 
that corporate environmental disclosures were simply used by a  Finnish chemical 
company to respond to institutional pressures in order to maintain its legitimacy in 
society. 
 
However,  the  dichotomy  between  legitimacy  and  efficiency  has  been  heavily 
discussed and even criticized by the current institutional theorists (see Basu et al., 
1999;  Carruthers,  1995;  Collier,  2001;  Greenwood  &  Hinings,  1996;  Hopper  & 
Major,  2007;  Modell,  2001,  2002;  Okike  &  Adegbite,  2012;  Ribeiro  &  Scapens, 
2006; Scapens, 2006). In general, these studies have established that institutionalized 
organisations  can  achieve  both  external  legitimacy  and  technical  efficiency.  For 
example, the works of Hopper and Major (2007) regarding the adoption of ABC by 
the Portuguese Telecommunication Company, Collier (2001) on the introduction of 
local financial management in the UK police force, and Basu et al. (1999) on the 
impact  of  legitimacy  and  organisational  choice  in  the  US,  demonstrate  that 
organisational legitimacy and technical efficiency can be achieved simultaneously. 
Also, Järvinen (2006) found that the institutional pressures and an efficiency criterion  
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were the driving forces behind the adoption of management accounting techniques in 
two  Finish  University  Hospital.  Similarly,  Modell  (2001)  noted  that  the  senior 
managers in the Norwegian health care sector had legitimacy seeking and efficiency 
enhancing  views  regarding  the  adoption  of  the  DRG  based  performance 
measurement. Interestingly, Modell (2001) found that legitimacy and efficiency were 
more closely interlinked than had been suggested by other studies. In a similar vein, 
this research demonstrated that legitimacy and efficiency can be achieved together, 
although, the efficiency was not open-ended. 
 
Because  local  government  organisations  generally  face  financial  constraints 
(Sørensen, 1997), there is no debate about the need to legitimize their operations to 
central  governments  and  other  funding  agencies  (Tambulasi,  2007;  Uddin  et  al., 
2011).  The  Tanzanian  Councils  were  not  exceptional.  They  had  implemented  a 
number of initiatives in order to appear legitimate to the Government and donors, 
which, consequently, increased financial resources. As well as bringing legitimacy, 
some of the adopted initiatives also resulted in organisational efficiency. However, in 
contrast  to  the  extant  literature,  the  efficiency  which  was  noted  in  the  studied 
Councils occurred automatically during the implementation of the adopted initiatives. 
For example, despite the operational challenges facing the effective implementation 
of  the  IFMS/EPICOR,  the  system  significantly  simplified  the  preparation  of  the 
financial statements. Following the implementation of the system, the time taken to 
prepare the financial statements had reduced from three months to less than three 
weeks.  Also,  there  were  acknowledgements  of  the  relevance  of  the  performance 
measurement practices: 
 
“Previously, we had no reliable information regarding how much we disburse to the 
Councils, and the reporting arrangements were very poor. Each Ministry had its own 
way of reporting, and there were neither consolidation, nor integration of the funds 
channeled to the Councils. With the LGCDG systems, we have only one reporting 
framework to all LGAs. We have precise information about funds channeled to the 
Councils  on  sector-wise,  and  under  various  funding  arrangements.  This  system 
[Performance Measurement] proved to be the efficient way of tracking public funds, 
and the Government intends to apply the same system to all public funds disbursed to  
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the  Ministries,  Departments,  and  Agencies”  (Siba, Financial  Expert,  Directorate  of 
Local Government: PMO-RALG). 
 
Similarly, despite the fact that the effective implementation of IPSAS was encircled 
by a number of challenges, the Councils’ officials had started to realize its potential. 
As  the  Internal  Auditor  of  the  KAMC  asserted,  “the  financial  statements  of  the 
Councils  are  now  somewhat  improved  in  terms  of  presentation,  accuracy,  and 
disclosures than in the past”. The Councils’ officials also held the opinion that IPSAS 
had improved the comparability of the Councils’ financial statements, which not only 
ensured  equitable  treatment  amongst  the  Councils,  but  also  facilitated  the 
consolidation of the financial information. Given the nature of the efficiencies noted 
in the studied Councils, it can be claimed that the efficiency criteria were unique, 
time specific, and sometimes difficult to recognize. Therefore, there is a need for 
deeper evaluation of the consequences of adopted structures as opposed to viewing 
them as merely legitimizing devices which have nothing to do with the technical 
demands of the organisations. It is possible that these observations may apply also to 
other  public  sector  entities  which  are  in  the  early  stage  of  the  reform  programs. 
Thorough analysis of the operating conditions could discover whether the adopted 
structures enhanced the organisational legitimacy alone or enhanced legitimacy and 
efficiency as well. 
8.5  Moving from the Substantive to Formal Theory 
This section suggests the move from the substantive to the formal grounded theory. 
This practice ensures the applicability of the emergent theory beyond the Tanzanian 
Councils where this research was carried out. The section specifically assembles the 
discussions  provided  in  the  previous  sections  within  the  paradigm  model  of 
manipulating legitimacy. In order to obtain the general understanding of the formal 
grounded  theory,  its  rationale  and  the  techniques  used  during  its  formulation  are 
firstly  discussed.  A  presentation  of  the  formal  grounded  theory  of  manipulating 
legitimacy concludes the section. 
8.5.1 The Rationale for a Formal Grounded Theory 
The rationale behind the development of formal grounded theory is embedded within 
the  core  categories  obtained  in  the  substantive  theory.  The  elements  of  the  core 
categories  normally  demand  general  implications.  As  Glaser  (2010)  commented,  
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“FGT [Formal Grounded Theory]…is just about the general implications of a core 
category generated from a substantive theory, which is a core variable with ‘grab’ 
and just pressuring to be generalized” (p.103). This suggests that the central category 
and other core categories which emerged from the substantive theory are forced to be 
generalized, so that they may attain broader meanings and explanations beyond the 
substantive area. Therefore, FGT is an important vehicle for generalizing the findings 
of the grounded theory informed study conducted in a certain substantive area. That’s 
why despite differences in the definition of a formal grounded theory and the related 
approaches for its development, there is consensus among the grounded theorists that 
FGT  is  an  important  generalizing  tool  (Corbin  &  Strauss,  2008;  Glaser,  2010; 
Kearney,  2010;  Locke  &  Locke,  2001).  The  definitions  and  approaches  used  to 
develop a formal grounded theory are discussed in the following section. 
8.5.2 The Definitions and Formation of a Formal Grounded Theory 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) were the first researchers to recommend the formation of a 
formal  grounded  theory.  They  contended  that  formal  grounded  theory  has  the 
potential to enhance the general implications of findings obtained in a certain situated 
substantive area. This reasoning was also acknowledged by other researchers (see for 
example, Apprey, 2005; Kearney, 2010; Kearney, Schreiber, & Stern, 2001; Wuest, 
2001). However, despite researchers’ interest on the development of FGT, there is 
confusion about its definition and formation, the main dispute being the position of 
the  central  category  and  its  level  of  abstraction.  For  example,  Locke  and  Locke 
(2001)  and  Alvesson  and  Skoldberg  (2000)  viewed  FGT  as  the  development  of 
higher level core categories obtained in the substantive area. Also, Kearney and her 
colleagues (Kearney, 1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2010; Kearney et al., 2001), regarded FGT 
as a middle range theory emerged from the substantive theory. Similarly, Dey (1999) 
differentiated  the  substantive  from  the  FGT  based  on  the  degree  of  conceptual 
abstraction,  arguing  that  FGT  has  a  high  level  of  conceptual  abstraction  when 
compared to substantive theory. In contrast, Glaser (2010) argued that a higher level 
of abstraction can also be available at the substantive level, and, therefore, should not 
be used as the criterion for FGT. Moreover, Strauss and Corbin (1990) viewed FGT 
as the product of a study conducted in different contexts. In their recent work, Corbin 
and Strauss (2008), defined FGT as elevating the “concept of the study up to a more  
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abstract level where it can have broader applicability but at the same time remain 
grounded in data” (p.102). 
 
The  different  explanations  of  FGT  discussed  above  also  indicate  the  various 
approaches to its formation. For example, Glaser (2010) is of the view that FGT 
needs  to  emerge naturally when the researcher  “continues  his  research  into other 
studies in the same or other substantive areas” (p.111). Strauss, on the other hand, 
recommends  the  development  of  formal  grounded  theory  through  comparing  and 
contrasting data from different research contexts (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Other researchers have recommended the use of a ‘meta-synthesis’ 
technique where the FGT is developed by combining different analytical approaches 
(Eaves, 2001; Finfgeld, 1999; Kearney, 2010).  Although developed within the health 
sciences, meta-synthesis has also been adopted  by accounting studies which have 
executed a formal grounded theory. For example, Goddard applied grounded theory 
and  Bourdieu’s  concept  of  habitus  to  study  the  relationship  between  accounting, 
governance,  and  accountability  in  the  UK’s  local  governments  (Goddard,  2004, 
2005a). Also, Coopey, Keegan, and Emler (1998) used grounded theory approaches 
and structuration theory to understand the management innovation process. Similarly, 
Covaleski et al. (1998) combined ethnographic and grounded theory approaches with 
the work of  Foucault (1983)  to  understand discipline and  identity in  the Big  Six 
public  accounting  firms.  In  a  similar  manner,  the  current  study  has  combined 
grounded  theory  and  New  Institutional  Sociology  (NIS)  to  study  the  accounting 
practices in the Tanzanian Councils. 
8.5.3 Towards a Formal Grounded Theory of Manipulating Legitimacy 
“Since substantive theory is grounded in research in one particular substantive area, 
it might be taken to apply only to that specific area. A theory at such a conceptual 
level, however, may have important general implications and relevance and become 
almost  automatically  a  springboard  or  stepping  stone  to  the  development  of  a 
grounded formal theory” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 79). 
 
As the quote suggests, manipulating legitimacy, as the central phenomenon which 
emerged from this research, was used as the starting point for the development of a 
formal grounded theory. The formal grounded theory of manipulating legitimacy was  
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formed by assembling the discussion provided in section 8.4 within the paradigm 
model recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1998). Again, the paradigm model was 
used  to  relate  the  central  category  and  other  elements  in  the  form  of  conditions, 
interactions, or consequences.  
 
Drawing upon section 8.4.1, the coercive pressures imposed on budgeting, financial 
reporting, and performance measurement, formed the macro conditioning context for 
the  manipulating  legitimacy.  As  was  evidenced  in  the  discussion,  the  pressures 
created  circumstances  which  compelled  the  Councils’  officials  to  manipulate  the 
organisational  legitimacy.  In  addition  to  these  pressures,  there  were  deficient 
regulatory  systems  and  funding  uncertainties,  factors  which  interacted  with  the 
coercive  pressures  to  force  the  Councils’  officials  to  be  manipulative  in  order  to 
maintain the organisational operations. 
 
The  process  of  manipulating  legitimacy  was  illustrated  by  the  responses  of  the 
Councils’ officials to the institutional pressures (section 8.4.2), namely, managing the 
organisational performance, playing of the legitimization games, and loose coupling 
of the budgetary practices. Managing the organisational performance comprised the 
deliberate and ‘harsh’ techniques employed by the Councils’ officials to defend the 
performance  of  the  Councils.  It  included  strategies  such  as  aggressive  fund 
management and lobbying. Legitimization games represented a second strategy used 
by the members to resolve operational uncertainties and maintain the organisational 
stability (Granlund, 2001; Lukka, 2007; Pettersen, 2001; Scapens, 1994). Related to 
this was the purposeful maintenance of the formal budgeting structures in a ‘loose 
coupling’ state, a strategy which was intended to ‘accommodate’ inherent problems 
in  the  Councils’  budgetary  practices  without  disturbing  the  formal  budgeting 
structures  (Ribeiro  &  Scapens,  2006).  The  process  of  manipulating  legitimacy 
demonstrated  the  simultaneous  achievement  of  organisational  legitimacy  and 
technical  efficiency  (section  8.4.4).  Corruption,  which  was  facilitated  by  inherent 
weaknesses in the internal control systems and the self-interested behaviour of the 
Councils’ officials, also emerged as a consequence of the manipulating legitimacy 
phenomenon. Moreover, the laxity of higher regulatory bodies had led performance 
measurement practices to be loosely coupled with the Councils’ daily routines. The  
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proposed model of the formal grounded theory of manipulating legitimacy is shown 
in the following figure. 
 
Figure 17: Formal Grounded Theory of Manipulating Legitimacy 
 
 
The proposed formal grounded theory of manipulating legitimacy suggests that the 
extent of manipulation and the desired outcomes are mediated by the extent of the 
institutional  pressures  imposed  to  the  organisations  and  the  effectiveness  of  the 
internal arrangements. It hypothesizes that when the external pressure is high and the 
organisational internal arrangements are weak, high levels of manipulation are likely 
to occur. It also suggests that the existence of strong and effective regulatory bodies 
may mediate the extent of manipulation by moderating, and possibly sanctioning, the 
self-interested behaviour of individual actors, which normally play a key role in the 
manipulation process. Thus, the formal grounded theory of manipulating legitimacy 
demonstrates  that  accounting  is  affecting,  and  being  affected  by,  the  interplay 
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between the institutional pressures and the actors’ responses (Moll & Hoque, 2011; 
Tsamenyi et al., 2006). 
8.6  Summary 
This chapter has discussed the emergent theory within the extant literature. It first 
integrated  the  central  category  and  other  related  phenomenon  within  the  extant 
literature.  The  differences  and  similarities  of  the  themes  as  emerged  from  this 
research  versus  the  extant  literature  were  established  and  their  implications  were 
integrated  into  the  research  findings.  The  chapter  then  highlighted  the  strands  of 
institutional  theory  which  are  usually  applied  in  the  accounting  discipline,  with 
special  emphasis  being  placed  on  NIS,  which  was  used  to  interpret  the  current 
research findings. It then specifically discussed the emergent theory within the NIS 
theoretical framework, highlighting the coercive pressures imposed on the Councils, 
the  responses  of  the  Councils’  officials,  implications  of  the  responses,  and  the 
assessment of the legitimacy and efficiency dichotomy. Finally, the chapter presented 
the formal grounded theory of manipulating legitimacy, a higher level concept which 
emerged from the integration of the emergent theory and its proponents within the 
NIS framework. The conclusions and recommendations of this research are provided 
in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
9.1  Introduction 
This chapter concludes the research process and draws upon the previous chapters to 
offer conclusions and recommendations of this study. Firstly, the chapter provides a 
summary  of  the  research,  its  methodological  and  theoretical  contributions,  its 
contribution  to  public  sector  accounting  in  the  emerging  economies,  and  specific 
recommendations for the Tanzanian LGAs. Recognising the incomplete nature of the 
research process, the potential limitations of the current research, and measures used 
to address them, are then discussed. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of 
potential areas for further research. 
9.2  Summary of the Research 
This  research  has  investigated  accounting  practices  in  the  Tanzanian  LGAs.  The 
overall  objective  of  the  research  was  to  understand  how  accounting  was  actually 
practiced in organisational settings, especially within the emerging economies which 
generally have received little attention (Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992, 2008; Goddard, 
2010; Rahaman, 2010). Therefore, the research was designed to understand the way 
in  which  accounting  practices  had  been  implemented  and  the  perceptions  of  the 
Councils’ officials and members of higher regulatory organs of this. In a broader 
sense, the research aimed to examine the extent to which the organisational members 
and  the  institutional  arrangement  influence,  and  are  influenced  by,  accounting 
practices. 
 
This  research  was  conducted  in  four  Tanzanian  LGAs  which  consisted  of  two 
Municipal Councils (KAMC and MDMC)  and two District Councils (KBDC and 
MCDC). A purposive sampling was used to select the Councils visited, and within 
the  Councils,  theoretical  sampling  was  employed  to  identify  the  prospective 
interviewees.  The  use  of  two  Councils  in  each  category  enhanced  comparison 
between the Councils, a practice which is an appropriate approach for generating a 
new  theory  (Humphrey  &  Scapens,  1996).  The  fieldwork  was  divided  into  two 
phases, undertaken at different times. The first phase was conducted from July 2010 
to January 2011, whilst the second phase was carried out from August to October 
2011. This arrangement facilitated a clear  understanding of the accounting practices  
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and also allowed the provisional testing of the emerging theory (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008). As an interpretive informed study, interviews were the main source of data. 
Documentary sources and observation of the Councils’ operations were employed to 
render corroborating evidence. 
 
A  grounded  theory  approach  was  used  to  understand  a  complex  phenomenon, 
accounting, as practiced in the organisational settings (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The 
approach  allowed  issues  of  interest  to  emerge  directly  from  the  field  without 
imposing any prior theory. Recognising the different approaches to grounded theory, 
the ‘Straussian’ view was employed throughout the data analysis. Therefore, the data 
was  analysed using  three iterative coding  processes, which were  open,  axial, and 
selective coding, as recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1998). Following careful 
examination of the raw data, 21 open categories  emerged. These  categories  were 
obtained during open coding and described incidences and events regarding the actual 
undertaking of the accounting practices in the Councils. Further abstraction of the 
data in the axial coding stage produced 13 core categories. The determination of the 
central category (phenomenon) was carried out in the selective coding stage, and the 
paradigm model was used to relate all other categories to the central category in the 
form of strategies, conditions, or consequences. 
 
Manipulating  legitimacy  emerged  as  the  central  phenomenon  of  this  research.  It 
represents  attempts  by  the  Councils’  officials  to  overcome  the  operational 
uncertainties  created  by  factors  such  as  donors’  influences,  funding  uncertainties, 
deficient regulatory systems, and political interference. The research also described 
the  techniques  employed  in  the  process  of  manipulating  legitimacy,  namely, 
maintaining the claims of accountability, establishing rhetorical rules and regulations, 
managing own sources, loose coupling of performance measurement and budgeting, 
compliance games, lobbying, and aggressive fund management. These techniques, 
which  fell  under  the  broad  strategies  of  building  the  organisational  image    and 
managing the organisational performance, ensured both the availability of resources 
for the organisational operations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and the attainment of the 
personal interests of the Councils’ officials (Granlund, 2001; Lukka, 2007). They 
were persuasive and defensive mechanisms employed to build legitimacy and accrue  
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more resources. Depending on the application of these strategies, the Councils and 
their  corresponding  service  deliveries  demonstrated  two  manipulating  legitimacy 
profiles:  high  and  low.  Being  located  in  the  urban  areas,  which  could  easily  be 
accessed  by  the  supervisory  bodies,  the  Municipal  Councils  demonstrated  lower 
degrees  of  manipulating  legitimacy  than  the  District  Councils.  This  was  also 
associated with the improvement of the accounting establishment and the presence of 
the  relatively  better-educated  Councillors  in  the  Municipal  Councils.  Also,  the 
absence of a statutory audit and competent staff at the Lower Local Governments 
(LLGs), such as Wards and Villages, contributed to a higher degree of manipulating 
legitimacy. In the studied social services, the higher influence of donors in the Health 
Services  had  reduced  the  magnitude  of  the  manipulation  when  compared  to  the 
Primary Education sector. 
 
The  process  of  manipulating  legitimacy  had  resulted  in  the  subordination  of 
accounting practices, a phenomenon which subscribes to the view that accounting 
was merely used as a legitimating device with little relevance for the internal decision 
making  processes  (Goddard  &  Assad,  2006).  The  subordination  was  evidenced 
through undermining the important accounting functions such as budgeting, auditing, 
financial  reporting,  and  performance  measurement.  Also,  professional  conflict 
between  accountants  and  medical  practitioners,  as  well  as  fraud  and  corruption 
emerged as the consequences of manipulating legitimacy. Furthermore, the process of 
manipulating  legitimacy  demonstrated  a  need  for  the  active  involvement  of  the 
accounting board, the NBAA, to regulate the accounting practices in the public sector 
organisations. Finally, because the tactics that were employed ensured the availability 
of resources for the Councils’ operations, they boosted social and political legitimacy 
of the Councils, the politicians, the ruling party, and the Government overall. 
 
The emergent theory was integrated within the extant literature, and, drawing upon 
NIS, the formal theory of manipulating legitimacy was proposed. A formal grounded 
theory of manipulating legitimacy suggests that institutionalized organisations which 
face pressures from the external environment, while, at the same time, being exposed 
to inherent weaknesses in their internal arrangements, are likely to be involved in  
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legitimacy  manipulation,  as  this  ensures  the  availability  of  resources  for 
organisational survival. 
 
In  line  with  the  research  aims  and  objectives  presented  in  section  1.2  and  their 
corresponding research questions (section 2.9), the findings of this study show that 
accounting practices were important to the Councils’ officials. Accounting practices 
played a crucial role in bargaining for the Councils’ resources and justifying their 
use. However, their effective undertaking was constrained by a number of factors, 
such as deficient regulatory systems, funding uncertainties, political interference, and 
the  influence  of  donors.  These  were  the  major  reasons  for  manipulation  of  the 
accounting practices in order to secure resources from the Government and donors. 
This study also established that accounting practices in the Municipal Councils were 
more  effective  than  those  of  District  Councils.  This  was  mainly  attributed  to  the 
presence of strong accounting establishment, relatively better-educated Councillors, 
and frequent supervision of higher regulatory bodies located in the urban areas. On 
the other hand, high involvement of donors in Health Services had strengthened their 
accounting practices when compared to Primary Education.  
 
Furthermore, the Councils’ officials described the frequent operational changes in the 
LGAs as externally oriented and grants-driven. The changes were not sufficiently 
supported  by  the  local  environment,  and,  as  a  result,  they  created  operational 
uncertainties which threatened the Councils’ operations. Moreover, the research has 
evidenced  enormous  influence  from  the  external  organs  on  actual  undertaking  of 
accounting  practices  in  the  Councils.  The  accounting  practices  in  the  Tanzanian 
Councils were highly influenced by the Councillors, higher Government officials, 
sectoral  ministries,  members  of  the  Parliamentary  committee,  and  donors.  What 
emerged  from  this  research  was  the  fact  that  actual  undertaking  of  accounting 
practices was primarily intended to satisfy the demands of these organs, mainly, the 
Government  and  donors.  The  contributions  and  recommendations  of  the  current 
research are discussed in the following section. 
9.3  Research Contributions and Recommendations 
This  section  presents  the  potential  contribution  of  the  current  research  to  the 
methodology  of  accounting  research,  New  Institutional  Sociology,  accounting  
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research  in  emerging  economies,  and  has  specific  recommendations  for  the 
Tanzanian LGAs. A detailed discussion of these contributions is offered below. 
9.3.1  Methodological Contributions 
The current research makes three potential methodological contributions to the extant 
literature. It contributes to interpretive accounting research in emerging economies, 
grounded  theory  approaches  and  procedures,  and  the  development  of  formal 
grounded theory. A detailed discussion of each of these contributions is provided 
below. 
9.3.1.1 Interpretive Accounting Research in Emerging Economies 
There  have  been  consistent  calls  for  the  need  for  an  interpretive  approach  in 
accounting research (Baker & Bettner, 1997; Baxter & Chua, 2003; Parker, 2008), 
with  the  most  recent  showing  the  apparent  gap  regarding  the  approach  in  public 
sector accounting research (Goddard, 2010). Because the approach facilitates a clear 
understanding  of  accounting  in  the  social  contexts  where  it  operates  (Ahrens  & 
Mollona, 2007; Dent, 1991; Hopwood, 1985), it is equally needed in the emerging 
economies  which  have  experienced  limited  public  sector  accounting  research  in 
general  (Broadbent  &  Guthrie,  2008;  Goddard,  2010).  Therefore,  by  using  the 
interpretive approach to investigate the accounting practices in the Tanzanian LGAs, 
the current study has demonstrated the power of such an approach to investigate the 
complex role of  accounting as practiced in the public sector entities of emerging 
economies. 
 
Essentially, the findings of the current study have demonstrated that the public sector 
entities of emerging economies are faced with inherent problems, such as deficient 
regulatory systems, poor infrastructures, inadequate financial resources, corruption, 
higher  levels  of  political  interference,  and  lower  levels  of  technical  competence. 
These  anomalies  have  constrained  the  reliability  of  the  accounting  information 
produced  in  these  countries.  However,  the  interpretive  approach  is  capable  of 
unravelling  these  complexities  (Parker,  2008),  and  providing  a  thorough 
understanding  of  the  accounting  practices.  Therefore,  the  application  of  the 
interpretive  approach  in  this  research  represents  methodological  contribution  to 
public sector accounting research in emerging economies in general.  
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9.3.1.2 Grounded Theory Procedures and Research Process 
Researchers may not necessarily apply grounded theory eclectically, as elaborated by 
its founders. As stated by Corbin and Strauss (2008), Kearney (2010), and Locke and 
Locke (2001), the approaches and procedures outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967), 
are merely guidelines and  not a ‘blueprint’ for the formation of a grounded theory. In 
line with this argument, the current research makes two methodological contributions 
to the canons of grounded theory. Firstly, this research established that it is possible 
for a main category to be thoroughly explained by the sub-categories of another main 
category (ies). For example, although sub-categories such as budgetary practices and 
deficient  financial  reporting  were  subsumed  in  the  ceremonial  conformity  and 
compliance games (main category), they also specifically and thoroughly explained 
accounting subordination, which was another main category. This was attributed to 
the fact that subordination of the accounting practices and ceremonial conformity and 
compliance games were manifested in the budgeting and financial reporting practices. 
Similarly, the ineffective auditing processes described three main categories, namely, 
fragile supervisory bodies, accounting subordination and ceremonial conformity and 
compliance games. Therefore, when the researcher codes for themes, and at the same 
time the main categories are closely related and theoretically dense, it is possible for 
the sub-category (ies) to sufficiently explain more than one of the main categories. 
 
Secondly, the current research applied a meta-coding approach which is rarely used 
in grounded theory studies. The approach was used throughout the coding processes 
to describe some of the main ideas behind the raw data. For example, words such as 
ceremonial  conformity,  compliance  games,  loose  coupling,  decoupling,  and 
rhetorical, were borrowed from the literature and used accordingly throughout the 
coding processes. This practice suggests that in the processes of coding and making 
sense  of  the  raw  data,  the  extant  literature  can  be  consulted  to  ensure  that  the 
categories are theoretically dense, while, at the same time, remain grounded from the 
raw data. 
9.3.1.3 Approach Used to Develop Formal Grounded Theory 
Two  stages  were  involved  throughout  the  development  of  the  formal  grounded 
theory. The first stage involved the integration of the research findings into the extant 
literature.  At  this  stage  the  central  phenomenon,  manipulating  legitimacy,  was  
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specifically integrated into the NIS theoretical framework. The final stage involved 
the  organisation  of  the  discussion  provided  in  the  first  stage  into  a  theoretical 
framework. The paradigm model recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1998) was 
used  to  organize  the  themes  of  discussion  into  conditions,  strategies,  and 
consequences,  hence  proposing  the  formal  grounded  theory  of  manipulating 
legitimacy (see Chapter 8, section 8.5). Therefore, the approach used in this study 
suggests that it is possible to develop a formal grounded theory without necessarily 
undertaking  the  same  research  in  other  substantive  areas.  This  is  an  important 
contribution to the development of a formal grounded theory especially when there is 
limited time available for the research. 
9.3.2  Theoretical Contributions 
This section discusses the potential contributions this research makes to NIS. These 
include  offering  micro-explanations  of  the  institutional  pressures,  intertwining 
legitimacy  and  efficiency,  recognizing  the  multiple  ‘faces’  of  loose  coupling, 
recognizing the different patterns of the actors responses, and the influence of the 
performance management initiatives in the NIS theoretical framework. Each of these 
is discussed in the following subsections. 
9.3.2.1 Micro Explanations of the Organisations 
Primarily NIS is more concerned with providing ‘macro’ level explanations about the 
adoption  of  specific  external  structures  and  procedures  by  institutionalized 
organisations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Drawing upon 
this background, the early NIS studies tended to ignore the micro-explanations of the 
organisations and argued that the organisational actors are passive adopters of the 
institutional  pressures.  However,  the  contemporary  NIS  researchers  recognize  the 
influences of intra-organisational factors on organisational operations (Nor-Aziah & 
Scapens,  2007;  Ribeiro  &  Scapens,  2006).  In  fact,  as  some  researchers  have 
observed,  the  organisational  actors  usually  respond  to  the  institutional  pressures 
strategically (Granlund, 2001; Modell, 2001, 2003; Oliver, 1991; Pettersen, 2001). 
The findings of the emergent theory contribute to this observation. As was argued 
previously, the current study observed the influence of the intra-organisational factors 
on shaping the Councils’ operations in general, and accounting practices in particular. 
This  was  manifested  through  the  internal  reactions  of  the  Councils’  officials  in 
response  to  the  institutional  pressures  imposed  by  the  Government  and  donors.  
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Because the internal reactions represent responses to the institutional pressures, they 
not only provide a proof that the actors are strategic in their responses (Oliver, 1991), 
but also contribute to the analysis of interplay between the micro (internal) and macro 
(external) organisational arrangements (Moll & Hoque, 2011). Therefore, the current 
study  extends  NIS  theoretical  orientations  further,  into  the  internal  assessment  of 
organisations (i.e. opening a ‘black-box’) (Ribeiro & Scapens, 2006), a path which is 
rarely pursued by the majority of the NIS studies. 
9.3.2.2 Intertwining Organisational Legitimacy and Efficiency 
There is a continuing debate in the NIS literature about the simultaneous achievement 
of external legitimacy and internal efficiency. Some researchers have argued for a 
distinct  separation  between  the  two  on  the  assumption  that  institutionalized 
organisations normally adopt external structures for the sake of external legitimacy, 
regardless of their impact on the internal technical demands (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983;  Meyer  &  Rowan,  1977;  Meyer  &  Scott,  1983a,  1983b; Scott,  1987).  This 
orientation has been applied implicitly and explicitly by a number of studies, which 
conclude that the external structures are merely adopted for the sake of legitimacy 
(Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Ansari & Euske, 1987; Hoque & Hopper, 1994; Laine, 
2009; Touron, 2005; Tuttle & Dillard, 2007). However, others are of the opinion that 
legitimacy and efficiency can be achieved simultaneously (Alam, 1997; Basu et al., 
1999; Hopper & Major, 2007; Modell, 2003; Scapens, 2006). As Scapens (2006) 
argued: 
 
“For example, the implementation of ABC may be driven by technical concerns to 
achieve the most appropriate allocation of overheads for economic decision making, 
but it may also be driven by the desire to conform to external expectations and to 
appear to be adopting the modern techniques which are used by other well known 
organisations. In actual situations, it may be very difficult to disentangle these two 
types of organisational conformance” (p. 13). 
 
The current study not only contributes to the view that legitimacy and efficiency can 
be  simultaneously  achieved,  but  also  extends  the  evaluation  of  the  organisational 
legitimacy  and  efficiency.  For  example,  the  current  study  observed  that  mere 
adoption of the external structures was not enough to assure the legitimacy of the 
Councils.  This  was  attributed  to  the  fact  that  the  main  external  stakeholders,  the  
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Government  and  donors,  to  whom  the  Councils  were  legitimated,  were  the  ones 
which introduced the external structures to the Councils. In this situation, therefore, it 
was the reactions of the Councils’ officials regarding the adopted structures which 
ensured  the  organisational  legitimacy.  This  supports  Moll  and  Hoque’s  (2011) 
argument  that  organisational  legitimacy  may  not  simply  be  achieved  through  the 
adoption of external structures. Internal factors are also important ingredients in the 
process of achieving external legitimacy. The legitimacy of the studied Councils was 
reflected in the way in which they were able to secure financial resources and support 
from the Government and donors. 
 
Also,  the  reduced  time  for  the  preparation  of  the  financial  statements,  improved 
financial reporting, and improved funds disbursement mechanisms, represented some 
of the efficiencies associated with the adopted structures. These had been expected by 
the  Government  and  donors,  although  throughout  the  implementation  of  the 
Councils’  operations  the  technocrats  themselves  had  not  worked  pro-actively  for 
these  improvements.  Thus,  the  findings  of  the  emergent  theory  contribute  to  the 
contemporary  NIS  literature,  which  argues  for  the  simultaneous  achievement  of 
external  legitimacy  and  internal  efficiency.  However,  the  research  findings 
demonstrated that the operating efficiencies were not resultant from the technocrats’ 
‘pro-active choice’ (cf. Modell, 2001) but, rather, they occurred automatically in the 
course of the conformance to the coercive pressures. Also, the levels of efficiency 
had not matured enough to be openly recognized. This is an important contribution, 
especially for  studies  carried out  in  emerging  economies. Because the  reforms  in 
these countries are in the infant stages, partial analysis of the adopted structures and 
procedures may not reveal technical efficiency. Therefore, organisational efficiency 
needs to be evaluated in line with the particular stage of adoption, something which is 
seldom emphasized in most of the NIS studies. 
9.3.2.3 Multiple Sources of ‘Loose Coupling’ 
The  literature  records  a  variety  of  sources  of  ‘loose  coupling’  phenomenon 
demonstrated  by  institutionalized  organisations.  For  example,  Meyer  and  Rowan 
(1977)  regarded  ‘loose  coupling’  as  a  ‘taken  for  granted’  feature  of  the 
institutionalized organisations. They held the opinion that it occurs automatically to 
buffer any uncertainties created by the formal structures. In contrast, Brignall and  
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Modell (2000) and Oliver (1991) observed ‘loose coupling’ as a form of resistance to 
the institutional pressures exerted on organisations. As a result, formal structures and 
procedures are maintained purposely in a loosely coupled state so as not to disturb the 
daily  routines  of  the  organisation  (Ribeiro  &  Scapens,  2006).  Furthermore,  Nor-
Aziah and Scapens (2007) found ‘loose coupling’ to be the process and consequences 
of the conflicting nature of institutional pressures, while Modell (2003) found it to be 
a  form  of  resistance  as  well  as  a  product  of  the  regulatory  passivity.  Recently, 
Rautiainen (2010) and How and Alawattage (2012) attributed ‘decoupling’ to being a 
result of conflicting interests. 
 
In the studied Councils, ‘loose coupling’ originated from a variety of sources (see 
Chapter 8, section 8.4.2.2). Firstly, it appeared as a product of the informal resistance 
of the Councils’ officials, especially in the adopted structures of budgetary practices 
and the accounting systems (IFMS/EPICOR).  Secondly, decoupling of the formal 
performance measurement system and routine was primarily caused by the laxity of 
the regulatory bodies. Furthermore, technical factors, such as unreliability of power 
supply  and  inadequate  competence,  had  contributed  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
accounting systems in a loosely coupled state. Moreover, the conflicting pressures 
from the politicians, regulatory bodies, and the Government and donors, had highly 
affected the formal budgeting structures and led them to be maintained in a ‘loose 
coupling’  state.  Therefore,  the  emergent  theory  not  only  recognizes  the  multiple 
sources of ‘loose coupling’, but also regards ‘loose coupling’ as a consequence of the 
unfavourable operating environment (technical factors). Also, it is worth noting that 
the self-interested behaviour of the Councils’ officials played a major role in the 
process of decoupling the formal structures and the daily routines. These are specific 
and  important  findings  especially  for  the  emerging  economies,  which  normally 
experience low capacity and deficient regulatory systems. 
9.3.2.4 Different Patterns of the Actors’ Responses 
This research observed that the responses of the Councils’ officials to the institutional 
pressures differed across the Councils and the service deliveries. As was discussed in 
detail in the previous chapters, the responses of the Councils’ officials, and their 
consequences, differed between the Municipal and the District Councils. Also, the 
responses of the officials in the HLGs (Councils) were different from those of LLGs  
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(Wards and Villages). Similarly, the practitioners in the Health Services reacted to 
the  external  pressures  differently  from  their  Primary  Education  counterparts. 
Therefore, the current study has revealed the extent to which the actors’ responses 
and their consequences  differed, and that  factors  such as  the  effectiveness  of the 
regulatory bodies, the influence of funding agencies, and the internal organisational 
profile, partially contributed to the difference. This is a clear and important departure 
by  the  current  research  from  most  of  the  NIS  studies,  which  regard  the  actors’ 
responses to the institutional pressures to be similar. As Ribeiro and Scapens (2006) 
argued, “there is always the possibility that not all actors within an organisation will 
follow the same rules and accept and enact the same representations” (p.100). In this 
regard, the emergent theory suggests that the actors’ responses to the institutional 
pressures should not always be assumed to be similar. In fact, the different profile of 
the  reactions  of  the  Councils’  officials  to  the  institutional  pressures  and  their 
corresponding  consequences  provide  proof  of  the  strategic  nature  of  the  actors’ 
responses  (Oliver,  1991),  and    extends  NIS  theorizing  beyond  the  simplistic 
assumption that actors’ responses to the external environment are similar. 
9.3.2.5 Performance Management in the Public Sector Entities 
This  research  established  that  performance  management  initiatives  also  constitute 
forms of the actors’ responses to the institutional pressures. This is mainly applicable 
to the public sector entities, which depend heavily on the external sources of finances 
which are based on performance. As observed in this research, because the Councils 
depended  heavily  on  funds  from  the  Government  and  donors  which  were 
performance based, the Councils’ officials were compelled to employ performance 
management techniques to ensure the availability of funds to the organisations. Of 
interest was the manner in which the performance management techniques affected 
the actual undertaking of the accounting practices in the Councils. For example, the 
compliance  games,  which  were  played  by  the  Councils’  officials  as  performance 
management mechanisms, affected the budgeting, auditing, and financial reporting. 
This shows that, to a certain extent, the accounting in the public sector, has affect, 
and being affected by, the performance management practices. 
9.3.3  Contributions to Accounting Research in Emerging Economies 
This study was motivated by the paucity of public sector accounting research in the 
emerging economies (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008; Goddard, 2010; Rahaman, 2010).  
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Because public sector accounting research is context specific (Broadbent & Guthrie, 
2008),  the  lesser  engagement  with  the  emerging  economies  has  limited  a  clear 
understanding of how accounting has been implicated in the public sector entities in 
these countries. Related to this is the fact that accounting is influenced by social, 
political, cultural, and economic settings in which it operates (Ahrens & Mollona, 
2007;  Alawattage  &  Wickramasinghe,  2008;  Dent,  1991),  and  these  factors  vary 
significantly between the developed, and the developing, countries. It is arguable that 
some of the research observations made in developed countries cannot sufficiently 
explain  accounting  as  practiced  in  emerging  economies.  Therefore,  the  current 
research, which investigated accounting practices in the Tanzanian LGAs, contributes 
to the body of public sector accounting research in emerging economies. 
 
As has been revealed by previous research (Neu & Ocampo, 2007; Neu, Ocampo 
Gomez, Graham, & Heincke, 2006; Uddin et al., 2011; Uddin & Hopper, 2001, 2003; 
Uddin & Tsamenyi, 2005), the current study observed the high influence of donors in 
the Councils’ operations. The donors including the World Bank and those countries 
under the ‘basket funding’ arrangements, introduced a variety of initiatives into the 
Councils.  Because  the  environment  was  unfavourable  for  the  effective 
implementation of the donors’ initiatives, the Councils’ officials became involved in 
manipulation in order to satisfy the donors’ requirements for funding purposes. As a 
result, for example, the proportion of the Councils qualified for grants had increased 
from 49% in 2005 to 68% in 2006. Similarly, the proportion of the Councils meeting 
the  minimum  conditions  for  grants  purposes  had  increased  from  54%  in  the  FY 
2004/05 to 90% in the FY 2007/08, while, at the same time, the proportion of the 
Councils qualifying for bonus grants had increased from 10% in the FY 2006/07 to 
30%  in  the  FY  2007/08  (Tidemand,  2009).  However,  this  trend,  as  the  findings 
suggest,  rather  than  being  associated  with  improved  Councils’  performance,  was 
mainly associated with manipulation techniques such as lobbying and the compliance 
games undertaken by the Councils’ officials. It appeared that Councils’ officials were 
keen to satisfy the funding requirements on paper, but this had little impact on the 
livelihoods of the local Tanzanians (see also Rahaman et al., 2004; Tsamenyi et al., 
2010;  Uddin  &  Hopper,  2003;  Uddin  &  Tsamenyi,  2005).  It  would  therefore  be  
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appropriate for the improvement of livelihood of local communities to be one of the 
bases for allocation of grants. 
 
The  emergent  theory  also  observed  higher  levels  of  corruption  practiced  by  the 
technocrats, the Councillors, and the members of the Parliamentary Committee. In 
general, corruption has been a major problem for public sector entities in emerging 
economies  (Abdulai,  2009;  Ampratwum,  2008;  Berkman  et  al.,  2008;  Brown  & 
Cloke, 2006; Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010; Malagueño et al., 2010; Muganda, 1997; Neu, 
Everett, Rahaman, & Martinez, 2012; Okike, 2004; Olowu, 1999; Tambulasi, 2007). 
In  this  regard,  further  to  the  improvement  of  accounting  and  institutional 
arrangements as recommended by Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010) and Okike (2004), the 
current study argues for a wider societal engagement to address corrupt behaviour in 
the emerging economies. Because accounting is a social practice, and is affecting, 
and being affected by, the social context in which it operates (Ahrens & Mollona, 
2007), accounting controls alone may not be sufficient to manage the inherent corrupt 
practices in the society. Therefore, multi-level anti-corruption strategies (Hopper et 
al.,  2009;  Riley,  1998)  which  take  into  account  social,  political,  economic,  and 
cultural factors, have the potential to minimize corrupt practices in the public sector 
entities of the emerging economies. 
 
Furthermore, the current research observed a low level of competence among the 
Councils’ officials and inadequate working facilities in the Councils. Unfortunately, 
this  trend  is  common  in  the  emerging  economies  (Gujarathi  &  Dean,  1993; 
Hammond et al., 2009; Hammond et al., 2011; Sian, 2006, 2007, 2011b). In general, 
it is apparent that the emerging economies lack adequate competence to undertake the 
imported  initiatives  including  accounting  practices  (Uddin  &  Hopper,  2003). 
Therefore, there is an immense need for comprehensive capacity building programs 
in emerging economies, which should not only focus on the organisational structures 
and  procedures,  but  also  on  the  professional  development  of  the  organisational 
members. 
 
In general, the findings of this research provide empirical evidence to Hopper et al.,’s 
(2009) framework of management accounting in less developed countries. Tracing  
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mode  of  production  of  the  less  developed  countries  from  pre-colonial  period  to 
market  capitalism  era,  Hopper  et  al.  (2009)  argued  that  the  application  of 
management accounting systems (MAS) was in existence in early traditional societies 
of less developed countries, and the advent of other modes of production such as 
colonialism and state capitalism, had forced traditional societies to adopt the modern 
MASs  from  their  colonial  master  and/or  their  financial  sponsors.  The  imported 
management accounting practices largely fail to take into account local contexts (i.e. 
culture, ethnicity, economic, political) of the less developed countries, as a result, 
they produced negative consequences (see also Tambulasi, 2007; Uddin & Hopper, 
2003;  Uddin  &  Tsamenyi,  2005).  These  observations  were  equally  noted  in  this 
study.  As  discussed  extensively  in  this  thesis,  the  Councils  adopted  various 
accounting  structures  and  procedures,  such  as  adoption  of  IPSAS,  performance 
measurement practices, and performance auditing, as part of funding conditions. This 
was  mainly  the  case  after  the  country  had  decided  to  implement  Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the late 1980s as recommended by the World Bank 
and IMF. As the findings of this research show, majority of these practices were 
neither  congruent  with  Tanzanian  local  contexts,  nor  were  fully  backed  up  with 
sufficient  supporting  resources.  As  a  result,  as  Hopper  et  al.  (2009)  argued,  the 
imported  accounting  practices  created  operational  uncertainties  which  forced  the 
Councils’  officials  to  be  manipulative  in  order  to  defend  the  reputation  of  the 
Councils and theirs. Therefore, the current study calls the reformers of public sector 
entities  in  the  emerging  economies  to  consider  social,  political,  economic,  and 
cultural  factors,  before  advocating  accounting  structures  and  procedures.  As  the 
findings  of  this  study  suggest,  mere  importation  and  eclectic  application  of 
accounting  practices  borrowed  from  different  contexts  increases  manipulative 
practices. 
9.3.4 Contributions to the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities 
“We do not undertake research solely to secure journal article ‘scores’, tenure and 
promotion points, or personal status. We have a tradition of undertaking research to 
contribute to societal and professional understanding and change. We aim to make a 
difference to the communities outside academe. That alone gives us reason for being” 
(Parker, 2008, p. 913). 
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This section exemplifies the quote which was offered in defense of the interpretive 
approach  in  accounting  research.  The  section  offers  specific  practical 
recommendations  to  the  Tanzanian  LGAs.  Without  meaning  to  generalize,  the 
recommendations offered can also be loosely applicable to other countries, especially 
those located in the emerging economies with similar issues to those found in this 
research.  Because  the  detailed  discussion  of  these  issues  has  been  given  in  the 
analysis chapters, this section provides the recommendations in a summarized fashion 
and they are discussed under the following sub-headings: a holistic approach to the 
reform  programs;  the  harmonization  and  review  of  laws  and  regulations; 
strengthening  financial  autonomy;  improving  fund  disbursement  and  reporting 
mechanisms;  and  improving  employee  welfare.  A  discussion  of  each  of  these  is 
provided below. 
9.3.4.1 A Holistic Approach to the Reform Programs 
The Councils demonstrated a need for a holistic approach to the reform programs 
which would take into account all operational aspects of the public sector entities. 
The current reform programs tend to put more emphasis on fiscal relations and ignore 
other important aspects such as the legal reforms, human resources development, and 
the capacity building programs. The partial nature of the reforms was responsible for 
the operational uncertainties which affected all aspects of the Councils including the 
accounting practices. Therefore, integrated public sector reform programs have the 
potential to guarantee a ‘robust accounting infrastructure’ (Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010), 
which could address major challenges facing the public sector entities in emerging 
economies in general, and the Tanzanian Councils in particular. 
9.3.4.2 The Harmonization and Review of Laws and Regulations 
This research observed that the Councils’ laws and regulations failed to accommodate 
their efficient management. Administrative regulations, among other things, failed to 
provide a clear demarcation of roles between the Councillors and technocrats. This 
had  contributed  to  the  political  interference,  which  had  significantly  affected  the 
Councils’  operations.  Similarly,  there  were  major  contradictory  clauses  in  the 
financial and administrative regulations. Therefore, review of the administrative and 
financial  laws  and  regulations  of  the  Councils  would  strengthen  their  overall 
operations. Also, harmonization of the regulations has the potential to strengthen the 
Councils’  operations.  For  example,  sufficient  harmonization  between  the  Local  
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Government Finances Act No. 9 of 1982 (amended 2000) and the Public Finance Act 
No.  6  of  2001,  would  strengthen  the  effective  undertaking  of  the  accounting 
practices.  Also,  establishing  a  clear  role  for  the  accounting  regulatory  board,  the 
NBAA, with regard to the accounting practices in the Tanzanian public sector entities 
would enhance the smooth undertaking of accounting practices. 
9.3.4.3 Strengthening Financial Autonomy of the LGAs 
Because the Councils had only an extremely low internal revenue raising capacity, 
there is an immense need for mechanisms to ensure that they become financially 
independent. In this regard, the Government needs to set broader revenue targets for 
the Councils and refrain from revenue administrative activities. Also, there is a need 
for strong enforcement bodies to curtail unethical behaviour in the Councils’ revenue 
collections, especially in the revenue outsourcing arrangements. Strengthening the 
Councils’ Procurement Unit in terms of staffing, facilities, and reporting relationship, 
would ensure, among other things, the selection of appropriate revenue collecting 
agents.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  for  the  local  sources  which  the  Government 
allowed  the  Councils  to  charge  their  own  rates,  majority  of  them  do  not  have 
appropriate collection rates. The tendency was to collect themselves initially in order 
to establish rates prior to outsourcing. For the sources which they could not initially 
collect on their own, they used ‘guess work’ to determine the collection rates. These 
intuitive  methods  are  partly  responsible  for  the  low  revenues.  Research  into  the 
Councils’ revenue collections would potentially reveal appropriate collection rates 
and  other  unexploited  revenue  sources.  Also,  improving  Cost  Sharing Scheme  in 
terms  of  administration,  staffing,  and  financial  controls,  could  possibly  minimize 
health financing dependence. 
9.3.4.4 Improving Fund Disbursement and the Reporting Mechanisms 
The  abolishing  and/or  discouraging  of  direct  financing  would  ensure  efficient 
management of the funds and equitable allocation of resources among the Councils. 
Also, the integration of the Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures into the 
daily operations has the potential to improve the Councils’ performance. Whilst it is 
important  to  have  performance  based  grants,  other  arrangements,  such  as  the 
development  of  Key  Performance  Indicators  (KPIs)  and  benchmarking,  would  be 
worth pursuing. In this regard, the commendable efforts of the Local Government 
Working  Group  (LGWG)  to  have  all  the  Councils’  financial  information  online,  
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could be used for benchmarking purposes. This would create an efficient utilization 
of the financial information for the improvement of the Councils’ performance, as 
opposed to the current trend, where the information is merely used for report writing 
(for  similar  observation,  see  Hernandez,  2002).  Furthermore,  a  more  timely 
disbursement of funds from the Government and donors could potentially minimize 
the  external  funding  uncertainties  facing  the  Councils.  Similarly,  the  compliance 
costs are increased by channeling the Government grants through RAS’s office, and 
the  practice  of  the  Councils’  donors  to  require  separate  budgeting,  auditing,  and 
reporting arrangements. In general, the synchronization of the reporting mechanisms 
would bring credibility of the reports, reduction of unnecessary costs, and would save 
time. 
9.3.4.5 Improving Employee Welfare 
Improvement of the working conditions of the technocrats has the potential to ensure 
the efficient attainment of the Councils’ objectives. Low salaries coupled with poor 
working conditions observed in the studied Councils reduced workers’ morale and 
was a potential source of employee fraud. Whilst other anti-corruption initiatives are 
worthy  of  investigation,  there  is  also  a  need  to  examine  the  Councils’  working 
environment. In this regard, it is also important to harmonize the employee payment 
system  to  both  professional  employees  and  across  the  various  tiers  of  the 
Government. This would minimize the inferiority complex of the Councils’ officials. 
9.4  Potential Limitations of the Research 
The current research is not without limitations. For instance, the reliability of the 
research findings  was  inevitably  affected by the  observation role  assumed by  the 
researcher.  In  this  regard,  the  observer’s  bias  throughout  the  data  collection  and 
analysis may potentially have influenced the research findings (Lightbody, 2000). 
However, the overt non-participant observation mode, which was used throughout the 
data  collection,  curtailed  this  threat  to  the  minimum  level.  Also,  the  constant 
comparison  method  (Glaser  &  Strauss,  1967;  Strauss  &  Corbin,  1998),  and  the 
iterative process, enhanced the reliability of the research findings and minimised the 
researcher’s bias. 
 
This research investigated accounting practices in four out of 134 LGAs available. 
Arguably, more insights would have been obtained had the research involved more  
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LGAs. However, the use of purposive sampling ensured an appropriate representation 
of the LGAs in the country. Also, the use of two Councils for each category enabled 
comparisons  across  the  Councils,  which  enhanced  the  theoretical  generalizations. 
Similarly, the common documentary sources such as laws and regulations, statutory 
audit reports, and Parliamentary Committee’s reports provided general information 
pertinent to all of the LGAs. Furthermore, the information from the higher bodies 
such as the Parliamentary Committee, PMO-RALG, MoEVT, and MoHSW provided 
deep insights into the LGAs’ operations beyond the selected Councils. Thus, drawing 
upon these arrangements suggests that the phenomenon of manipulating legitimacy 
would also hold true with the other Councils. 
 
Also, the findings of the current research were restricted by the credibility of the 
information,  as  the  Councils’  financial  information  was  not  reliable  because  it 
differed from source to source. However, use of a variety of data collection methods 
to some extent addressed this concern. The cross examination of data from different 
sources was also made, and, more importantly, the implication of the differences was 
established and substantiated in the research findings. Furthermore, the preliminary 
findings  were  presented  and  discussed  to  some  of  the  Councils’  officials  for 
validation  purposes.  These  arrangements  enhanced  the  credibility  of  the  data 
presented in this study. 
 
The limited time spent on the Councils (10 months), possibly constrained the research 
findings. Since accounting is a social and cultural phenomenon (Ahrens & Mollona, 
2007; Dent,  1991), the  manner in  which it has  been  perceived and practiced has 
evolved  with  time.  Arguably,  more  insights  would  have  been  obtained  had  the 
researcher  been  able  to  spend  more  time  with  the  researched  organisations  and 
observe things as they unfolded (cf. Ansari & Euske, 1987). However, undertaking 
two phases of fieldwork at different periods of time (i.e. July 2010-January 2011, and 
August  to  October  2011),  enabled  the  researcher  to  establish  the  patterns  of  the 
accounting practices and to validate the observed phenomena. Also, some interviews 
involved the Councils’ officials who had worked for a long time, which enabled the 
researcher to identify previous trends in the accounting practices of the Councils.  
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These approaches substantially enhanced the reliability and validity of the research 
findings. 
 
It is also important to acknowledge that the fieldwork failed to be extended to the 
National Audit Office (NAO) and the Councils’ donors. This was because of the time 
constraints and the long procedural arrangements involved in negotiating access to 
these  organisations.  Nevertheless,  the  use  of  the  Councils’  audited  accounts  and 
donors’ reports,  attendance of  the various  Councils’  meetings,  and the interviews 
involving other officials, enabled the researcher to understand the influence of the 
statutory auditor and the donors on the operations of the Councils in general, and 
accounting  practices  in  particular.  However,  future  accounting  research  on  the 
Tanzanian LGAs needs to include the statutory auditor and the Councils’ donors as 
main research participants. 
 
In general, by limiting the focus to Tanzania as a single case-study of a developing 
country, the research recognises that the findings are likely to be context specific, as 
the  accounting  practices  as  implicated  in  the  Tanzanian  LGAs  are  likely  to  be 
somewhat different from other developing countries. However, similarities found in 
other studies conducted in emerging economies somewhat address this concern (see 
for example, Okike, 2007; Tambulasi, 2007; Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu, & Onumah, 
2007; Uddin et al., 2011; Uddin & Hopper, 2001, 2003; Uddin & Tsamenyi, 2005). 
Therefore, the current study does provide a clear understanding of the accounting 
practices in the context of the emerging economies, and, in particular, elucidates how 
the interaction between the institutional pressures from the funding agencies and the 
reactions  of  the  organisational  members  can  influence  the  actual  undertaking  of 
accounting practices. 
9.5  Implications and Areas for Further Research 
Whilst this research studied all the major aspects of accounting as practiced in the 
Tanzanian LGAs, future research could investigate in greater depth specific areas 
such as budgeting, auditing, financial reporting, and performance measurement. For 
example,  it  would  be  interesting  to  examine  the  role  of  budgeting  in  the 
implementation  of  the  decentralization  by  devolution  policy  which  was  formally 
introduced into the country in 1998. Also, a study which would investigate in detail  
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the performance measurement practices in the Tanzanian LGAs has much potential 
for research. Because the country has adopted a performance based grants system in 
2004,  a  thorough  examination  of  the  entire  system  from  the  perspectives  of  the 
Government, donors, consultants, the general public, the Councils, and the statutory 
auditor,  could  augment  the  understanding  of  the  system  even  further.  Also,  a 
longitudinal study of the financial reporting frameworks could theoretically examine 
in detail why the Councils are subjected to frequent changes to the financial reporting 
frameworks, and how the Councils’ officials cope with the transition periods. 
 
This study investigated accounting practices in the Tanzanian LGAs, and it would be 
interesting to compare the findings with other Government units such as Ministries, 
Departments, and Agencies. In this regard, it could also be interesting to compare the 
findings  of  the  current  study  with  the  Zanzibar’s  Local  Governments,  because 
Zanzibar  is  part  of  the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania,  but  with  different  local 
government systems. Such a study has the potential to explain the influence of the 
Union Government on the operation of the LGAs in Zanzibar. Similarly, because the 
principle  idea  of  this  research  was  to  understand  accounting  in  the  emerging 
economies,  a  comparative  study  involving  other  countries  could  also  potentially 
deepen the practical and theoretical understanding of accounting practices in these 
countries. The findings of future studies into the emerging economies could establish 
empirically whether the Tanzanian LGAs were unique or whether similar trends can 
be found in other countries, which could be used to test the generalizability of the 
findings obtained in this study. 
 
Furthermore,  the  current  research  focused  more  on  the  institutionalization  of  the 
external  structures  and  procedures  (DiMaggio  & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977;  Strang  &  Meyer,  1993).  The  emergent  theory,  as  with  other  NIS  studies, 
suggests that institutionalized organisations are forced to adopt external structures 
and procedures in order to confer legitimacy and resources for survival (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983b). Further research is needed to explore how de-
institutionalization of the organisational former structures and procedures takes place. 
Such research might shed further light on the interactions between the former and the 
new organisational structures and the procedures in the institutionalization process  
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(cf. Dillard et al., 2004; Oliver, 1992; Seal, 2003). In the context of the Tanzanian 
LGAs, for example, it may be valuable to investigate how former financial reporting 
frameworks, such as TSSAPs and IFRSs, were discarded, and what would be the 
potential  consequences  of  the  de-institutionalization  process  on  the  Councils’ 
operations in general, and accounting practices in particular. 
 
The combination of a grounded theory approach and NIS as used in this study has the 
potential to enhance a clear understanding of the interplay between accounting and 
institutional arrangements. Therefore, the current study not only encourages further 
application of grounded theory, but also argues for its ‘meta synthesis’ with other 
theoretical  orientations  (Goddard,  2004,  2005a;  Kearney,  1998b,  2010).  In  this 
regard, the current study also encourages replication of the proposed formal theory of 
manipulating  legitimacy  to  other  substantive  areas.  It  would  be  interesting  to 
investigate the phenomenon of manipulating legitimacy emerged in this research in 
the public and the private entities located in both developed and emerging economies. 
It  is  in  this  context  that  the  current  research  welcomes  wider  replication  of  the 
manipulating legitimacy theory in different organisational settings. 
 
Moreover, this study encourages a broader engagement with interpretive field based 
research in general, and in emerging economies in particular. As has been established 
in previous research (Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010; Uddin & Hopper, 2003), this study 
has also observed that the public sector entities in emerging economies are faced with 
poor accounting infrastructures due to factors such as deficient regulatory systems, 
low competencies, political interference, and low levels of technology. The reliability 
of the quantitative instruments such as questionnaires in modelling these complexities 
and to  provide a clear  understanding  of accounting practices is  questionable  (see 
Parker,  2008).  In  contrast,  as  the  findings  of  this  study  suggest,  an  interpretive 
approach  has  the  potential  to  unpack  these  intricacies  and  provide  thorough 
explanations  of  accounting  practices.  Therefore,  the  application  of  an  interpretive 
approach in public sector accounting research in the emerging economies is more 
appealing and longitudinal case studies would appear to be the preferred research 
strategy.  
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9.6  Summary 
This chapter has summarised the entirety of this research. It has also presented the 
methodological  and  theoretical  contributions  made  by  the  current  research  to  the 
extant literature. The chapter has also discussed the contributions made by the current 
study to the emerging economies in general, and to the Tanzanian LGAs in particular, 
and concluded with a presentation of the research limitations and areas for further 
research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: LGAs’ Performance Measures 
 
Functional Area  Total  
Score 
Minimum score 
below which a 
penalty applies 
Minimum score 
to receive 
Performance 
bonus 
A. Financial Management  25  12  18 
B. Fiscal Capacity  15  7  12 
C. Development Planning  27  12  22 
D. Transparency and Accountability  15  6  12 
E. Interaction with LLG  10  4  7 
F. Human Resource Development  13  5  9 
G. Procurement  14  6  10 
H. Project Implementation  26  10  18 
I. Council Functional Processes  5  2  3 
 
Source: Assessment Manual of the Councils Minimum Conditions and Performance 
Measurement  Criteria,  Local  Government  Capital  Development  Grant 
Systems, PMO-RALG, August 2006 (p. 7). 
 
Appendix 2: LGAs’ Budget Timeframe 
 
Month  Activity 
January  Issuing of budget guidelines 
February  Call for proposal from sub-village-village-ward-council 
March  Council Management Team (CMT) prepare draft budget 
April  Draft  budget  submitted  to  RAS,  Council  standing 
committee. After their approval, it then passed to the full 
council for approval. Subject to being passed by the full 
council the budget is then submitted to PMO-RALG and 
MoF. 
May  Initial discussions with MoF to obtain revised ceilings 
June  Parliament discusses national budget including transfers 
to LGAs 
July-November  Receipt of final ceilings for the sectors from MoF 
 
Source:  Public Expenditure Review Annual Consultative Meeting, Joint 
 Evaluation Report on Local Government Fiduciary Assessment,  
May 2006 (p.18). 
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Appendix 3: Concepts, Open and Axial Categories 
 
No  Concepts  Open Categories  Axial Categories 
1.  Perceived value of 
accounting 
The role of accounting and 
accountants 
Accounting 
subordination 
2.  Councils accounting 
profile 
3.  Precedent role of 
accounting 
4  Perceived role of 
accountants 
       
5.  Late and inappropriate 
budget guidelines 
Budgetary practices 
Ceremonial 
conformity and 
compliance games 
6.  Participatory planning 
7.  Budgetary malpractices 
8.  Frequent changes of 
financial reporting 
frameworks  Deficient financial 
reporting practices  9.  Low level of compliance 
10  Unreliability of the 
Councils final accounts 
       
11.  Conflicting provisions  Outdated accounting 
provisions  Deficient regulatory 
frameworks 
12.  Uncoordinated regulations 
13.  Outdated regulations  Weak administrative 
regulations  14.  Parallel structures 
       
15.  Financial dependence 
Donors’ practices  Donors’ influence  16.  Donors supremacy 
17.  Funding conditions and 
priorities 
       
18.  Limited segregation of 
duties 
Inherent weaknesses of the 
internal control systems 
Emergence of fraud 
and corruption 
19.  Fraud symptoms 
20  Shortage of accounting 
staffs 
21.  Low salaries and other 
incentives 
Unfavourable working 
conditions 
22.  Insufficient working tools 
23.  Perceived low respects 
24  Inadequate supporting 
environment  
       
25.  Low technocrats’ 
competence  Deficient financial and 
administrative structures 
Fragile supervisory 
bodies  26.  Weak enforcement organs  
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No  Concepts  Open Categories  Axial Categories 
27.  Weak low level structures 
28.  Low level of audit 
independence 
Ineffective auditing 
processes  29.  Insufficient working tools 
30.  Inadequate auditors’ 
competence 
       
31.  Fund volatility 
Low fiscal capacity 
Funding 
uncertainties 
32.  Late disbursement of 
funds 
33.  Inappropriate Government 
directives 
   
34.  Uncoordinated funding 
sources 
Inefficient fund 
management 
35.  Allowances emphasis 
36.  Inappropriate funding 
allocations 
37.  Inadequate departmental 
coordination 
38.  Favouritisms 
Collusion  Lobbying 
39.  Financial and political 
interest 
40.  Conspiracy 
41.  Political ‘shielding’ 
       
42.  Selfishness and 
individualism  Disguised participants 
behaviours 
Organisational 
cultural attributes 
43.  Blaming attitude 
44.  Fear 
45.  Low Councillors’ 
qualifications  Language barriers 
46.  Inadequate financial 
awareness of citizens 
       
47.  Performance profile 
Performance measurement 
practices 
Performance 
management 
48.  Simplistic meaning of 
performance 
49.  Performance emphasis 
and Councils’ grants 
       
50.  Financial bureaucracy 
Domination and autonomy 
Political and 
hierarchical 
interferences 
51.  Financial autonomy 
52.  Control and trust 
53.  Centralised decision 
making 
54.  Inappropriate funding  
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No  Concepts  Open Categories  Axial Categories 
regulations 
55.  Government directives 
Perceived political 
interference 
56.  Councillors-technocrats 
hostile relationship 
57.  Perceived irrelevant 
structures-RAS 
58.  Multi-partism ‘politics’ 
       
59.  HLGs and LLGs 
structures 
Accountability 
arrangements 
Improving 
accountability and 
governance 
60.  Decentralization by 
devolution policy 
61.  Revenue sharing 
62.  Translation of the 
financial reports 
Transparency measures 
63.  Accounting for ‘receipt in 
kind’ 
64.  Posting Government 
remittances and own 
sources 
       
65.  Low professional respects 
Professional dilemmas  Professional conflict  66.  Employee power relations 
67.  Incomplete nature of 
reform programs 
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Appendix 4: List of Main Documents Used 
 
SN  Documents  Source 
  Laws and Regulations:   
1.  Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7, 1982  AG, URT 
2.  Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8, 1982  AG, URT 
3.  Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 6, 1999  AG, URT 
4.  Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 13,2006  AG, URT 
5.  Local Authorities (Elections) Act No. 4, 1979  AG, URT 
6.  Local Government Finances Act No. 9, 1982 (amended 2000)  AG, URT 
7.  Public Finances Act, 2001  AG, URT 
8.  Local Authority Financial Memorandum (LAFM), 1997  PMO-
RALG 
9.  Local Authority Accounting Manual (LAAM), 1992  PMO-
RALG 
10.  Local Government Authorities Tender Boards (Establishment and 
Proceedings) Regulations, 2007 
AG, URT 
11.  Public Procurement Act No. 21, 2004  AG, URT 
12.  Public Finance Act No. 6, 2001  AG, URT 
13.  The Regional Administration Act No. 19, 1997  AG, URT 
14.  Local Government Authorities Internal Audit Manual, 2005 
 
PO-RALG 
15.  Comprehensive Council Health Planning Guideline  PMO-
RALG 
&MoHSW 
  Policy Documents:   
16.  Local Government Reform Agenda, 1996-2000  URT 
17.  Policy Paper on Local Government Reform, 1998  URT 
18.  Joint Evaluation Report on Local Government Fiduciary Assessment, 2006  PER 
19.  Implementation Report of Local Government Reform Programme, 2008  PMO-
RALG 
20.  Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP I), 2002-2006   MoEVT 
21.  Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP II), 2007-2011  MoEVT 
22.  Primary Health Services Development Programme, 2007-2017  MoHSW 
23.  Health Sector Supportive Supervision Performance Indicators  MoHSW 
24.  Health Cost Sharing Scheme, 1997  MoHSW 
25.  Health Sector Strategic Plan II, 2009-2015  MoHSW 
26.  Final  Report  on  Development  of  a  Strategic  Framework  for  the  Financing  of 
Local Governments in Tanzania, President’s Office-Regional Administration and 
Local Government and Ministry of Finance, 2005. 
URT 
27.  A Review of the Role and Functions of the Bank of Tanzania, 1961-2011  BOT 
  Confidential Documents:   
28.  Internal Auditors Reports  LGAs 
29.  Minutes-Full Council Meetings  LGAs 
30.  Minutes-Finance and Administration Committee  LGAs 
31.  Health Technical and Financial Reports  LGAs 
32.  Draft Final Accounts for the FY 2009/10  KAMC 
33.  PEDP Implementation Report, 2010  KAMC 
  Publicly Available Information:    
 
Accounting Practices in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs): Page 229 
 
SN  Documents  Source 
34.  Councils Performance Assessment Manual  PMO-
RALG 
35.  Councils  Performance  Assessment  Reports  for  the  FY  2007/08  and 
2008/09 
PMO-
RALG 
36.  LGAs Audited Accounts, FY 2005-2010  CAG 
37.  LGAs Revenues and Expenditures, FY 2005/06-2010/11  LGWG 
38.  LAAC Reports, FY 2007/08-2010/11  Parliament 
39.  Sector Budget Support in Practice in Tanzanian Local Governments, Nov 
2009 
ODI 
  Newspapers:   
40.  Editorial, The Guardian, 24
th February, 2010   
41.  Reporter, Daily News, 1
st April, 2011   
42.  Reporter, The Guardian, 21
st January, 2010   
43.  Editorial, The Guardian, 24
th March, 2011   
44.  Reporter, Daily News, 4
th June, 2012   
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